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Maritime disputes in the Western Pacific have increased tensions among East Asian 
states. This thesis uses three case studies to investigate two questions: first, whether 
China’s maritime claims and behavior align with international legal principles governing 
maritime disputes, and second, which IR framework best describes China’s behavior 
related to its maritime disputes. The first case study examined ten legal rulings on 
maritime sovereignty and concludes that courts view effective control as a determinative 
factor in settling maritime disputes. The second case study examined effective control in 
three of China’s maritime disputes. The analysis revealed Japan’s claim to the Senkaku 
Islands and China’s claim to the Paracel Islands are strong due to continued 
demonstrations of effective control. However, the Philippine claim to the Scarborough 
Shoal using effective control is valid but weak. The final case study showed how China 
attempts to effective control on its maritime claims using legal warfare. Based on the 
analysis of Chinese legal warfare, evidence shows two IR frameworks best describe 
China’s behavior related to its maritime claims. Legal warfare provides a façade for 
offensive realist behavior; whereas the English School of realism expects China to use 
legal warfare to conform to some norms while revising other norms.  
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I. INTRODUCTION: CHINA’S MARITIME CLAIMS AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since 2009, maritime disputes in the Western Pacific have increased tensions 
among Asian neighbors. At the center of these maritime disputes is the People’s Republic 
of China. China contests the Senkaku Islands with Japan, the Paracel Islands with 
Vietnam, Huangyan Island (commonly referred to as Scarborough Shoal) with the 
Philippines, and the Spratly Islands with Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and 
Taiwan. These territorial disputes brew nationalism, create diplomatic tension, and can 
incite more armed conflict. Can China’s maritime territorial disputes reveal its intent to 
rise as a revisionist or status quo power?  
This thesis will investigate whether China’s claims and behavior align with 
international legal principles governing maritime disputes. The central research questions 
are the following: Do China’s maritime claims and behavior regarding the Senkaku 
Islands, Paracel Islands, and Scarborough Shoal have a sound basis in contemporary 
international law? Are international legal principles likely to constrain China’s current 
and future behavior in these disputes? More generally, does China comply with 
international law and the peaceful settlement of disputes banning territorial conquest that 
have characterized the international order since 1945?  
In order to answer these questions, the thesis will examine the legal principles that 
appear to be decisive in contemporary maritime settlements that are applicable to the 
China cases, as well as the arguments made in the Chinese maritime disputes. Recent 
international maritime legal decisions are germane to these disputes, and may indicate 
whether China is likely to legally win its cause, and consequently, whether China will 
rely on peaceful legal remedies or more forceful means. The thesis will ultimately assess 
to what degree international law shapes China’s behavior in these maritime disputes.  
The thesis will use three case studies to show China’s behavior related to its 
maritime disputes conforms to two IR frameworks. The first case study will analyze ten 
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international court verdicts on maritime disputes. The case study will conclude effective 
control is the most determinative factor in deciding sovereignty for islands and rocks. The 
second case study will analyze demonstrations of effective control in three Chinese 
maritime disputes. Analysis will reveal Japan’s claim to the Senkaku Islands and China’s 
claim to the Paracel Islands is relatively strong due to clear demonstrations of effective 
control. However, analysis of the Scarborough Shoal dispute will argue the Philippines 
conducted weak but valid demonstrations of effective control. The third case study will 
analyze how China’s strategy of legal warfare attempts to exert effective control over its 
maritime disputes. China’s use of legal warfare provides evidence for which IR theory 
best describes its behavior related to PRC maritime disputes. The English School of 
Realism is the strongest IR framework that describes Chinese behavior because it 
conforms to some international norms and laws while attempting to revise the 
internationally accepted standard of how sovereignty is determined. Offensive realism is 
another IR framework that describes China’s behavior because it acts in an irredentist 
manner while using legal warfare to disguise the PRC’s true expansionist intent. 
Defensive realism and liberal institutionalism do not adequately explain Chinese behavior 
related to its maritime disputes.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
An analysis of international law pertaining to China’s maritime claims has 
become increasingly relevant as it grows more powerful. China’s maritime claims in the 
East and South China Seas have run afoul of its maritime neighbors. Japan currently 
controls the Senkaku Islands that China claims were part of Imperial China. Recent 
saber-rattling on both sides have escalated already strained relations and could draw the 
United States into a conflict through the United States-Japanese security alliance, or 
through destabilization of the region.1  
                                                 
1 Reinhard Drifte, “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Territorial Dispute Between Japan and China: 
Between the Materialization of the ‘China Threat’ and Japan ‘Reversing the Outcome of World War II’?” 
UNISCI Discussion Papers 32 (May 2013): 9–60, (hereafter cited as “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
Territorial Dispute”); Mira Rapp-Hooper, “The Battle for the Senkakus Moves to the Skies,” The Diplomat, 
November 12, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/the-battle-for-the-senkakus-moves-to-the-skies/. 
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The Philippines dispute China’s claim to Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly 
Islands. Since 2012, Chinese law enforcement vessels prohibited Philippine fishermen 
from fishing around Scarborough Shoal, even though the shoal is within the Philippines’ 
200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Despite the withdrawal of the 
Philippines naval vessel, Gregorio del Pilar, Chinese law enforcement vessels remain on 
patrol by the shoal. Similar to the Senkaku case, a conflict between China and the 
Philippines could potentially draw the United States into a war against China. Based on 
China’s encroachment into Scarborough Shoal, the Philippines submitted the maritime 
dispute to arbitration in 2013. A verdict in favor of the Philippines could inspire other 
claimant states to pursue legal remedies as well.2  
Vietnam disputes China’s claim to the Paracel and Spratly Islands. In 1988, 
China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) gunned down 60 Vietnamese soldiers 
who were planting a flag on Johnson Reef, Spratly Islands. Since 1999, Vietnam has 
protested an annual Chinese fishing ban within both countries’ disputed exclusive 
economic zone. The recent exploratory drilling of the Chinese oil rig HD-981 within 
Vietnam’s claimed EEZ sparked a low intensity military conflict that later ignited violent 
anti-Chinese demonstrations in Vietnam. It is apparent the East and South China Seas 
have become a flashpoint in Asia.3  
China has a multitude of reasons to defend its claims. First, an international court 
may interpret China’s inaction as acquiescence. China cannot yield to foreign incursions 
as claimant states could use the PRC’s failure to act as a demonstration of acquiescence 
in an international court and rule in the claimant’s favor. Second, defending Chinese 
sovereign territory is a vital national interest. In China’s White Paper on Peaceful 
                                                 
2 Renato Cruz De Castro, China’s Realpolitik Approach in the South China Sea Dispute: The Case of 
the 2012 Scarborough Shoal Standoff, Managing Tensions in the South China Sea (Washington, DC: 
Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2013), 
http://csis.org/files/attachments/130606_DeCastro_ConferencePaper.pdf, (hereafter cited as China’s 
Realpolitik Approach in the SCS); Jeff Himmelman, “A Game of Shark and Minnow,” The New York Times 
Magazine, October 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2013/10/27/south-china-sea/; Luke 
Hunt, “China’s Un-Neighborly Fishing Ban,” The Diplomat, May 19, 2012, 
http://thediplomat.com/2012/05/chinas-un-neighborly-fishing-ban/, (hereafter cited as “Fishing Ban”). 
3 Hiep, Le Hong, “Vietnam’s Domestic-Foreign Policy Nexus: Doi Moi, Foreign Policy Reform, and 
Sino-Vietnamese Normalization,” Asian Politics and Policy 5, no. 3 (2013): 398; Hunt, “Fishing Ban.”  
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Development, core interests include “state sovereignty” and “territorial integrity.”4 China 
must uphold the precedent of defending what it perceives as national territory. Failure to 
defend what China perceives as national territory inspires maritime claimants to take 
more territory. Additionally, separatists in Xinjiang, Tibet, or Taiwan could declare 
independence if China did not defend its borders. Maintaining Chinese territorial integrity 
is not only a core interest, but vital for regime legitimacy. If the Chinese Communist 
Party is incapable of defending a core interest, the regime may find itself combating civil 
unrest to maintain its own survival. Third, defense of Chinese economic growth is a vital 
national interest. The exclusive economic zone attached to the maritime claims entitles 
China to food, mineral, and energy resources for its economy. Finally, nationalism affects 
the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) legitimacy. Failure to defend maritime claims 
(particularly against Japan) would cast the CCP in a vulnerable and weak light. Therefore 
China perceives the maritime territorial disputes as vital national interests, a failure to 
defend these national interests would negatively affect the CCP’s legitimacy.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In answering the research questions, this thesis will examine the relationship 
between China and international law. China’s adherence (or enmity) to international law 
can provide indicators as to whether its rise will be as a peaceful or expansionist power. 
First, it will review the relevance of international law in IR theory. Second, it will analyze 
China’s behavior in the context of IR theories. This section will use realism, the English 
School of Realism, and liberalism, as a framework to discuss China’s behavior.  
1. International Law and International Relations Theory 
There is a debate within international relations theory as to whether international 
law has any effect on the way states, including China, behave. Some international 
relations scholars, like realists, argue international law is irrelevant. Other IR scholars, 
like liberals, claim that international law constrains the behavior of states. This section 
                                                 
4 People’s Republic of China, “White Paper: China’s Peaceful Development” (Information Office of 
the State Council, September 2011), http://english.gov.cn/official/2011-09/06/content_1941354.htm. 
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will summarize three schools of international relations theory and their views on 
international law.  
Realists, such as Hans Morgenthau, dismiss the role of international law, arguing 
that the underlying influence in international relations is the lack of central authority; in 
such a situation of anarchy, power is what drives states, as it alone can ensure their 
survival and security. Reliance on international law to maintain peace and stability is 
idealistic because it ignores the reality of power. Determined states will ignore the 
constraints of international law and act to promote their narrow self-interest. Richard 
Steinberg summarizes this view as, “the strong do what they may, and the weak do what 
they must.”5 For example, Stalin and the Soviet Union placed great faith in the Molotov- 
Ribbentrop Pact of 1939. In 1941, the Soviet Union paid dearly for Stalin’s faith in this 
agreement as the Soviets gave ground to the Nazi blitzkrieg advance. Realists like 
Stephen Krasner further argue international law was an “epiphenomenon” of power, as it 
is a tool used by powerful states against weaker states.6 Because the great powers create 
international institutions, those institutions do the bidding of the great powers.7 Major 
power, in this view, are expected to ignore or break international laws when they conflict 
with their immediate interests. 
Realists believe international law and institutions are propped up by powerful 
countries to control weaker countries. If power shifts away from the countries that 
promote international institutions, then those institutions should disappear. This view was 
undercut when, even as power diffused from stronger countries to weaker countries, the 
institutions that the powerful had created remained. As power shifted over time from the 
post-war years to the 1980s, the United States increasingly shared power with European 
states in organizations like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the 
                                                 
5 Richard H. Steinberg and Jonathan M. Zasloff, “Power and International Law,” The American 
Journal of International Law 100, no. 1 (January 2006): 73 (hereafter cited as “Power and International 
Law”). 
6 Ibid., 74–75. 
7 Ibid., 72–76; Christian Reus-Smit, “The Politics of International Law,” in The Politics of 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 16–17 (hereafter cited as “The Politics 
of International Law”).   
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International Monetary Fund.8 Realism, therefore, fails to explain even a modest 
adherence of major powers to international law and customary norms.  
In contrast, Hedley Bull and the English School of realism bring together some of 
the insights of classical realism and liberalism. They argue that, despite the anarchy of 
international relations, an international society emerges among states with common rules, 
beliefs, and interests. Bull cites the work of Hugo Grotius in arguing that, “States are not 
engaged in simple struggle, like gladiators in an arena, but are limited in their conflicts 
with one another by common rules and institutions.”9 Although power is influential, it 
fails to predict a state’s behavior.  
Bull argues that states adhere to three types of norms that uphold the international 
order. First, because states have common goal in insuring that only states can act at the 
international level, they form a “society of states,” with the purpose of preventing one 
state from eradicating other states from the system. This contrasts with the constant world 
of warfare among states described by Thomas Hobbes. Second, within the “society of 
states,” rules for coexistence keep states acting together in support of the society. These 
rules establish how states interact with each other and consist of the respect for state 
sovereignty, the principle that promises should be kept, and the idea violence should be 
limited.10 The first rule of coexistence consists of the idea that each state has the right to 
own and govern particular pieces of territory. This basic rule of the existence of 
sovereign property rights underpins international stability, according to the English 
School. The second rule of coexistence is the idea that states can enter into agreements 
with each other with the expectation that their promises will be kept and reciprocated. 
The third rule restricts the use of warfare to moments that are justified. Finally, states 
develop complex rules designed to foster and regulate cooperation within the “society of 
states.” These rules pursue secondary goals like social welfare or economic gain.11 States 
                                                 
8 Steinberg and Zasloff, “Power and International Law,” 79. 
9 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 2nd ed. (London: 
Macmillan, 1977), 25, (hereafter cited as The Anarchical Society). 
10 Ibid., 40. 
11 Ibid., 64–67. 
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uphold the rules of society through the institutions of international law, diplomacy, the 
balance of power, and when necessary, war. 
Although the “society of states” is held together with rules and norms, individual 
states can attempt to alter those rules and norms. Because of the anarchic international 
system, no global authority enforces rules and norms upon states. Therefore, the states 
themselves must legitimize and enforce rules. Rule legitimization and enforcement occur 
through international institutions like the United Nations or World Trade Organization. 
States, in a demonstration of self-help, can attempt to change the rules from within the 
“society of states.”12 “States change the old rules by violating or ignoring them 
systematically enough to demonstrate that they have withdrawn their consent to them.”13 
However, violation of the basic rules of coexistence, in particular territorial sovereignty, 
are unlikely to be accepted, as changing them undermines the existence of the society of 
states as a whole. Violation of property rights is likely to lead to an armed response from 
a coalition of states acting against the transgressor, as was the case in the 1991 war 
against Iraq to restore Kuwaiti sovereignty. 
The liberal tradition of international relations theory shares with the English 
School of realism an acceptance of the self-interested origins and maintenance of 
international law. It downplays the English School’s emphasis on the role of mutual 
interest in a society of states as the galvanizing rationale for international institutions. 
Robert Keohane, one of the founders of neoliberalism, argues that the pessimistic realist 
view on institutions (including international law) is incorrect. Keohane finds that repeated 
self-interested interaction among states yields cooperation to create and uphold 
international institutions, including international laws. These institutions allow for 
information sharing, transparency, wider bases for cooperation, and reduced uncertainty 
with respect to intentions.14 Liberals argue the existence of institutions promotes 
international stability and provides an incentive to conform to established norms and laws 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 69–71. 
13 Ibid., 70. 
14 Ibid., 79. It should be noted that although Keohane avoids specifically mentioning international law 
as an institution it is inherently implied. 
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for the benefit of mutual long-term absolute economic and security gains. In addition  
to absolute gains, states will conform to rules and norms, like international law, because 
of their expectation of reciprocity.15 In contrast to the realist view, neoliberals argue  
that both powerful and weak states have incentives to abide by international law even 
when the laws may conflict with their short-term interests, so long as they expect their 
long-term benefits from conforming to the law outweigh their short-term gains from 
violating it.  
In summary, hypotheses on the effect of international law on international 
relations vary widely from realism, the English School of Realism, and liberalism. 
Realism dismisses the effect of international law, as powerful states will do what they 
will regardless of the constraints imposed by liberal institutions. The English School of 
Realism builds a case that a “society of states” with common norms and values exist. 
This society creates an environment for common norms, like international law, to be 
successful. Due to anarchy, states reserve the right to conform, change, or defect from 
established international norms; however, they are least likely to challenge the basic rules 
of coexistence, including respect for sovereignty and limitation of violence. Liberalism 
argues cooperation is possible through repeated self-interested interaction and 
institutions. International law is an institution that constrains behavior in favor of 
international stability and reciprocity. With this baseline understanding of how 
international law effects international relations, the discussion will turn to how IR 
theorists view China’s rise.  
2. China’s Rise in International Relations Theory 
As China rises, international relations scholars debate whether it does so 
peacefully or belligerently. China’s adherence and respect for international law is an 
indicator as to the nature of a peaceful rise. Conversely, China’s ambivalence toward 
international law could indicate an expansionist inclination. Before discussing China’s 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 79–82; Aaron Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?,” 
International Security 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 13–14, (hereafter cited as “Future of U.S.-China Relations”); 
Reus-Smit, “The Politics of International Law,” 18–20. 
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relationship with international law, it is relevant to discuss the general nature of China’s 
rise in the IR literature.  
3. Realism 
There are many flavors of realist theories; this section will examine defensive 
realism, offensive realism, and the English School of Realism.  
a. Defensive Realism 
Among realists, defensive realists suggest China can rise peacefully if it conveys 
its defensive intent to neighboring states and major powers. Defensive realism argues that 
security, not power, is the primary pursuit of states in an anarchical system. States 
accumulate security through militarization or by bandwagoning with strong states. States 
also act conservatively to prevent a misinterpretation of intent. States attempt to avoid 
inadvertent security competition or counterbalancing against itself by rival states. 
Theodore Roosevelt’s saying, “Speak softly but carry a big stick,” is a simplistic 
embodiment of defensive realism.16  
While rising, China’s military modernization should avoid initiating a security 
dilemma among its neighbors, in the defensive realist view. China can build a strong 
military, centering on defense, to deter aggression and defend territorial sovereignty.17 
Such a defensive buildup might be evident in China’s strong navy built around a weak 
underway-replenishment capability.18 Similarly, China’s air force is modernizing with 
limited aerial refueling capability.19 Additionally, China lacks strategically located 
logistical bases throughout the region or around the world. All three examples imply the 
People’s Liberation Army intends to operate close to home as opposed to project power 
far from its shores. The Chinese defensive realist reserves the capability to defend against 
                                                 
16 Theodore Roosevelt, “Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Sprague,” January 26, 1900, 
Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/trm139.html. 
17 David Shambaugh, “Coping with a Conflicted China,” Washington Quarterly (Winter 2011): 12, 
(hereafter cited as “Conflicted China”).    
18 Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy in the Twenty-First Century, Second 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 72–76, 95, 107–108. 
19 Ibid., 109, 154. 
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aggression by the United States in the form of nuclear weapons, DF-21D anti-ship 
ballistic missiles, and anti-satellite missile capability.20  
In the context of the Senkaku Islands, Paracel Islands, and Scarborough Shoal, a 
defensive realist argument would identify the islands as a vital national interest tied to the 
survival of the country. The islands are strategically important and valuable in natural 
resources. Strategically, the disputed maritime claims represent a defensive perimeter or a 
naval buffer. The islands are geographically located between U.S. security allies, close to 
the Strait of Malacca, and located along the major sea line of communication connecting 
Chinese ports to Europe and the Middle East. Therefore, the islands represent a defensive 
perimeter worthy of protection, that also happens to have historic meaning to China. 
Concurrently, China’s behavior must prevent aggravating its maritime neighbors so they 
do not engage in counter balancing or security dilemmas.  
b. Offensive Realism 
IR theorists like John Mearshimer counter the defensive realist argument in three 
ways. First, despite government declarations on China’s peaceful rise (as seen in the 
statements of peaceful rise above), Mearsheimer suggests that states can never truly know 
about another state’s intentions. Therefore states can never confidently know that a 
state’s intentions are purely defensive. Second, as a country builds up its military under 
the auspices of defense, these weapon systems can be used for both offense and defense. 
An aircraft carrier, such as the newly launched Liaoning, can be used for both defense (to 
defend maritime sovereignty) and offensive power projection (similar to U.S. 
employment of aircraft carriers). A stealth fighter like the J-20 can be used for air 
defense, or offensive strikes similar to U.S. employment of the B-2 bomber.21 Third, 
China’s historical, non-aggressive behavior toward its neighbors is not a reliable indicator 
                                                 
20 Amy Chang, Indigenous Weapons Development in China’s Military Modernization, U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Project (U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission, April 5, 2012), 14–20. 
21 John J. Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to U.S. Power in Asia,” The 
Chinese Journal of International Politics 3 (2010): 387–390, (hereafter cited as “The Gathering Storm”); 
Johnston, Alastair Iain, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003): 25–
26. 
 11
to China’s future behavior. Foreign and domestic conditions can force a country to react 
to a situation differently than it has in the past. Because a state cannot truly know another 
state’s intentions, states are forced to assume the worst, leading to a security dilemma.  
Inevitably, states cannot be secure unless other states are insecure.22 
An offensive realist may view China’s actions vis-à-vis the maritime disputes as 
expansionist. Yet, Mearshimer argues an alternative point by contending that states are 
most likely to expand their power relative to another state when they already have a 
power advantage over it. Until the balance of power shifts in its favor, states must 
accumulate power.23 For example, China’s military modernization provided the People’s 
Liberation Army with state-of-the-art ships and aircraft. These weapons gave China a 
clear military power advantage over weaker militaries from Vietnam and the Philippines. 
This modernized capability also deters the United States and Japan from attacking China. 
China utilizes its maritime superiority and economic power to bully Vietnam and the 
Philippines. Evidence of China’s use of maritime power is demonstrated by increased 
Chinese naval patrols in the vicinity of the Paracel Islands and Scarborough Shoal. The 
overwhelming Chinese naval superiority deterred Vietnam and the Philippines from 
escalating maritime disputes into military conflict. Chinese economic power was used to 
sanction Philippine assertiveness in the vicinity of the Scarborough Shoal when 1,200 
containers of fruit were held in quarantine at various Chinese ports. The sanctions hurt 
the Philippines, which exports 30% of its bananas to China.24 China’s economic power 
also deterred Vietnamese military escalation. Vietnam’s trade deficit with China was 
between $17.4 billion and $23.4 billion and Vietnam could not afford Chinese economic 
isolation.25  
                                                 
22 Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm,” 382–384. 
23 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, Inc., 2014), 360–383. 
24 Shambaugh, “Conflicted China,” 12–13; Bonnie S. Glaser, “China’s Coercive Economic 
Diplomacy,” The Diplomat, July 25, 2012, http://thediplomat.com/2012/07/chinas-coercive-economic-
diplomacy/; Cruz De Castro, China’s Realpolitik Approach in the SCS. 
25 Asia Briefing, “Vietnam Addresses Trade Deficit with China,” Asia Briefing, August 6, 2013, 
http://www.asiabriefing.com/news/2013/08/vietnam-addresses-trade-deficit-with-china/; Xinhua, “China 
Remains Vietnam’s Biggest Trade Partner in 2013,” China Daily, January 29, 2014, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/chinadata/2014-01/29/content_17264283.htm. 
 12
In both offensive and defensive realism, even if China pursues a defensive arms 
buildup, strategic misinterpretation can lead to security competition or armed conflict.26 
What may actually be defensive behavior is perceived as expansionist. Neither branch of 
realism expects international legal norms or institutions to prevent or constrain Chinese 
behavior. The basic premise for both schools is that states will act in accordance with 
institutions (like international law) when it suits them. Realists are fundamentally 
motivated to use power for self-help. If an institution’s goals conform to the state’s self-
help objectives, the state will support institutionalized behavior. However, if an 
institution and a state’s self-help goals are in conflict, the realists will opt out of 
institutionalized behavior.  
4. English School of Realism 
In contrast to the American-dominated schools of offensive and defensive 
realism, the English School of realism argues that states, while pursuing their power and 
security interests, share common goals of ensuring the continuing existence of states as 
the dominant actors in world politics. In order to prevent the emergence of an actor 
powerful enough to eradicate all states and form a sort of global empire, states will 
cooperate to a limited extent in creating a basic set of international rules and institutions 
to preserve the state system. These rules include adherence to the principle of the balance 
of power (to prevent hegemony) as well as international laws regarding sovereignty and 
territorial integrity that prevent the eradication of a state from the international system, 
among others. As such, English School realists view the international system as a society 
of states.27  
Barry Buzan argues that China participates in some aspects of contemporary 
international society, yet in other aspects it does not. He suggests that China is a rule 
abider in three ways. First, China had to adopt norms and practices in order to participate 
in the globalized economy. It must abide by norms set forth in international economic 
organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO). Second, China subscribes to 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 384–385. 
27 Bull, The Anarchical Society. 
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standards of international society. For example, China holds conservative views of 
sovereignty and non-intervention as evident in its Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 
and reluctance to interfere in other states internal matters. Third, China makes 
contributions to UN peacekeeping and non-proliferation. The People’s Liberation Army 
provides more forces to UN peacekeeping operations than the United States or United 
Kingdom combined.28 It has signed international agreements like the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention.29 
However, according to Buzan, China is outside the norm of international society 
in three ways. First, China is a non-democracy in a “Western dominated political 
order.”30 Second, China votes in the UN Security Council to defend its domestic self-
interests (more on this below under liberal institutionalism). Third, China’s Sino-centric 
historic waters view of its maritime disputes comes into conflict with Westphalian norms. 
As will be discussed in later chapters, although China is a signatory of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), its adherence to the Qing era, Sino-centric 
paradigm of legal rights leads China to argue that customary international law justifies its 
claim to maritime disputes in East Asia. In this paradigm, China was the dominant power 
in East Asia and other barbaric kingdoms throughout the region recognized this power 
and paid tribute to the Middle Kingdom. Therefore the Sino-centric norm pre-dated 
UNCLOS by hundreds of years and, in the Chinese view, remains relevant today. This 
will be explained in greater detail in Chapter III.  
In the end, Buzan concludes China can either adhere to international norms or 
rewrite the norms, but it is up to China. Based on observed Chinese behavior, Buzan 
classifies China as a reformist revisionist, which he defines as, “accepting some of the 
institutions of international society for a mixture of calculated and instrumental reasons. 
                                                 
28 United Nations, “UN Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors,” United Nations, June 2014, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml. 
29 Barry Buzan, “China in International Society: Is ‘Peaceful Rise’ Possible?” The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics 3 (2010): 9-16, (hereafter cited as “China in International Society”).   
30 Ibid., 14. 
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But it resists and wants to reform, others, and possibly also wants to change its status.”31 
Therefore, China conforms to or disregards international societal rules when it sees fit.32  
Realisms of all stripes lacks clarity concerning China’s expansionist behavior or 
its compliance with international law, with the English School being the most optimistic, 
and offensive realism being most pessimistic. In contrast, liberals argue that all states 
have interests in creating and upholding international laws and institutions, as these 
provide mutual, long-term benefits that out-weigh short term costs of noncompliance.  
5. Liberalism 
From an optimistic liberal perspective China can rise peacefully. In liberalism, 
domestic factors shape foreign policy actions. Richard Rosecrance offers an optimistic 
liberal point of view stating China will rise peacefully because economic growth is more 
important than conflict. There is no longer a requirement to take resources by conquest. 
Through globalization, countries can obtain resources through trade. Furthermore, 
globalization provides an incentive for countries to act within norms. Due to the 
interdependent nature of the globalized economy, conflict would cripple China’s 
economic growth. Economic powers (including the United States and Japan) would trade 
elsewhere, pricing China’s potential loss of trade in the trillions of dollars. China would 
lose foreign direct investment from economic powers like the United States, Japan, the 
European Union, and even Taiwan. Therefore, conflict would disrupt the economic 
growth that China has sustained since the 1980s (See Table 1). Inability to sustain 
economic growth could delegitimize the regime, negatively affecting the Chinese 
Communist Party’s mandate to rule. Additionally, China could stand to lose from 
punitive sanctions levied by economic powers to punish or dissuade aggressive Chinese 
behavior. Similar to the sanctions levied by the United States and European Union 
against Russia in 2014, China could be subject to the same economic treatment if it 
engaged in conflict.33  
                                                 
31 Ibid., 18. 
32 Ibid., 7. 
33 Richard Rosecrance, “Power and International Relations: The Rise of China and Its Effects,” 
International Studies Perspectives 7 (2006): 32–35. 
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Table 1.   Top 10 Trading Partners with Mainland China (in billion dollars)34 
1. United States $521 6. Germany $161.56 
2. Hong Kong $401 7. Australia $136.37 
3. Japan $312.55 8. Malaysia $106.07 
4. South Korea $274.24 9. Brazil $90.27 
5. Taiwan $197.28 10. Russia $89.21 
 
From a liberal institutionalist perspective, China participates in a multitude of 
liberal international governmental organizations. These organizations promote 
cooperation among states, and constrain China’s behavior so it can continue to participate 
in and profit from these organizations. Justin S. Hempson-Jones argues China joins three 
specific categories of liberal institutions. First, China extensively participates in liberal 
economic institutions like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and World 
Trade Organization. These international governmental organizations are the most 
important and high profile economic institutions. In order to join these organizations, 
China had to voluntarily give up some of its sovereignty as preconditions for 
membership. For example, China had to agree to currency devaluation, trade restrictions, 
domestic privatization, and internal regulatory reform. The loss of sovereignty still has 
afforded China absolute gains, since it was able to participate in the globalized economy 
and fuel its sustained growth. One proponent of liberal economic institutions argues that 
this practice taught the PRC to shift its mindset, “from rule of man to rule of law” 
teaching the population a “culture of law.”35  
Second, China participates in international political institutions. As mentioned 
above under the English School, China is a major stakeholder in the UN as a permanent 
member of the Security Council and participant in peacekeeping operations. Over time, 
China’s attitude toward the UN changed from initially dismissing it as a tool for 
                                                 
34 China Daily, “Top 10 Trading Partners of the Chinese Mainland,” China Daily, February 19, 2014, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2014-02/19/content_17290565.htm. 
35 Justin S. Hempson-Jones, “The Evolution of China’s Engagement with International Governmental 
Organizations: Toward a Liberal Foreign Policy?” Asian Survey 45, no. 5 (October 2005): 708–709, 
(hereafter cited as “Evolution of China’s Engagement with IGOs”).     ; Richard H. Holton and Xia Yuan 
Lin, “China and the World Trade Organization: Can the Assimilation Problems Be Overcome?” Asian 
Survey 38, no. 8 (August 1998): 746; from Hempson-Jones, “Evolution of China’s Engagement with 
IGOs,” 710. 
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imperialist powers to a valid institution for dispute resolution and mitigation. Former 
PRC Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian said:  
In the past 40 years the United Nations has followed a tortuous path and 
made some erroneous decisions. But on the whole, we should affirm its 
effective efforts to maintain peace, prevent and ease conflicts, accelerate 
decolonization, and promote international cooperation.36   
Yet some UN actions, particularly humanitarian intervention, contradict the 
PRC’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Therefore China began supporting 
selected UNSC votes that contradicted the Five Principles, rather than blocking UN 
actions with a veto (for example China voted in support of the 1992 and 1993 UNSC 
resolutions authorizing the humanitarian intervention in Somalia or the 1994 
humanitarian intervention into Haiti).37 With that said, China vetoes other UNSC 
measures that pressured an ally or strategic partner (for example the PRC voted against 
the 2007 UNSC condemnation of human rights abuses in Myanmar because it has a long 
standing relationship with China). China also votes against UNSC agendas that can be 
used as precedence against its authoritarian control of its people (for example the 2014 
UNSC condemnation of human rights abuses in Syria).38 
Finally, China participates in security institutions like the ASEAN Regional 
Forum. Although China is a non-charter member of ASEAN, it acts as a highly 
influential observer. China participates in this organization and conducts multilateral 
negotiation despite its preference to bilateral negotiation. Critics argue the ASEAN 
Regional Forum makes declarations (particularly on behavior in the South China Sea), 
yet has no enforcement or sanctioning mechanisms to reign in PRC behavior.39  
Hempson-Jones concludes that China fully participates in economic institutions 
but marginally participates in political and security institutions. The loss of economic 
                                                 
36 Wu Xueqian from Hempson-Jones, “Evolution of China’s Engagement with IGOs,” 712. 
37 Jonathan E. Davis, “From Ideology to Pragmatism: China’s Position on Humanitarian Intervention 
in the Post-Cold War Era,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 44, no. 2 (March 2011): 230–235. 
38 United Nations, “UN Research Guides and Resources: Security Council—Veto List,” Dag 
Hammarskjold Library, United Nations, accessed September 1, 2014, 
http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact_veto_en.shtml; Buzan, “China in International Society,” 15. 
39 Hempson-Jones, “Evolution of China’s Engagement with IGOs,” 718–719. 
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sovereignty is more tolerable than a loss in the political and security realm. Despite some 
controversial UNSC vetoes, China constrains its behavior to conform toward 
international institutions for diplomatic leverage and gain. This restrained behavior 
promotes cooperation among states participating in international institutions thereby 
reducing armed conflict through diplomatic dispute resolution.  
Examining Chinese behavior related to maritime territories and international law 
reveals conduct both inside and outside legal norms. Although China refuses to 
participate in UNCLOS-sanctioned arbitration (as observed in the 2013 South China Sea 
arbitration with the Philippines), it does promise to adhere to international law when 
settling maritime disputes. China’s behavior around the disputed maritime territories 
could devolve into war, yet it has not. In the case of China’s East and South China Sea 
patrols, the ships happen to be maritime law enforcement vessels as opposed to naval 
combat ships. The employment of these maritime law enforcement vessels sends a 
geopolitical signal to prevent escalation and support China’s law-based claim.40  
Despite the optimism of liberal theories based on economics and institutions, not 
all liberal theories are optimistic. Aaron Friedberg argues one liberal pessimist theory 
explains China is susceptible to conflict. As an insecure authoritarian regime, China may 
engage in conflict because of “dubious legitimacy with an uncertain grip on power.”41 
For example, if China’s economy faltered, domestic unrest may ensue. In order to 
preserve its legitimacy and distract the populace, the Chinese Communist Party might 
incite nationalism to support a conflict. The ensuing conflict would deflect antagonistic 
sentiment from the regime toward a perceived existential threat. This pessimistic liberal 
theory could potentially steer China on a course toward conflict over disputed islands.42  
                                                 
40 United Nations, “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” United Nations, December 
10, 1982, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm, 
(hereafter cited as “UNCLOS”).   
41 Friedberg, “Future of U.S.-China Relations,” 29. 
42 Ibid., 29–31. 
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6. Conclusion 
To sum up, despite declaring peaceful and benevolent intentions, China’s 
behavior toward its maritime disputes can reveal its intention to rise peacefully or 
belligerently. IR theories like offensive and defensive realism, the English School of 
realism, and liberalism explain Chinese actions in the East and South China Seas in 
analytic frameworks. A defensive realist argument can be made if China maintains a low 
profile and its actions do not inspire counterbalancing and security dilemmas among its 
maritime neighbors. An offensive realist argument can be made if China’s actions are 
power maximizing. The offensive realists would expect China to use power to forcibly 
take the islands from less powerful countries in an irredentist land grab. Within the 
English School of realism, China selectively picks and chooses which international 
societal norms and rules to follow based on its strategic interests. Barry Buzan defined 
this behavior as reformist revisionist because China adheres to some laws and norms yet 
attempts to revise other laws and norms. China refuses UNCLOS arbitration and prefers 
to settle territorial disputes through bilateral negotiation where it can use economic 
strength, political power, and military intimidation (actions short of war) against a state. 
This power play can be seen as belligerent and expansionist for the region, or as a 
defensive strategy to maintain its security, or as picking and choosing among the two. 
Among liberal institutionalists, China participates in international governmental 
organizations institutions like the WTO and UN. China’s participation in these 
organizations constrains its behavior allowing it to rise peacefully.  
No single theory can elucidate every occurrence in geopolitics. Analysis of 
international law in maritime disputes can help provide an answer to identify which IR 
theory best explains China’s behavior. If China completely ignores the role of 
international law by acting belligerently, then its behavior conforms to offensive realism. 
However, if China diligently builds a legal case for its actions, then perhaps it subscribes 
to a liberal institutionalist point of view and is truly rising peacefully. Perhaps it largely 
plays by the rules, as the English School suggests, and only seeks revision of the margins. 
This thesis intends to shed light on these questions.  
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D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
In maritime disputes as controversial as the Senkaku Islands, the Paracel Islands, 
and the Scarborough Shoal, multiple points of view support and contradict China’s claim. 
Scholars who defend China’s claims in international law use history to justify their 
arguments. In looking at China’s legal cases over the disputed islands, the question that 
needs to be asked is if the structure of the legal system constrains and shapes China’s 
behavior to act the way it does. The IR literature suggests three possible answers: 1) 
China’s behavior is not constrained by law, but by power and security dynamics. It will 
therefore ignore international law when it conflicts with enhancing Chinese power or 
security, and it will use all means, up to and including limited or all-out war, to achieve 
them. (It will conveniently side with international law when it is advantageous to do so 
when the outcome of international law aligns with national objectives);43 2) China’s 
behavior is constrained by international law. It will therefore seek to abide by the rules of 
UNCLOS but peacefully attempts to use those rules and norms to its advantage.44 3) A 
middle ground where China is constrained by some aspects of international laws and 
norms but also selectively redefines norms to suit its self-interests, peacefully and 
through the use of force, short of limited war.45   
This thesis will examine four hypotheses for Chinese behavior. The first 
hypothesis this thesis will examine is that contemporary international law (such as 
UNCLOS and court verdicts) constrains and shapes China’s behavior in the East and 
South China Seas and leads to low intensity conflict (conflict short of limited war). If 
true, such an argument would strengthen the case for those who suggest China is 
constrained by international law and norms. By demonstrating behavior constrained by 
international law, evidence would support proponents of liberal institutionalism, giving 
credence for a peaceful rise. In this optimistic hypothesis China builds a compelling legal 
                                                 
43 Shambaugh, “Conflicted China,” 12; Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm,” 382–385. 
44 Hempson-Jones, “Evolution of China’s Engagement with IGOs,” 710–719; Friedberg, “Future of 
U.S.-China Relations,” 12–14. 
45 Barry Buzan, “China in International Society:  Is ‘Peaceful Rise’ Possible?” The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics 3 (2010): 9–16; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society:  A Study of Order in World 
Politics, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1977), 65–70. 
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case to defend its claim to disputed territories (within legally accepted norms). It then 
utilizes diplomacy and dispute resolution institutions set forth by the United Nations to 
resolve maritime disputes through mediation or arbitration.  
However, if evidence shows that international law disadvantages China, it should 
reject international law, in line with realist predictions. This pessimistic hypothesis would 
initially appear as militarized saber-rattling evolving into militarized conflict in the East 
and South China Seas to seize disputed maritime claims. The militarized conflict could 
lead to war between China, its neighbors, and potentially the United States. Realism 
offers two alternative explanations of why China acts as it does towards the islands.   
The first alternative realist explanation and second thesis hypothesis asserts China 
is an irredentist nation that uses force to compel weaker countries to yield to China’s 
desires. Contesting the islands is a challenge to regional countries’ resolve. In this 
offensive realist hypothesis, China is expected to use hard power to expand its vital 
national interests, to include expanding territorially in the region, when it is advantageous 
to do so. The use of power, in its extreme form, could be full-fledged military conflict. In 
this situation, China should ignore international law that attempts to constrain its 
acquisition of power resources.  
The second alternative realist explanation and third thesis hypothesis contends 
that China acts passively, avoiding actions leading to strategic miscalculation, security 
dilemmas, and balancing against itself. China reserves the right to defend its perceived 
sovereign territory with anything, including full-fledged military conflict. However, it 
must do so as a state defending its interests as opposed to a state expanding its territory. 
China must demonstrate a defensive intent as opposed to an irredentist one.  As with 
offensive realism, China should ignore international law if and when it seeks to prevent 
China from securing its vital national interests. 
A middle ground, where Chinese behavior is constrained by international law in 
some cases, especially those that threaten the fundamental institutions of international 
society, would lend credence to the English School. This fourth hypothesis would show 
China adheres to some of rules described in the English School but opts out or redefines 
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its adherence to other rules. For example, China would respect the rules for coexistence 
but attempt to rewrite its definition of how sovereignty is determined in maritime 
disputes. China would demonstrate respect for sovereignty by avoiding war on claimed 
islands occupied by a foreign nation. However, China would also attempt to rewrite the 
norms on how maritime sovereignty is determined by using a Sino-centric historic waters 
argument backed up by maritime law enforcement.  
This thesis will demonstrate that International Court of Justice (ICJ) and 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) maritime dispute precedents are weighted toward 
the demonstration of the legal principle known as effective control. International courts 
resolve sovereignty cases based on many legal arguments, including treaty law, effective 
control, geography, history, and uti possidetis. However research suggests that effective 
control, or the demonstration of a state’s sovereignty over a territory, is the most 
compelling argument that courts use to decide maritime territorial disputes. In order to 
strengthen its legal case, China repeatedly demonstrates effective control across disputed 
maritime claims through a strategy known as legal warfare.  
Demonstrations of effective control include the use of maritime law enforcement 
vessels to administer sovereignty in perceived territorial waters (i.e., fishing bans), or the 
construction of public works on the islands. These demonstrations appear self-serving as 
arguable misinterpretations of UNCLOS.46 Yet China does not outright invade (or 
defend) its claims using militarized violence. Instead, China walks a narrow line by 
following a strategy of legal warfare to enforce effective control over what it perceives as 
its sovereign territory. This thesis will evaluate China’s behavior in these maritime 
disputes in light of the hypotheses proposed to determine which one best explains 
China’s actions.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research will draw from scholarly articles written about ICJ and PCA cases, 
court documents related to the island disputes themselves, scholarly articles regarding 
                                                 
46 Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, “China’s Island Factory,” BBC News, September 9, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/special/2014/newsspec_8701/index.html. 
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Chinese foreign policy, as well as official government statements made by the claimant 
countries. The three maritime disputes were chosen because of minor variation in each of 
the three cases. The disputes required China and one other country to be the claimants. 
(The Spratly Islands did not meet these criteria because the island group is claimed by six 
parties [China, Taiwan, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam].) The Senkaku 
Islands were chosen because this is a case where China does not maintain de facto 
control, Japan is a security ally with the United States, it possesses a comparable naval to 
balance against China, and the islands are outside of the Nine Dash Line. The Paracel 
Islands were chosen because China maintains de facto control, Vietnam does not fall 
under any treaty protection of the United States, its navy is weaker than the PLAN, and 
the disputed islands reside within the Nine Dash Line. The Scarborough Shoal was 
chosen because China maintains de facto control over the shoal, the Philippines are a 
security ally of the United States, the Philippine Navy is incapable of countering the 
Chinese Navy, and it resides within China’s Nine Dash Line. The shoal (like many 
formations in the Spratly Island Chain) is not considered an island by UNCLOS 
standards and will utilize a different legal argument. Table 2 summarizes the cases.  










China Maintains De Facto 
Control 
No Yes Yes 
Security Alliance With the U.S. Yes No Yes 
Comparable Naval Capability Yes No No 
Within China’s Nine-Dash Line No Yes Yes 
 
1. Indicators of Successful or Unsuccessful Hypothesis 
This thesis will test the four hypotheses and assess which framework best 
describes China’s behavior in the three maritime disputes. The first hypothesis will test 
offensive realism. Does China use hard power to take advantage of weaker states that it 
maintains a clear power advantage over? This hypothesis will account for power disparity 
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among China and fellow maritime claimants. It will also assess the role international law 
and its potential to constrain Chinese behavior. The second hypothesis will test defensive 
realism. Does Chinese behavior related to its maritime disputes encourage security 
competition and balancing against it?  Again, this hypothesis will assess the role of 
international law. In these first two hypotheses, adherence to international law and norms 
when it does not advantage China would disprove both offensive and defensive realism. 
The third hypothesis tests the liberal institutionalist framework. If China conforms to 
international laws and norms (to include UNCLOS and ASEAN) its behavior would align 
with liberal institutionalism. In order for this framework to apply, China’s behavior must 
be constrained by these institutions. Finally, the fourth hypothesis tests the English 
School of Realism. In this framework, Chinese behavior would conform to some norms 
and rules yet attempt to revise other norms and rules. Chinese behavior is expected to 
conform to rules for coexistence. Yet its behavior is expected to revise legal rules on how 
the maritime sovereignty is determined.   
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This first chapter of the thesis establishes the research questions and their 
theoretical basis in international relations theory. The thesis will examine whether 
contemporary international law (UNCLOS) constrains Chinese behavior in the East and 
South China Seas. If true, then China’s behavior in maritime disputes is evidence of a 
peaceful rise as a status quo power.  
Chapter II analyzes ICJ, PCIJ, and PCA court verdicts to show that courts use 
effective control as a conclusive factor in the settlement of maritime disputes. An 
inadvertent consequence of the courts’ decisions is that the determining principle of 
effective control may promote land grabs and the potential use of force. Chapter III 
analyzes the legal cases for the Senkaku Islands, Paracel Islands, and Scarborough Shoal 
dispute. The chapter will argue that China has a weak claim to the Senkaku Islands and 
Scarborough Shoal, while it has a strong claim to the Paracel Islands. This chapter will 
establish how legal-case weakness may lead China to pursue demonstrations of effective 
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control. Chapter IV will show how China demonstrates effective control though the 
strategy of legal warfare.  
The thesis will conclude with an assessment of which IR framework best 
describes China’s strategy and behavior related to its maritime disputes. After examining 
four IR theories (defensive realism, offensive realism, the English School of Realism, and 
liberal institutionalism) the thesis will suggest China’s use of legal warfare provides 
evidence that offensive realism and the English School of Realism are two IR 
frameworks that explain China’s behavior related to its maritime disputes. China’s 
behavior is reflective of offensive realism because it acts in an irredentist manner while 
using international law and legal warfare to disguise its expansionist intent. The English 
School of Realism is another IR framework that describes Chinese behavior because 
China conforms to some international norms and laws while attempting to revise the 
internationally accepted way sovereignty is determined. 
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II. EFFECTIVE CONTROL IN MARITIME DISPUTES 
Does China’s behavior regarding its maritime disputes have a sound basis in 
contemporary international law? In order to answer this question, this thesis must first 
examine contemporary international law and identify the key legal factors used in 
resolving maritime disputes.   
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the context of this thesis, understanding trends in contemporary international 
law can help explain China’s behavior toward maritime disputes. Determining trends in 
contemporary international law is vital in assessing the strength of China’s legal claims.  
Additionally, understanding legal trends could support China’s claim its behavior is 
grounded in international law. Conversely, a study of international law can support 
accusations China’s behavior is expansionist.   
This chapter will focus on the settlement of maritime disputes in accordance with 
international law. More specifically, it will identify determinative elements that 
international courts use to decide maritime territorial cases. This chapter will attempt to 
answer the following questions: First, do court decisions emphasize one legal argument 
over other legal arguments? Second, if trends do exist, can they be used (or abused) by 
countries to strengthen a state’s case for ownership or sovereignty? For example, if 
maritime patrols support a case for maritime sovereignty, this can refute accusations 
China acts in an expansionist manner when it is really defending its sovereignty.   
To answer the first question, this chapter will use the case study method to 
analyze ten verdicts from the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ), and International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ten cases 
represent all maritime territorial cases decided in international courts. The case analysis 
will show the verdicts of maritime territorial disputes are overwhelmingly concluded 
using the principle of effective control over other legal arguments, such as treaty law, uti 
possidetis, history, or geography to name a few. Next, the chapter will attempt to analyze 
why effective control is decisive in most cases instead of treaty law or uti possidetis. 
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Finally, if states recognizes effective control is the gold standard to determine 
sovereignty, states will do their utmost to demonstrate effective control in maritime 
disputes even though it provokes other claimant states increasing regional tension.   
Demonstration of effective control can be as simple as passing domestic 
legislation on the governance of a faraway disputed maritime claim, or more laborious 
like constructing a hospital and providing public health care for the residents of an island. 
An insight into court trends could validate (or refute) China’s legal claim to the Senkaku 
Islands, Paracel Islands, or Scarborough Shoal. This insight could become the basis of 
Chinese policy or legal strategy to strengthen its claim in maritime disputes. Additionally, 
the pursuit (or lack of pursuit) of a legal strategy can be a critical indicator as to which 
international relations theory best explains China’s behavior. Pursuit of a legal strategy 
would indicate China’s behavior is explained by liberal institutionalism or the English 
School of Realism. Ignoring the role of effective control and other legal arguments could 
demonstrate China’s behavior is explained by a realist school of international relations.  
1. Methodology  
In his article, “Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice,” Brian 
Taylor Sumner analyzed how international courts settle territorial disputes. Sumner’s 
analysis of territorial disputes in the ICJ revealed claimants argue cases based on nine 
categories: treaties, geography, economy, culture, effective control, history, uti possidetis, 
elitism, and ideology. Sumner analyzed nine land and maritime territorial disputes 
resolved in the ICJ and found treaty law, uti possidetis, and effective control were the 
determinative factors for the court’s verdict.47 Additional analysis of this trend was 
conducted by the Carter Center by adding five additional territorial verdicts from the 
PCA, and it confirmed Sumner’s findings.48  
                                                 
47 Brian Taylor Sumner, “Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice,” Duke Law Journal 
53 (2004): 1779–1812, (hereafter cited as “Territorial Disputes at the ICJ”). 
48 The Carter Center, Approaches to Solving Territorial Conflicts: Sources, Situations, Scenarios, and 
Suggestions (Atlanta, GA: The Carter Center, May 2010), 1–16 (hereafter cited as Solving Territorial 
Conflicts). 
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Furthermore, Sumner revealed the court’s decision-making sequence was 
hierarchical. Courts attempted to settle the case using treaty law first, then uti possidetis, 
and finally effective control. The court initially reviews treaty law to determine a legal 
title. When no clear title exists, the court moves on to consider uti possidetis (or the 
continued exercise of sovereignty bequeathed from a colonial power). The court reviews 
evidence the colonial power (if applicable) bequeathed the territory to the post-colonial 
state. If no evidence is available, the court reverts to demonstrations of effective control. 
The court assesses the colonial and post-colonial demonstrations of effective control to 
decide a verdict. Again, the decision process is hierarchical; therefore if the court can 
render a verdict by reviewing treaty law alone, then there is no need for the court to 
consider evidence of uti possidetis or effective control. In the 1994 ICJ case Libya v. 
Chad, the court decided the case solely on treaty law and dismissed all other evidence 
provided by Libya and Chad.49 Surprisingly, between the two studies, history alone was 
not a major factor in reaching a verdict. Although history was used most frequently by 
the claimants to establish first possession and the duration of the possession, the court did 
not find this compelling.50  
The Carter Center goes on to assert although the three factors (treaty law, uti 
possidetis, and effective control) are compelling, an “unclear prioritization of legal norms 
continues to make decision making by the Court in territorial cases somewhat 
unpredictable.”51 This observation may be true in looking at both land and maritime 
disputes, however when only looking at maritime disputes a different conclusion is 
reached. Further analysis of the findings from Sumner and the Carter Center reveal that, 
within maritime territorial disputes, effective control is the single most compelling 
argument for courts.  
                                                 
49 Sumner, “Territorial Disputes at the ICJ,” 1803–1804. 
50 Ibid., 1807–1808. 
51 Carter Center, Solving Territorial Conflicts, 2. 
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2. Definitions 
To begin the discussion on court decisions and sovereignty it is necessary to 
establish definitions. Since much of this chapter is based on Brian Taylor Sumner’s 
analysis, it is important to use his definitions. UNCLOS also provides relevant legal 
definitions for maritime features like seas and islands.  
a. Treaty Law 
Treaty law acts as a legal contract among states. Historically treaties have ended 
wars, established trade, and granted legal titles to territories just to name a few functions 
of treaties. For example, the Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain (also 
known as the Treaty of Paris 1898) ended the Spanish American War and relinquished 
the Spanish title for Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines to the United States.52 
Sumner accurately identifies in many contemporary cases, the claimant states are 
sometimes not members of the original parties since the original parties were former 
colonizers or states no longer in existence.53 For example, the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) 
and the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) partitioned the Ottoman Empire following World War 
I. Modern day states like Jordan, Syria, and Iraq, were not parties to the treaties since 
they did not exist in 1920; however, their title lineage and borders can be traced to both 
treaties.54  
b. Uti Possidetis 
Sumner defines uti possidetis as a principle in “defining post-colonial boundaries” 
based on colonial administration. In other words, newly formed states that were former 
colonies assume the boundaries established by the previous colonizing state.55  
                                                 
52 United States and Spain, “Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain,” December 10, 
1898, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/sp1898.asp. 
53 Sumner, “Territorial Disputes at the ICJ,” 1784–1785. 
54 British Empire et al., “Treaty of Sèvres,” August 10, 1920, 
http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Section_I, Articles_1_-_260; British Empire et al., “Treaty of Lausanne,” 
July 24, 1923, http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne. 
55 Sumner, “Territorial Disputes at the ICJ,” 1790. 
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c. Effective Control (or Effectivités) 
Sumner defined effective control as the unambiguous exertion of state power in a 
territory or population. He also draws a parallel to how possession is a decisive 
determination in property law (also known as possession is nine tenths of the law). 
Effective control can be demonstrated by providing examples of governance on a 
territory.56  
d. Acquiescence (or Abandonment) 
Acquiescence is the legal principle that a state has given up its claim to a territory. 
By divesting its claim, another state can take the vacated territory. Failure to exert a 
minimum amount of effective control can constitute acquiescence. In some legal cases, 
effective control works hand in hand with acquiescence. Not only must a claimant prove 
it demonstrated effective control over a territory, it must also show the competing 
claimant gave up on its claim to the territory.57   
e. Territorial Sea 
UNCLOS breaks the oceans into four distinct zones, the territorial sea, contiguous 
zone, exclusive economic zone, and high seas. Each zone entitles the coastal state 
different sovereign rights and economic potential. A territorial sea is the continuation of a 
state’s sovereignty on land extending 12 nautical miles into the water. The territorial sea 
originates from a state’s mainland shore or island. The 12 nautical miles is measured 
from the state’s low tide line on land. (See Figure 1)58    
f. Contiguous Zone 
A contiguous zone extends from the termination of the territorial sea (at 12 
nautical miles) out to 24 miles from land (or the baseline). Within this zone the state can 
enforce the same laws and regulations it enforces on its territory or within its territorial 
                                                 
56 Ibid., 1787. 
57 Ibid. 
58 United Nations, “UNCLOS.” 
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sea. These laws include customs enforcement, immigration control, or sanitation laws. 
(See Figure 1)59  
g. Exclusive Economic Zone 
The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) grants the coastal state exclusionary rights to 
extract economic resources from the waters, seabed, and its subsoil. The zone begins 
from the land and extends 200 nautical miles from the coastline. Within the EEZ, the 
coastal state is authorized to construct artificial islands and structures, conduct scientific 
research, and preserve and protect the environment. (See Figure 1).60   
                                                 
59 Ibid., 35. 
60 Ibid., 43–44. 
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Figure 1.  Illustration showing the maritime zones61 
h. Islands 
Based on UNCLOS, an island is defined as “a naturally formed area of land, 
surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.”62 Islands are entitled to a 
territorial sea, contiguous zone, and exclusive economic zone. Reefs that rise above the 
water at low tide are considered attached to islands.63 Artificial islands do not obtain the 
right of a territorial sea, contiguous zone, or an exclusive economic zone.64   
                                                 
61 United Nations, “UNCLOS Maritime Zones,” UNCLOS Maritime Zones, 1982, 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/marinezones.jpg. 
62 United Nations, “UNCLOS,” 66. 
63 Ibid., 27. 
64 Ibid., 45. 
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i. Rocks 
Rocks are geographic features that rise above the water at high-tide. They are 
unable to “sustain human habitation or economic life of their own.”65 Rocks are entitled 
to a territorial sea but not entitled to a contiguous zone or exclusive economic zone.66  
j. Low-Tide Elevation 
A low-tide elevation is a naturally formed land feature (like a sand bar or reef) 
that is partially or completely above water at low tide and completely submerged during 
high tide. Low-tide elevations can be used to draw maritime baselines based on the 
exposed land during low-tide.67 Because low-tide elevations are not islands or rocks, 
courts cannot determine sovereignty unless it is located within a territorial sea.  
k. High Seas 
High seas is the water outside of the territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive 
economic zone, internal waters of a state, and archipelagic waters of an archipelagic 
state.68  
B. CASE ANALYSIS OF MARITIME DISPUTES IN THE PCA, PCIJ, AND 
ICJ 
Using the work done by Sumner and the Carter Center, this thesis will now 
review the maritime territorial disputes of the PCA, PCIJ, and ICJ to reveal the 
determinative influences for each verdict. This section will also highlight how states have 
demonstrated effective control in order to win their case. All the cases chosen deal with 
the sovereignty of disputed maritime territories. The cases chosen will not discuss 
disputes over land, river islands, or maritime delimitation (like the demarcation of 
exclusive economic zones, or the extension of land borders onto the water separating two 
states). Some of these cases settled questions on land boundaries in addition to maritime 
                                                 
65 Ibid., 66. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., 29. 
68 Ibid., 57. 
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claims. To maintain focus on the argument, this section will ignore any portion of a case 
deciding the sovereignty distribution of land territory. The 10 cases used in this study 
represent all maritime territorial disputes decided in an international court.   
1. United States v. Netherlands (Island of Palmas, 1928) 
As the result of the Spanish American War, the United States gained control of 
the Philippines from Spain. The United States argued it owned the Island of Palmas 
because it was included in the greater Philippine archipelago as bequeathed by Spain 
through the 1898 Treaty of Paris. Yet the Dutch contended the island was part of their 
claim to the Dutch East Indies. The PCA found treaty law was inconclusive since the 
treaties failed to mention the island by name or location and the Netherlands were not 
party to the treaties.69  
Logically, U.S. possession of the island was based on Spain’s possession and 
subsequent demonstration of effective control. The arbiter found a lack of evidence could 
not reinforce the U.S. argument of Spanish control over the island.70 However the 
Netherlands claimed the Island of Palmas in its colonial claim to the Dutch East Indies. 
The arbiter found the actions of the Dutch East India Company represented the acts of the 
government of the Netherlands. Therefore actions by the Dutch East India Company 
constituted Dutch effective control.  
Although infrequent, the Netherlands provided peaceful and effective rule over 
the island.71 Demonstration of Dutch effective control included but was not limited to, 
contracts with the local population, hoisting a Dutch flag as witnessed by the locals in 
1700, and tax collection.72 The arbiter, Max Huber, decided Spain failed to contest Dutch 
control over the island when it withdrew to Molucca in 1666. Failure to contest the 
effective control constituted acquiescence.73 Max Huber, ruled in favor of the 
                                                 
69 Netherlands v. United States, 831, 850, (Permanent Court of Arbitration 1928).    
70 Ibid., 851–852. 
71 Ibid., 867–869. 
72 Ibid., 864–866. 
73 Ibid., 868. 
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Netherlands by saying, “The Netherlands’ tide of sovereignty, acquired by continuous 
and peaceful display of State authority during a long period of time going probably back 
beyond the year 1700, therefore holds good.”74  
2. Norway v. Denmark (Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, 1933) 
In 1933, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) settled the dispute 
between Norway and Denmark on the sovereignty of Greenland. Denmark argued it 
owned the entire island of Greenland. Norway contended it owned Eastern Greenland 
because it was terra nullius and Denmark’s ownership only extended as far as its existing 
settlements. The PCIJ initially reviewed treaty law and concluded the 1814 Treaty of Kiel 
specifically ceded Greenland to Denmark.  
However, the court needed to determine if Denmark maintained effective control 
over the entire island after the 1814 Treaty of Kiel. Recognizing it was difficult for states 
to demonstrate unambiguous effective control over remote and “thinly populated” areas, 
the court established a low bar for evidence.75 This landmark decision influenced all 
other legal settlements over remote or unoccupied land. The court established the 
definition of effective control as: “The intention and will to act as sovereign, and some 
actual exercise or display of such authority.”76 The court found Danish diplomatic 
correspondence and multilateral commercial treaties, which incorporated the entirety of 
the island, represented evidence to act as sovereign. The PCIJ also cited the Danish 
issuance of visitation permits, as well as hunting and scientific expeditions endorsed by 
the government were additional displays of authority on the eastern side of Greenland.77  
Also compelling was evidence Norway acquiesced its claim to Greenland. 
Denmark argued, in what would become known as the Ihlen Declaration, Norway’s 
Minister of Foreign Affairs relinquished its claim to Greenland. On 14 July 1919, the 
Danish Minister asked the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nils Claus Ihlen, for 
                                                 
74 Ibid., 869. 
75 Denmark v. Norway, 4, 28, (Permanent Court of International Justice 1933).    
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid., 44–45; Charles Cheney Hyde, “The Case Concerning the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland,” 
American Journal of International Law 27, no. 4 (October 1933): 736. 
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recognition of “Denmark’s sovereignty over the whole of Greenland.”78 Eight days later, 
on 22 July, Ihlen replied, “…the Norwegian Government would not make any difficulties 
in the settlement of this question.”79 The 22 July statement from the Norwegian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs became known as the Ihlen Declaration and provided Denmark with 
Norwegian recognition of its claim to Greenland. The court agreed with this point of 
view by stating:  
The Court considers it beyond all dispute that a reply of this nature given 
by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf of his Government in 
response to a request by the diplomatic representative of a foreign Power, 
in regard to a question falling within his province, is binding upon the 
country to which the Minister belongs.80  
Therefore, based on the demonstration of Danish effective control as well as Norwegian 
acquiescence, the PCIJ ruled Greenland fell under the sovereignty of Denmark. This 
landmark case codified the definition of effective control and justified the low bar for its 
demonstration. This low standard of effective control will be relevant to subsequent cases 
as well as Chinese maritime disputes.  
3. France v. United Kingdom (Minquiers and Ecrehos, 1953) 
In 1953, the ICJ ruled on the sovereignty of two groups of islets, Minquiers and 
Ecrehos. Both island groups were claimed by France and the United Kingdom with a 
record of possession dating back to the ninth century. The court considered historic 
documents and treaties but concluded the wealth of documents from both sides were 
insufficient in compelling the court to decide a clear victor. Therefore the court focused 
on effective control to determine sovereignty.81  
The court ruled in favor of the United Kingdom finding its demonstration of 
effective control as more compelling than the French arguments. The court identified a 
close relationship between the disputed maritime territories and the neighboring British 
                                                 
78 Denmark v. Norway, 52. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid., 53. 
81 France v. United Kingdom (Summary), 1, 1–3, (International Court of Justice 1953).   
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island of Jersey. The local government of Jersey provided on-island administration over 
an oyster fishery, presided over criminal proceedings, levied taxes on houses, and 
registered real estate contracts.  
France argued it maintained sovereignty over the islands through a fishing 
convention and by placing navigation buoys. Because the United Kingdom never 
protested French effective control, France made a case for acquiescence. However, the 
court discounted these examples of effective control because it covered the 
administration of the waters surrounding the disputed claim and not on land.82  
4. El Salvador v. Honduras (Land, Island and Maritime Frontier 
Dispute, 1992)  
In 1992, the ICJ decided the land and maritime boundaries between El Salvador 
and Honduras. The court also decided on the sovereignty of three islands in the Gulf of 
Fonseca (El Tigre Island, Meanguera Island, and Meanguerita Island). This brief 
summary will concentrate on the legal arguments concerning the three islands and not the 
land or maritime boundaries. The court attempted to use uti possidetis to determine a title. 
However, it found uti possidetis was “too fragmentary and ambiguous” to determine a 
clear conclusion on title.83 Spanish colonial law, the former Federal Republic of Central 
America, and successor states failed to clearly bequeath the islands to El Salvador or 
Honduras due to the limited population on the island or scant economic value of the 
islands. The court was forced to pursue examples of post-colonial (after 1821) effective 
control as examples of Spanish colonial intent. Additionally the court looked for 
examples of acquiescence to solidify its judgments.84  
                                                 
82 Ibid.; D. H. N. Johnson, “The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case,” The International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 3, no. 2 (April 1954): 197–207, 209–215. 
83 El Salvador v. Honduras, 4, 29, (International Court of Justice 1992).    
84 Ibid., 28–30. 
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a. El Tigre Island  
The court found Honduran settlement and administration of El Tigre Island, as 
early as 1933, provided evidence Spain intended the island to go to Honduras.85 Evidence 
of Honduran effective control included multiple examples of international diplomacy. 
First, to recoup debts from Honduras and El Salvador, the British Government occupied 
El Tigre Island. A month after the invasion, British correspondence revealed military 
authorities specifically returned the island to Honduras. Second, Honduras signed an 
agreement with the United States to cede the island to the United States for eighteen 
months. Third, in 1854, Honduras sold parts of El Tigre to foreign powers. El Salvador 
protested the sale of El Tigre and the potential sale of Meanguera Island but never 
questioned Honduras’s right to sell El Tigre. This second point provided the court an 
example of El Salvador’s acquiescence.86 Fourth, in 1873, El Salvador invaded El Tigre 
Island but returned the island to Honduras a year later. Once again this constituted El 
Salvadorian acquiescence. If El Salvador truly believed the island was theirs then they 
should have occupied the island outright instead of returning the island to Honduras. 
Fifth, Honduras and El Salvador used El Tigre Island as a geographic reference point 
dividing the two countries. El Salvador failed to lodge a protest providing even more 
evidence of acquiescence. The court recognized the five examples of Honduran effective 
control took place shortly after Honduran independence in 1821. Therefore, the court 
concluded the five examples were unambiguous demonstrations of Honduran effective 
control granting El Tigre Island to Honduras.87  
b. Meanguera Island and Meanguerita Island 
The court found numerous examples of El Salvadorian effective control and 
administration covering Meanguera Island and Meanguerita Island. The government of El 
Salvador submitted as evidence a lengthy dossier of records showing it conducted 
administrative functions of a state on Meanguera Island and Meanguerita Island: it hired 
                                                 
85El Salvador v. Honduras, 220. 
86 Ibid., 221. 
87 Ibid., 219–223. 
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justices of the peace, appointed military authorities, issued licenses, held elections, 
collected taxes, conducted censuses, tracked births/deaths, registered land, conducted 
criminal and civil proceedings, provided postal services, constructed infrastructure 
(electricity, schools), offered health care, and provided education. El Salvador even 
provided witnesses to confirm the above.88  
Honduras could not provide any evidence of effective control on the island. 
Instead it criticized El Salvador’s effective control as a violation of the 1969 General 
Treaty of Peace by altering the status quo on a disputed territory.89 The court interpreted 
Nicaragua’s lack of evidence and subsequent protest as acquiescence and agreed 
Meanguera and Meanguerita Islands belonged to El Salvador.90  
5. Eritrea v. Yemen (Red Sea Islands, 1998) 
The PCA was asked by Eritrea and Yemen to decide the sovereignty of numerous 
islands, rocks, and undersea features in the Red Sea. In their decision of October, 1998 
the PCA divided the contested Red Sea Islands into four groups and ruled on the 
sovereignty of each group individually. The court muddled through the convoluted 
historic colonial title and found tying the islands to a specific state inconclusive since 
treaties and uti possidetis alone could not decide island possession.91  
a. The Mohabbakahs 
The court rejected Yemeni and Eritrean arguments the islands were covered by 
treaty law and uti possidetis. Instead, the court decided the islands fell within the 12 
nautical mile territorial seas of Eritrea, and ruled in favor of Eritrea.92  
                                                 
88 Ibid., 225–227. 
89 Ibid., 228–229. 
90 Ibid., 225–229. 
91 Barbara Kwiatkowska, “The Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration: Landmark Progress in the Acquisition of 
Territorial Sovereignty and Equitable Maritime Boundary Delimitation,” Ocean Development & 
International Law 32 (2001): 3–7, (hereafter cited as “Eritrea v. Yemen, Landmark Progress”). 
92 Ibid., 6; Eritrea v. Yemen, 1, 131–133, (Permanent Court of Arbitration 1998).     
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b. The Haycocks 
Based on Eritrean arguments of pre and post-colonial effective control and 
Yemeni acquiescence, the court ruled the Haycock Islands fell under Eritrean 
sovereignty. Italy demonstrated pre-colonial effective control through the construction 
and maintenance of lighthouses. Eritrea demonstrated post-colonial effective control 
through the regulation of petroleum exploration. The court agreed that Yemen’s failure to 
protest the well-publicized petroleum exploration agreements constituted Yemen’s 
acquiesce.93  
c. The Zuqar—Hanish Group 
The court was unable decide the sovereignty of the islands based on title or 
succession, so the court turned to demonstrations of recent, post-colonial effective 
control. Although Eritrea provided examples of effective control, the court found Yemeni 
effective control more compelling. Yemen demonstrated effective control through the 
construction and maintenance of one lighthouse, construction of an air landing site for 
Yemeni sanctioned petroleum workers, and the licensing of tourist attractions on the 
islands.94  
d. Jabal al-Tayr and the Zubayr Group of Islands 
The court found scant evidence of treaty law or uti possidetis and immediately 
went to recent examples of effective control to decide sovereignty. The court agreed 
Yemen’s promise to operate lighthouses on the islands in question as well as the 
regulation of petroleum exploration close to the islands constituted effective control.95  
Once again the court found effective control the most compelling way of settling 
the sovereignty dispute in three out of the four island disputes. In the case of the 
Mohabbakahs, the geographic location within Eritrean territorial waters was 
determinative. Because the court recognized that territorial waters are the internationally 
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recognized maritime boundaries of the state codified in UNCLOS and customary 
international law, the fair and equitable disposition of the islands should be to Eritrea. 
This also corresponds to Ethiopia’s 1953 declaration it claimed and enforced sovereignty 
of its twelve nautical mile territorial sea.96  
6. Qatar v. Bahrain (Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and 
Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, 2001)  
In 2001, the ICJ decided one disputed land and numerous maritime claims 
between Qatar and Bahrain. The sovereignty cases were decided by uti possidetis and 
effective control. This summary will focus on the legal arguments concerning the 
maritime features and not the disputed Zubarah territory on the Qatar Peninsula or the 
maritime delimitation.  
a. The Hawar Islands 
The ICJ ruled the disposition of the Hawar Islands was decided by the British 
Government in 1939 granting sovereignty to Bahrain. Although the Qatari government 
disagreed with the 1939 outcome, the court found no reason to contradict the British 
decision as it was a product of an arbitrative process. Since the British Government, the 
colonial power ruling Bahrain and Qatar at the time, settled this case, the sovereignty of 
the Hawar Islands was determined by uti possidetis.97 As Brian Taylor Sumner’s analysis 
revealed, the sequence on how the court decides a case is hierarchical. Sumner 
determined the ICJ examines treaty law, then uti possidetis, and finally effective control. 
In the case between Bahrain versus Qatar uti possidetis was immediately compelling 
(after reviewing treaty law) because the colonial ruler, Great Britain, arbitrated the same 
boundary dispute between Bahrain and Qatar in 1939. When Great Britain granted 
independence to Qatar and Bahrain in 1971, the 1939 decision was still binding and 
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independence was based on the territorial holdings established during British colonial 
rule. Therefore, a ruling using effective control was not required.98  
b. Janan Island 
Similar to the Hawar Islands, the ICJ used uti possidetis to determine the 
sovereignty of Janan Island. In this instance, British colonial correspondence from 1947 
stated Janan Island was not part of the Hawar Islands and therefore not part of the 1939 
arbitration. The court concluded the British correspondence determined the island was 
Qatari.99  
c. Fasht al Azm 
The ICJ weighed whether Fasht al Azm was connected to Bahrain’s Sitrah Island 
or an independent low-tide elevation separated from Sitrah Island. Bahrain argued Sitrah 
Island and Fasht al Azm were connected, however a 1982 dredging project created an 
artificial channel separating Sitrah Island and Fasht al Azm. If the court determined Fasht 
al Azm was part of Sitrah Island, the decision would increase the size of Bahrain’s 
territorial sea and impact the delimitation of the maritime boundary in Bahrain’s favor. 
However, if Fasht al Azm was ruled a low-tide elevation then the feature would be 
subject to the jurisdiction of which ever territorial sea it resided under (subject to the 
maritime delimitation verdict of the same case). In the end, the court determined Fasht al 
Azm was a low-tide elevation. The Court subsequently drew the maritime boundary 
between Bahrain and Qatar on top of Fasht al Azm thereby splitting the feature between 
both countries. This case goes on to show courts cannot rule on the sovereignty of low-
tide elevations. This will become more relevant in the later discussion over the 
Scarborough Shoal and Spratly Islands.100  
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d. Qit’at Jaradah 
Although Qatar contends Qit’at Jaradah is a low tide elevation, Bahrain and the 
court’s experts determined it was a rock subject to appropriation since it rose 0.4 meters 
above sea level at high tide. The court ruled Bahrain established effective control by 
constructing a navigational aid on the island.101  
7. Indonesia v. Malaysia (Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau 
Sipadan, 2002) 
In 2002 the ICJ ruled on the dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia over the two 
small islands, Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan. The court found the arguments of treaty 
law, and uti possidetis to be inconclusive. Indonesia’s treaty law argument could not 
justify that the land border treaty between the United Kingdom and Netherlands applied 
over water. Both Indonesia and Malaysia argued they had historic titles based on colonial 
agreements with the local sultanates. Indonesia claimed the Netherlands Indies assumed 
possession of the islands from the Sultan of Bulungan. Malaysia claimed British North 
Borneo assumed possession of the islands from the Sultan of Sulu. Because the territories 
of both sultanates overlapped Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, the court could not 
decisively reach a verdict using uti possidetis. The court was forced to turn to effective 
control to reach a decision.  
In their argument for effective control, Indonesia claimed the waters surrounding 
the islands were patrolled by the navy and recognized by local fishermen as Indonesian. 
Yet the court rejected this argument based on two accounts. First, naval patrols near the 
islands are not conclusive demonstrations of effective control on land. Second, acts of 
private fishermen do not constitute the acts of the state. Instead, the court found 
Malaysia’s demonstration of effective control more compelling. First, Malaysia’s 
maintenance of lighthouses on both islands were clear evidence of effective control. 
Second, enforcement of Malaysia’s Turtle Preservation Ordinance of 1917 demonstrated 
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effective governance of the islands. Therefore lighthouses and regulation of turtle egg 
collection decided the case in favor of Malaysia.102  
8. Nicaragua v. Colombia (Territorial and Maritime Dispute, 2012)  
In 2007, the ICJ decided the sovereignty of the San Andres, Providencia, and 
Santa Catalina Islands as part of a larger maritime dispute between Nicaragua and 
Colombia (which was ultimately decided in 2012). The court agreed the 1928 Treaty 
concerning Territorial Questions at Issue between Colombia and Nicaragua (henceforth 
referred to as the 1928 Treaty) unequivocally granted Colombia sovereignty over the 
maritime territories of the San Andres Archipelago. However, the 1928 Treaty failed to 
provide specific details on which islands comprised the San Andres Archipelago. This 
case brought out how the ambiguity of the treaty in determining specific islands led to the 
maritime dispute (this will be relevant when discussing the Senkaku Island case.) The 
court was asked to determine which maritime features constituted the San Andres 
Archipelago.103  
In reviewing the case, the court found evidence of historical claims and uti 
possidetis inconclusive in determining sovereignty.104 Therefore, the court was once 
again forced to turn to effective control to determine sovereignty. Demonstrations of 
effective control included regulation of commerce, construction and maintenance of 
lighthouses or naval outposts, law enforcement, naval patrol visits, and finally search and 
rescue operations. The court found these demonstrations of effective control compelling 
and awarded sovereignty to Colombia.105  
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9. Nicaragua v. Honduras (Case Concerning Territorial and Maritime 
Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea, 
2007)    
In 200,7 the ICJ ruled on the sovereignty of four islands disputed by Nicaragua 
and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea. Initially, the court tried to decide the claims to the 
islands using uti possidetis. However Spain did not clearly bequeath the islands to either 
Nicaragua or Honduras. The court attempted to examine demonstrations of effective 
control during the colonial period before 1821, but was unable to reach a conclusion. 
Therefore the court considered arguments of effective control after the colonial period.  
Before reviewing claims of effective control, the court set out to determine a 
critical date. This date considers all claims of effective control prior to the critical date. 
However, all claims after the critical date are seen as meaningless by the court since the 
parties are aware of the existence of a dispute and can engage in behavior to bolster their 
demonstration of effective control. In the case of the disputed islands, the court ruled the 
critical date (when both parties realized there was a dispute) took place on 21 March 
2001 when Nicaragua requested in the Memorial to the court to decide the sovereignty of 
the islands. From Honduras’s point of view, the 2001 Memorial this was the first time 
Nicaragua asserted a claim to the disputed islands. Nicaragua argued the question of the 
islands began in 1977 when correspondence regarding maritime delimitation was initially 
exchanged between both countries. Nicaragua argued the discussion of the maritime 
delimitation inherently implied the sovereignty of the disputed islands. The court 
supported Honduras’s argument. Therefore relevant demonstrations of post-colonial 
effective control had to have taken place between independence in 1821 and 21 March 
2001.  
Honduras argued it maintained effective control over the islands by passing three 
constitutions and legislation which broadly mentioned the islands. (The legal instruments 
mention but do not specifically identify the four islands by name.) The court found that 
passing legislation without specifically mentioning the territories by name did not 
constitute effective control.106  
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However, Honduras argued civil and criminal enforcement (including sanctioning 
a 1993 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration Operation where U.S. surveillance aircraft 
were permitted to overfly the islands in question), immigration enforcement in the 1990s, 
fishing licensing in 1992, and authorization to build an antenna on Bobel Cay to support 
Honduran-approved oil exploration constituted effective control over the islands. 
(Honduras’s effort to control the airspace over the island will become a relevant effective 
control argument when discussing China’s East China Sea Air Defense Identification 
Zone.)107  
Nicaragua failed to provide evidence of effective control. Instead, it rebutted most 
demonstrations of Honduran effective control occurred after what Nicaraguan authorities 
deemed as the critical date of 1977. Yet, even with the 156 year period between 1821 and 
1977, Nicaragua failed to provide any compelling evidence of effective control. 
Therefore the court awarded the islands to Honduras based on effective control 
demonstrated in its post-colonial history.108  
10. Malaysia v. Singapore (Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pedra 
Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge, 2008) 
In May of 2008, the ICJ ruled in the sovereignty of Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu 
Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge. The court granted sovereignty of Pedra 
Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh to Singapore and Middle Rocks to Malaysia. The court 
attempted to decide the case on uti possidetis by tracing the title of the disputed maritime 
territories to the Sultanate of Johor in 1512. The 1824 Anglo-Dutch Treaty divided the 
Sultanate of Johor into British and Dutch spheres of influence. During this time, the 
disputed maritime territories remained as part of the Sultanate of Johor. The court found 
Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh remained in Malaysian control until 1953 when 
diplomatic correspondence between the Colonial Secretary of Singapore and the Acting 
State Secretary of Johor disclosed Johor no longer claimed the island. This unambiguous 
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reply from Johor gave Singaporean officials legal confirmation that the Sultanate of Johor 
had abandoned its claim to the island.109  
Once the court drew this conclusion, it looked to demonstrations of effective 
control to confirm Singaporean sovereignty and Malaysian acquiescence. In 1974 and 
1978, Singapore regulated visits to Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh including the visits of 
Malaysian officials and vessels. The court ruled this was a clear demonstration of 
effective control and acquiescence of Malaysia. If Malaysia truly claimed the island, they 
would have vehemently protested asking permission to go to their own island.110 Other 
demonstrations of effective control included the investigation of shipwrecks around the 
island, flying the Singapore flag over the Horsburgh lighthouse, installation of a naval 
relay antenna, and the proposed reclamation of land around Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu 
Puteh. All of these examples of effective control met no resistance by Malaysia and 
upheld Singapore’s claim. The court rejected naval patrols as a form of effective control 
due to the proximity of both countries. The court also rejected Malaysia’s claim it 
demonstrated effective control by regulating petroleum exploration. The court found the 
exploration agreement was ambiguous and did not publicly provide coordinates that 
would contest Singapore’s claim.111  
In this case the existence of a lighthouse alone was not an example of 
British/Singaporean effective control. This is because representatives of the British East 
India Company requested the lighthouse from the Sultanate of Johor. It is within legal 
norms for a lighthouse to be operated and maintained by one country on the shores of 
another country.112  
As for the sovereignty of Middle Rocks and South Ledge, the court dismissed 
Singapore’s argument that Middle Rocks and South Ledge are one comprehensive island 
group covered under the sovereignty of Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh. Since Singapore 
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offered no demonstrative legal argument other than proximity to Pedra Branca/Pulau 
Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks remained under Malaysian control. The court determined 
South Ledge was a low-tide elevation under the definition set forth by UNCLOS. 
Therefore, sovereignty rests within whichever territorial waters it is located. Since South 
Ledge falls under the overlapping territorial waters of both mainland Malaysia and Pedra 
Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh (Singapore), the court did not determine ownership.113  
C. CASE ANALYSIS: 
Why are so many maritime claims settled based on effective control? Nine out of 
ten cases support the assertion that effective control is the most determinative 
consideration in deciding maritime disputes. Therefore it is relevant to ask why this is the 
case. Why is treaty law and uti possidetis so inconclusive in settling maritime disputes? 
1. Why Not Treaty Law?  
Treaty law does not adequately cover maritime features for two reasons. First, 
“out of sight out of mind” matters for maritime features. Because the islands are remote 
and uninhabited, the sovereign/state forgets about the maritime features. Perhaps the 
maritime features were forgotten because they did not provide an economic incentive for 
incorporation into the state (or kingdom, or colony). It was difficult for ancient or 
colonial governments to administer uninhabited offshore territory. Water purification or 
food preservation technology did not exist for remote islands to maintain a human 
presence. The remote nature of these islands provided little economic incentive to exert 
historic effective control. It was not until the twentieth century that technological 
advances in offshore resource extraction (like petroleum) combined with UNCLOS’s 
award of a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone gave barren islands immense value 
through natural resources.114  
Second, because of the small and insignificant nature of the islands, treaties fail to 
accurately account for the islands. Maritime features are often ambiguously grouped 
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together, as was the case in Colombia v. Honduras where the San Andres Archipelago 
was not clearly defined. As observed in the United States v. Netherlands Island of Palmas 
case, specific locational data was unavailable to the colonial cartographers and treaty 
makers to identify the islands and tie it to a treaty. The court spent a considerable amount 
of effort to ensure evidence from both sides pertained to the Island of Palmas and not to 
other neighboring islands.115  
2. Why Not Uti Possidetis?  
History is messy and arguments for uti possidetis are directly affected by this. As 
was shown in all but one of the cases, the court found great difficulty in identifying a 
clear chain of title through the colonial period. In France v. United Kingdom (Minquiers 
and Ecrehos), the court could not clearly define a title dating back to the ninth century. In 
the case of Eritrea v. Yemen, the court was forced to maintain a title dating back to the 
King of Yemen, through rule by the Ottoman Empire, which was split into spheres of 
influence between Italy and the United Kingdom. Then the court had to determine which 
islands came with Eritrea when it split from Ethiopia. This was simply impossible to 
objectively rule on.116 In the case of the United States v. Netherlands, the court 
recognized the United States was at a significant disadvantage since the arguments 
circulated around records and events that took place during Spanish colonial possession. 
The United States in turn had a difficult time proving uti possidetis and effective control 
during the colonial period.117 As was seen in the El Tigre Island ruling from El Salvador 
v. Honduras, effective control during the colonial period and post-colonial period was the 
only way uti possidetis could be argued.  
3. Why Effective Control? 
In light of what the court is given to rule on, effective control often is easier to 
decide upon in contrast to treaty law and uti possidetis. First, the court can accept recent 
examples of effective control. This allows states to provide modern and well documented 
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evidence of effective control. For example, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration 
could clearly provide records that it had asked for permission to overfly Honduran islands 
in Honduras v. Nicaragua.  
Second, as codified in the Denmark v. Norway case (Legal Status of Eastern 
Greenland), because of the remote and uninhabited nature of the islands, the courts accept 
low standards defining effective control. The court is forced to answer, what does 
effective control on remote islands look like? The text book example was El Salvador’s 
case demonstrating state control and infrastructure on Meanguera Island (health care, 
postal service, infrastructure, law enforcement, etc.). El Salvador’s examples of effective 
control could be considered strong since it can be argued the demonstrations of 
sovereignty were integrated into the daily life of the population of the island.   
Yet, examples of weak effective control test the low bar established in the 
Denmark v. Norway case. For example, in the case of Indonesia v. Malaysia over Pulau 
Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, the court used sporadic turtle egg collection enforcement as 
an example of effective control. In Eritrea v. Yemen, the promise of constructing and 
administering a lighthouse in diplomatic correspondence was sufficient to provide 
evidence of effective control. Honduras’s authorization for the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Agency to overfly the disputed islands in the Nicaragua v. Honduras provided an 
example of its intent to regulate the national airspace of the island. These examples of 
effective control are particularly weak since they do not demonstrate sovereign rule at a 
high frequency. Additionally, in the case of Eritrea v. Yemen and Nicaragua v. 
Honduras, a representative from the state never stepped foot on the island.  
Third, demonstrations of effective control are easier to prove with evidence 
compared to interpretations of history and treaty law. A state either exerts effective 
control or it does not. In the case of Eritrea v. Yemen, the lighthouses on the Hanish 
Islands are either there or they are not. Tangible records of a criminal proceeding are 
presented to the court or they are not, as occurred in France v. United Kingdom. In the 
United States v. Netherlands, witness accounts from the Island of Palmas clearly state 
they saw the Dutch East India Company raise a flag when it landed.  
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4. The Negative Case (Qatar v. Bahrain) 
In the ten case studies above, nine cases were ultimately decided by effective 
control. Only in the Qatar v. Bahrain verdict did the ICJ use uti possidetis to determine 
the sovereignty of the Hawar and Janan Islands. This negative case can be explained by 
four reasons. First, as Brian Taylor Sumner discussed, ICJ and PCA cases are generally 
decided through a process by first examining treaty law, then uti possidetis, and finally 
demonstrations of effective control. In this case there was available evidence to reach a 
verdict using the court’s second test, uti possidetis.  
Second, the British colonial period for both countries started later than in the other 
cases above. In this case, colonial administration occurred in the twentieth century after 
the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore the colonial records were relatively recent 
compared to other examples of uti possidetis. The dispute over the islands existed for a 
comparatively brief period of history. By the time the court decided the case over the 
islands, only 62 years had elapsed between Great Britain’s arbitrative ruling in 1939 and 
the ICJ’s verdict in the 2001. In contrast, the case material for France v. United Kingdom 
spanned hundreds of years before it was reviewed by the court.  
Third, the dispute was well documented by British colonial administrators. The 
correspondence from all three sides was available to the court. Fourth, the dispute 
covered islands which were relatively close to the shores of the claimants. All the 
disputed maritime territories were within twelve nautical miles of both claimants. It is 
hard to forget about these remote and uninhabited islands (or maritime features) when 
they are so close to the claimant states.  
5. Implications for Chinese-disputed Maritime Territories 
The analysis leads to an unsettling conclusion. Effective control being an 
overriding sine que non factor in deciding international maritime disputes may set a 
dangerous precedent. Sumner says it best when he states, “because it is a general 
principle of law, [effective control] might--in a worst case scenario--encourage territorial 
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imperialism and a new wave of colonialism.”118 Based on these trends, states have a 
greater incentive to exert effective control to demonstrate maritime claims. They can 
abuse this by using offensive force to seize islands in order to exert effective control. 
Alternatively, states would use force to defend islands in order to maintain territorial 
sovereignty. All claimants have a legal justification to demonstrate effective control even 
though the unintended consequences could escalate tensions. A system created to settle 
conflict may inadvertently provide an incentive for conflict.   
Therefore, as Reinhard Drifte observes, challenges to a country’s effective control 
promotes a country’s case but also may escalate a maritime dispute into a conflict.  
Because ICJ and PCA verdicts favor effective control, states may aggressively assert or 
defend their sovereignty:119 First, forcibly taking islands provides an opportunity for a 
claimant to demonstrate effective control. This was the case for China in the 1974 
occupation of the Paracel islands. In 1974, China invaded the Paracel Islands wresting 
control of the islands from South Vietnam. The islands remain under Chinese de facto 
control to this day. It can be argued, the peaceful occupation of the islands (since 1974) 
has done more to strengthen China’s legal claim through the continued and peaceful 
exertion of sovereignty.120 Second, claimants are encouraged to violently defend disputed 
claims, as China did against Vietnam in the Johnson Reef Incident of 1988. In 1988, 
China killed 60 Vietnamese soldiers who were attempting to plant a flag on Johnson 
Reef.121 Third, claimants are encouraged to enlarge their military garrisons on disputed 
maritime claims. This is done to reinforce the island’s military presence as well as 
provide a legal example of effective control. In 2012, China increased its Woody Island 
garrison with additional military forces and can forward deploy fighter aircraft using the 
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small air base on the island.122 Fourth, claimants are encouraged to conduct economic 
ventures on the islands.123 State sanctioned economic ventures reinforce an effective 
control claim. Fifth, claimants are encouraged to build structures on disputed islands like 
Japan’s construction of lighthouses on the Senkaku Islands. In 1978, Japanese 
nationalists constructed a lighthouse on Senkaku Island to demonstrate its claim to the 
island.124 These actions strengthen one claimants’ title and if uncontested, weaken or 
challenge the other claimant’s title.   
Despite the pessimistic outlook, facts reveal the trends in the PCA and ICJ tend 
not promote land grabs. Over the past 25 years, only one conflict escalated to war over an 
island. (The most recent conflict was the skirmish between Yemen and Eritrea over the 
Red Sea Islands in 1995. This island sovereignty dispute was ultimately resolved by the 
PCA in 1998. The last major war over an island was the Falkland Islands War which took 
place in 1982. Even the lesser known military skirmish in the Johnson Atoll described 
above took place in 1988.) Instead, in the same 25 year period, six ICJ or PCA cases were 
initiated and settled in the international court system. Therefore international law is 
utilized more frequently than military force.  
D. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this chapter analyzed ten maritime disputes settled in the PCA, 
PCIJ, and ICJ. Nine out of the ten cases revealed effective control was the most 
determinative factor in deciding maritime disputes (see Table 3). The courts initially 
analyzed treaty law and uti possidetis, but for one reason or another this was 
inconclusive. Instead, the courts reverted to using colonial and post-colonial examples of 
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effective control to reach a verdict. Treaty law was not determinative because often these 
small, desolate, unpopulated, and economically insignificant islands were forgotten or not 
mentioned in treaties. In some cases, the treaties broadly referenced the islands but failed 
to specifically identify islands. Uti possidetis was inconclusive because the courts were 
forced to wade through hundreds of years of title to reach a conclusion. This was difficult 
to do objectively. Effective control was the most determinative because it is often easier 
to define and prove, and the courts tolerate a low standard for its determination. Yet the 
problem with using effective control over all other legal arguments is that states can 
abuse this legal justification in the name of international law. Countries may be 
encouraged to act aggressively to create and defend effective control or to undermine and 
challenge another claimant’s effective control. Therefore an institution designed to settle 
conflict may actually encourage it.  
Effective control, is extraordinarily important in determining the legality of a 
disputed maritime claim. As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, the strength and 
weakness of China’s effective control in the Senkaku Islands, the Paracel Islands, and 
Scarborough Shoal could determine the sovereignty of these cases. Additionally, the 
strength or weakness of their claim may determine how China exerts legal warfare, as 





Table 3.   Maritime Disputes in the PCA, PCIJ, and ICJ 
Date Claimant Claimant Court Name of Case Who Won Basis of 
Decision 
Examples of Effective Control 
1928 U.S. Netherlands PCA Island of Palmas Netherlands Effective 
Control 
1. Suzerain contracts with the local population; 2. 
Flag hoisting; 3. Taxation.  




1. Diplomatic agreements mentioning Greenland (as 
a whole); 2. Hunting expeditions; 3. Scientific 
exploration; 4. Visitation permits 
1953 France United 
Kingdom 




1. Regulation of oyster fishing; 2. Criminal 









1. International diplomacy/international recognition; 
2. Sale of the island; 3. Claimant returned the island 
to the other claimant; 4. Nomination of Justices of 
the Peace; 5. Military appointments; 6. Issued 
Licenses; 7. Held elections; 8. Taxation; 9. 
Conducted census; 10. Tracked births/deaths; 11. 
Registered land; 12. Civil and criminal proceedings 
on the islands; 13. Postal service; 14. Built 
infrastructure (electricity, schools); 15. Provided 
health care for the population; 16. Provided 
education.  
1996 Eritrea Yemen PCA Red Sea Islands Split Effective 
Control / 
Geography 
1. Construction and maintenance of lighthouses; 2. 
Regulation of petroleum exploration. 3. Construction 
of an airstrip for Yemeni sanctioned petroleum 
workers; 4. Licensing tourist activities; 5. Promise 
and intent to operate a lighthouse.  
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Date Claimant Claimant Court Name of Case Who Won Basis of 
Decision 
Examples of Effective Control 
2001 Qatar Bahrain ICJ Case Concerning 
Maritime Delimitation 
and Territorial Questions 






1. Construction of a navigational aid 
2002 Indonesia Malaysia ICJ Sovereignty over Pulau 




1. Construction and maintenance of lighthouses; 2. 
Regulation of turtle egg collection. 




1. Construction and maintenance of lighthouses; 2. 
Construction of naval outposts; 3. Law enforcement 
on the island; 4. Naval patrol visits; 5. Search and 
rescue operations. 
2007 Nicaragua Honduras ICJ Case Concerning 
Territorial and Maritime 
Dispute Between 
Nicaragua and Honduras 
in the Caribbean Sea 
Split Effective 
Control 
1. Civil and criminal law enforcement; 2. 
International recognition; 3. Immigration 
enforcement; 4. Fishing enforcement (with on island 
construction); 5. Oil exploration; 6. Public Works to 
support oil exploration.  
2008 Malaysia Singapore ICJ Case Concerning 
Sovereignty over Pedra 
Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, 






1. Regulation of foreign visits; 2. Investigation of 
shipwrecks around the islands; 3. Flying the 
Singapore flag; 4. Installation of a naval relay 
antenna; 5. Proposed land reclamation 
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III. EXAMINING CHINA’S MARITIME DISPUTES: THE 
SENKAKU ISLANDS, PARACEL ISLANDS, AND SCARBOROUGH 
SHOAL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The last chapter focused on international law and how international courts use 
examples of effective control to resolve maritime disputes. This chapter will focus on 
China’s legal case for the Senkaku Islands, Paracel Islands, and Scarborough Shoal. It 
seeks to answer the initial research question: do China’s maritime claims and behavior 
regarding the Senkaku Islands, Paracel Islands, and Scarborough Shoal have a sound 
basis in contemporary international law? 
The strength or weakness of China’s legal case can potentially drive its strategy 
and tactics in dealing with its maritime disputes. If China’s claim to the Senkaku Islands 
(or any other disputed maritime territory) is weak, it may be more likely to resort to other 
legal methods (or unlawful methods) to contest Japan’s control over the islands. Other 
legal methods may include legal actions or actions outside of the law that use a quasi-
legal justification. If China’s legal claim to the Nine Dash Line (and therefore the Paracel 
Islands and Scarborough Shoal) using customary international law is flawed, China may 
be more likely to use nuanced legal justifications to fortify its claim. Concurrently, if 
China’s legal claim is strong, it may use unlawful measures to defend its claim. 
Competing claimants may use unlawful measures to dislodge China’s occupation 
depending on the strength or weakness of China’s legal claim. The next chapter will 
discuss China’s use of international law to fortify its legal claims or to justify its actions.   
1. Case Study Method 
To answer the research question, this chapter uses the case study method to 
analyze the Senkaku Islands, Paracel Islands, and Scarborough Shoal disputes. Each case 
will examine the multiple legal factors justifying both side’s legal claim to the maritime 
features. Using Brian Taylor Sumner’s method of analysis, the legal factors will include 
treaty law, uti possidetis, and effective control. The intent is to analyze the cases as a 
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court would. This analysis is important to show that, despite the outward confidence 
China exhibits in its claim, its legal case surrounding two of the three maritime features is 
very tenuous. The only dispute in which China has a reasonable claim is the Paracel 
Islands because of clear demonstrations of effective control and brief acquiescence by 
Vietnam.  
The first section of this chapter will cover the Senkaku Island dispute. It will 
show Japan’s claim to the Senkaku Islands is stronger than the Chinese claim. The 
second section will cover the dispute over the Paracel Islands and Scarborough Shoal. 
This section will assess China’s claim to the South China Sea and the Nine Dash Line 
using customary international law. Case analysis will show that although China’s claim 
to the Paracel Islands is strong, its claim to the Scarborough Shoal is weak.  
B. THE SENKAKU (DIAOYU) ISLAND DISPUTE 
This section will examine the Senkaku Islands sovereignty dispute between Japan 
and China.  It seeks to answer the question which state has a stronger claim.  
1. Introduction 
The Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands are contested by China and Japan based on historic 
claims from both sides (See Figure 2). Tensions surrounding the islands have led to a war 
of rhetoric between Japan and the People’s Republic of China. Although tensions rose in 
2010 when the Japanese Coast Guard arrested a Chinese fisherman in the waters 
surrounding the Senkaku Islands, the dispute climaxed in 2012 when Japan nationalized 
the islands by purchasing them from a private Japanese citizen.125 Since then both sides 
conducted air and maritime patrols around the islands. In 2013 China announced an Air 
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea.126 The air and maritime 
patrols increase the potential for miscalculation, escalation, and possible conflict. Both 
                                                 
125 Reinhard Drifte, “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Territorial Dispute Between Japan and China:  
Between the Materialization of the ‘China Threat’ and Japan ‘Reversing the Outcome of World War II'?” 
UNISCI Discussion Papers 32 (May 2013): 10. 
126 Xinhua, “Statement by the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Establishing the East 
China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone,” Xinhua, November 23, 2013, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/23/c_132911635.htm. 
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sides lay claim to the island, and both sides have conducted military shows of force in 
and around the islands. Although China and Japan present strong claims over the 
Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, Japan’s claim is slightly more convincing. After a brief 
background and some definitions the first section will summarize the historic cases made 
by both sides. The second section will show how Japan’s claim is stronger than China’s 
claim based on demonstrations of Japanese effective control.  
 
Figure 2.  The Location of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands127 
2. Background 
The Senkaku Islands are located approximately 90 nautical miles northeast of 
Taiwan, approximately 200 nautical miles east of mainland China, and approximately 90 
                                                 
127 Matt Stiles, “The Role for the U.S. in the East China Sea Dispute,” National Public Radio, January 
13, 2013, http://www.npr.org/2013/01/30/170667524/reality-and-perception-on-the-containment-of-china. 
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nautical miles from the nearest Japanese Island of the Ryukyu Island chain.128 Japan 
refers to the archipelago as the Senkaku Islands while the People’s Republic of China 
refer to them as the Diaoyu Islands (the Chinese word means fishing platform). There are 
eight total maritime features; five are uninhabitable islets, and three are barren rocks.129 
In 1971, the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) released its 
findings of potential oil and natural gas in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands.130 This 
report combined with the oil shocks of the 1970s provided an economic and national 
security incentive for nations to control the Senkaku Islands and its hydrocarbon 
resources.  
a. International Law 
The last section provided a background on the Senkaku Islands, this brief section 
will establish two legal concepts relevant to this chapter.   
(1) Basis for Sovereignty 
In accordance with international law, sovereignty for new territory can be claimed 
by meeting two elements. The first element is the discovery of terra nullius. An 
individual, acting on behalf of the state can initiate a claim of terra nullius for that state. 
As discussed in the Chapter II, the second required element for sovereignty is the 
demonstration of effective control. Any case using effective control can also be 
reinforced through acquiescence.131  
(2) Belligerent Occupation 
Under international law and the 1945 United Nations Charter, if a state uses force 
to violate sovereignty and conquer territory, the takeover is considered belligerent 
                                                 
128 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan), “The Senkaku Islands: Seeking Maritime Peace Based on 
Rule of Law, Not Force or Coercion,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs—Japan, accessed February 12, 2014, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000018519.pdf. 
129 Han-yi Shaw, The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the 
Ownership Claims (Baltimore, MD: School of Law University of Maryland, 1999), 10, (hereafter cited as 
Senkaku Island Dispute - History and Analysis).   
130 Ibid., 5. 
131 William R. Slomanson, Fundamental Perspectives on International Law, 5th ed. (Belmont, CA: 
Thomson Wadsworth, 2007), 268–269. 
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occupation and the conquering state is not recognized as the legitimate ruler of the 
territory. A country and the occupied population maintain sovereignty despite belligerent 
foreign occupation.132 A relevant historic example is the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait from 
1990 to 1991. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August of 1990, the 
international community condemned the attack. Within international law the Iraqi 
occupation of Kuwait was seen as belligerent occupation and an international coalition 
was organized with the intent to liberate Kuwait. At the end of hostilities, the sovereignty 
of Kuwait was restored while Iraq retreated to its pre-war borders.  
b. Japan’s Claim 
From the Japanese point of view, the islands were identified as terra nullius and 
“discovered” by Koga Tatsushiro who landed on the islands to carry out his business of 
“catching and exporting marine products.”133 He was attracted to the island due to the 
presence of albatross feathers and petitioned to lease the islands in 1885 from Okinawa 
Prefectural authorities. Several of Mr. Koga’s petitions were denied because Japanese 
authorities questioned if it owned the islands. His petition was finally approved on 10 
June 1895.134 Over the years, Koga was granted a no-rent lease for 30 years. During that 
time he employed workers and developed the islands for habitation. After the 30 year 
lease ended, Japan rented and then sold the islands to Koga. Prior to World War II, the 
islands were left uninhabited because the cost of transportation was too great.135  
In 1958, the US military used the islands for target practice and training. Because 
one of the islands that the military used was owned by the Koga family, the United States 
leased the island from the family. Afterwards, the Koga family sold their islands to the 
Kurihara family. One of the islands, Taisho-jima has remained state-owned land and 
belongs to the Ministry of Finance.  
                                                 
132 Ibid., 271–273. 
133 Shaw, Senkaku Island Dispute - History and Analysis, 30. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid., 30–31. 
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Due to the controversy following China’s claim to the islands, in 1972 Japan 
issued The Basic View of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Senkaku Islands. This 
document represents Japan’s official stance and legal justification supporting its claim to 
the Senkaku Islands. The view states the islands were terra nullius and were incorporated 
in 1895 through discovery occupation. A marker was placed by the government of 
Okinawa prefecture to establish this claim in 1895.136 The Japanese also assert the 
islands were never part of Taiwan. Therefore, they were not included in Article 2 of the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki which ceded Taiwan and the adjacent islands to Japan.137 
Because, the islands were not included in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the Cairo 
Declaration, or the 1951 San Francisco Treaty (the peace treaty between the United States 
and Japan that ended the state of war between both nations), Japan was not required to 
return the islands to the Republic of China at the conclusion of World War II.138 In May 
of 1969, authorities from Okinawa erected a fixed concrete marker on the main island of 
Senkaku. The engraving established the island as part of the City of Ishigaki. The 
Republic of China protested this unilateral move.139 In 1978, a Japanese right-wing 
political group, Nihon Seinensha (Japanese Youth Federation), built a lighthouse on 
Senkaku Island. By building a navigational aid, the group intended to legitimize the 
Japanese claim over the islands. This infuriated the PRC and led to Chinese protests. The 
situation was diffused in October of 1978, when the PRC and Japan signed the Treaty of 
Peace and Friendship (this treaty was the peace treaty between the PRC and Japan 
recognizing an end to World War II). At the time, both sides elected to shelve the dispute. 
In 1990, the lighthouse was renovated by Nihon Seinensha, instigating the ire of the 
                                                 
136 Ibid., 22–28; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan), “The Basic View of the Ministry of Foreign 
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Chinese again. On 9 February 2005, Japan placed the lighthouse under the protection of 
Japanese state control. The move was condemned by China.140 The markers and 
navigational aids provide evidence of Japanese authority and effective control.  
The islands were mentioned in early diplomatic correspondence between Japan 
and the Republic of China and support an argument of ROC acquiescence. In 1920, the 
Chinese Consul stationed in Nagasaki, wrote a letter of appreciation to Japanese 
fishermen for rescuing shipwrecked Taiwanese sailors who were stranded on the Senkaku 
Islands. In the letter, the Consul cites “[fishermen] were met with contrary winds and 
drifted to Wayo Island, Senkaku Islands, Yaeyama District, Okinawa Prefecture, Empire 
of Japan.” To many historians, this letter is written evidence of China’s 
acknowledgement that the Senkaku Islands were seen by the Chinese as Japanese owned 
and administered. The letter was written by a Republic of China Consul, in his official 
capacity of his duties.141 This statement is similar to the acquiescence observed by the 
Ihlen Declaration in the Norway v. Denmark (Eastern Greenland) case. In 1968, workers 
from the Republic of China were found on the islands without passports or official 
Japanese permission. Japanese officials asked the workers to leave. The workers then 
applied for permission with Okinawan prefecture authorities and were granted access to 
their original worksite. During this diplomatic exchange, the Republic of China did not 
issue a protest or demarche over the sovereignty of the islands.142 This is another 
example of ROC acquiescence. The PRC disputes any acquiescence argument stating the 
actions of the ROC do not represent the official stance of the PRC.  
c. China’s Claim  
China’s claim to the Senkaku Islands dates back to the Fourteenth Century. The 
Ryukyuan Kingdom was a tributary state of China in the Fourteenth Century. Chinese 
navigators used the Senkaku Islands as navigational aids to sail to Okinawa. Therefore, in 
this view, the Japanese claim that the islands were terra nullius is void. Furthermore, 
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envoys indicated that Chinese navigators felt they had reached foreign islands well after 
navigating past the Senkaku Islands. Sailors conducted ceremonial and sacrificial rituals 
indicating increased tension and uncertainty because of departing home waters.143 Sailors 
from the eighteenth century noted that the color of the sea changed from blue to black 
when crossing into foreign waters after passing the Senkaku Islands. The Chinese sailors 
even named the area between the Ryukyu Islands as “Black Water Trough.” Modern day 
oceanographers have noted that this change in water color is caused by moving from 200 
meters of depth to over 2,000 meters into what is known today as the Okinawa 
Trough.144  
A noted Japanese map maker from the Edo period colored the islands as 
belonging to Taiwan. His basis for the coloring was centered on Chinese envoy reports 
and give further evidence that the Japanese were aware of the Chinese boundary between 
Taiwan and the Ryukyu Islands; therefore the islands were not terra nullius.145 China 
also contends Japan opportunistically cites map evidence from one particular map maker 
when his work supports Japan’s claim yet dismiss work from the same map maker when 
his work does not support Japan’s claim. Therefore, it is illogical for Japan to dismiss the 
map maker’s contradictory evidence in the Senkaku dispute.146   
Evidence of Chinese on-island effective control is hard to come by. To provide 
evidence of effective control, China argues that Fourteenth and Sixteenth century Chinese 
sailors conducted counter-piracy and naval patrols around the islands, as the islands were 
incorporated into the Chinese coastal defense system.147 However, further primary source 
evidence showing on-island effective control is simply not available. Instead, the PRC 
contends customary international law reflects Imperial China was the regionally and 
historically accepted ruler of the East China Sea (and South China Sea). This Sino-centric 
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world view perceives that China was the middle kingdom of the world and all other 
foreign cultures should pay tribute to China and adopt Chinese culture as the defining 
world order. Because of this Sino-centric view of the world, according to the Chinese 
view, the relevance of effective control is superseded by the customary norm in the 
region. Primary sources written during the time of Imperial China would naturally reflect 
a Sino-centric world view and do not incorporate the Western European world view that 
requires the establishment of effective control, sovereignty, and borders. While there are 
no primary sources showing on-island effective control over the Senkaku Islands this is a 
moot point since customary international law demonstrates Imperial China was the 
historically and regionally accepted ruler of the region.148  
In its white paper on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, the PRC contends the Senkaku 
Islands are part of the larger island of Taiwan. China was forced to cede control of 
Taiwan and the neighboring islands (to include the Senkaku Islands) to Japan in the 
“unequal” 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki.149 This treaty between Imperial China and Japan 
ended the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). China contends that the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki began the belligerent occupation of the Senkaku Islands. Based on the 
belligerent occupation, the Republic of China attested that the islands should have 
returned to Chinese control in accordance with the 1943 Cairo Declaration, the 1945 
Potsdam Declaration, and the 1953 Peace Treaty between the ROC and Japan. (Both 
declarations established the territorial claims and expectations among the victorious 
powers in the post-World War II era.)150  
China’s white paper also contends the islands were briefly returned to Chinese 
control as part of the return of Taiwan but backroom deals and secret consultations 
between Japan and the United States generated a conspiracy to steal the Senkaku Islands 
from China. The PRC protested the San Francisco Treaty of 1951, the peace treaty 
between the United States and Japan. In 1971 the United States and Japan signed the 
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Ryukyu Reversion Agreement. This agreement returned the Ryukyu Island chain to 
Japanese sovereignty. Included in the agreement were the Senkaku Islands. The PRC 
protested this agreement too, yet it should be noted, the United States did not recognize 
the sovereignty of the PRC until 1979. Therefore PRC protests at the time were ignored. 
PRC protests are relevant because they demonstrate consistent defiance to Japan’s claim, 
preventing any argument of Chinese acquiescence.151  
d. Japan’s Response to China’s Claim: 
Japan responded to China’s Senkaku white paper, “Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent 
Territory of China,” on its Ministry of Foreign Affairs webpage. The Japanese 
government webpage refutes China’s legal assertions.152 First, Japan contends the 
Senkaku Islands are separate from Taiwan and not part of the Cairo Declaration. Both the 
Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Declaration do not specifically mention the Senkaku 
Islands by name or location. Second, “The Basic View” argues both the ROC and PRC 
failed to protest the incorporation of the islands in Article III of the San Francisco Treaty. 
In the treaty, the United States was given administration of the Ryukyu Islands via a 
latitude and longitude. Both the ROC and PRC acquiesced to Japan’s claim by failing to 
protest U.S. custody of the islands.153 Third, China’s argument that the islands were 
Chinese owned is based on assumptions or implied in documents. China cannot produce 
any documents stating the islands were explicitly Chinese owned. In this third point, 
Japan contends China fails to produce concrete evidence the Chinese government or 
imperial predecessors exerted any on-island effective control. If China truly claimed the 
islands prior to 1895, it made no attempt to occupy or exert effective control on the 
islands. Japan also argues conducting counter piracy patrols does not constitute effective 
control of the islands in accordance with international law.154 Finally, the ROC did not 
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protest the 1971 Ryukyu and Daito Island Reversion Agreement returning sovereignty of 
the islands from the United States back to Japan.155  
e. China’s Rebuttal to Japan’s Claim: 
In reaction to Japan’s case, China’s white paper on the Senkaku Islands 
challenges Japan’s “Basic View” by lodging four counter arguments to Japan’s claims. 
First, Koga Tatsushiro’s petition to lease the island was only approved on 10 June 1895, 
six days after Japan had occupied Taiwan. Japan only approved Koga’s ownership 
request because it held a legal claim to Taiwan and the islands surrounding Taiwan. 
Second, the islands were part of Taiwanese territory and therefore subject to the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki. Therefore Japan should have relinquished all claims to the island at the 
conclusion of World War II. Third, despite Japan’s insistence that the islands were never 
occupied by the Chinese, due to the remote and inhospitable nature of the islands, it 
would be impossible for Chinese to occupy the islands. Prior to 1895, technology for bulk 
water storage and water distillation did not exist. Finally, the PRC consistently disputed 
Japan’s claim to the Senkaku Islands in the San Francisco Treaty and the Ryukyu 
Reversion agreement and therefore never acquiesced to Japan’s claim.156  
f. Applying Sumner’s Methodology 
By analyzing treaty law, uti possidetis, and effective control, a legal case would 
most likely favor Japan’s claim to the islands.157 Analyzing treaty law alone would be 
inconclusive. There is no conclusive proof the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the Cairo 
Declaration, or the 1951 San Francisco Treaty clearly incorporates the Senkaku Islands. 
In examining the Nicaragua v. Colombia case, treaty specificity matters. In Nicaragua v. 
Colombia the court unanimously agreed the San Andres Archipelago belonged to 
Colombia. However the treaty did not mention by name or location, which maritime 
features were included in the San Andres Archipelago. Similarly, the court would 
                                                 
155 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan), “Senkaku Island Q&A.” 
156 People’s Republic of China, “Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China”; Shaw, Senkaku Island 
Dispute - History and Analysis, 112–122. 
157 Sumner, “Territorial Disputes at the ICJ,” 1803–1804. 
 68
unanimously agree Japan was required to relinquish its territories taken via conflict in 
accordance with the Cairo Declaration and the San Francisco Treaty. The Cairo 
Declaration states: 
It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the 
Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first 
World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the 
Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa (Taiwan), and the Pescadores, shall 
be restored to the Republic of China.158 
However, without exact locations or specific mention of the Senkaku Islands, the court 
would not be able to draw a conclusion using treaty law. The declaration unambiguously 
mentions Manchuria, Formosa (Taiwan), and the Pescadores yet it does not mention the 
Senkaku Islands by name. China would likely argue that the Senkaku Islands are included 
in the geography of Formosa (Taiwan). However, Japan would reiterate that if the 
declaration mentioned the Pescadores (which are closer to Formosa and the Chinese 
mainland) the treaty should have also mentioned the Senkaku Islands (which are further 
and smaller than the Pescadores). The Japanese argument would conclude that failure to 
mention the Senkaku Islands means the Cairo Declaration did not intend to cover the 
Senkaku Islands. Furthermore, Japanese control began prior to the First World War, 
therefore the Senkaku Islands would not qualify based on the time frame designated in 
the Cairo Declaration.  
Using uti possidetis to determine sovereignty would be irrelevant because the 
islands were never under any colonial rule. Therefore the court would look to 
demonstrations of effective control. China would argue its demonstrations of effective 
control included anti-piracy patrols in the vicinity of the islands, as well as navigators 
using the islands as a navigation point. However, as demonstrated in Indonesia v. 
Malaysia and Nicaragua v. Honduras, naval patrols around the islands do not constitute 
effective control on the island. Therefore China’s demonstration of effective control 
would be unsubstantiated. China could also argue a case for belligerent occupation. Since 
signing the Treaty of Shimonoseki, China had no alternative but to accede to Japanese de 
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facto rule. However, (according to Japan’s assertion) such a claim would prove difficult, 
given that during the period between 1949 and 1971, the PRC failed to contest Japan’s 
claim to the islands. The PRC disputes it ever acquiesced during this time frame by 
stating it consistently protested the San Francisco Treaty and the Ryukyu Reversion 
Agreement. To address this question a court will have to distinguish if protests lodged by 
the PRC before the PRC was recognized by the United Nations constituted legitimate 
protests of a state. This topic alone will be highly contentious and the court may not rule 
on this argument. 
Japan’s demonstrations of effective control are overwhelming. First, Japanese 
intent to grant Koga Tatsushiro a permit to extract resources, and later to lease, and sell 
the islands to him is an initial demonstration to act as a sovereign. Second, the local 
Okinawan government placed a sovereignty marker on Senkaku Island in 1895 and 1969 
to establish its claim. Third, in 1968 Japan enforced immigration law on workers on the 
islands from the Republic of China. As observed in Nicaragua v. Honduras and Malaysia 
v. Singapore, immigration and visitor control is additional evidence that Japanese 
jurisdiction covered the islands. Fourth, Japan conducted diplomacy regarding the islands 
by ensuring the 1971 Ryukyu Reversion Agreement included the Senkaku Islands. As 
observed in the El Salvador v. Honduras case, negotiating bilateral treaties covering the 
disputed territory is an example of Japan acting as a sovereign. Supporting this argument 
is the intent of the United States to return the Ryukyu Islands (including the Senkaku 
Islands) to Japan. This is not unlike how the United Kingdom returned El Tigre Island to 
Honduras after taking possession of the island to repay debts in the El Salvador v. 
Honduras case. Fifth, placing the Senkaku lighthouse under state control is another 
demonstration of effective control. Initially the construction of the lighthouse could be 
dismissed as the unsanctioned actions of private citizens. However, effective control was 
exerted when the lighthouse passed from the hands of private citizens to the control of the 
state. State run lighthouses are reoccurring examples of effective control as seen in 
Eritrea v. Yemen, Indonesia v. Malaysia, and Nicaragua v. Colombia.  
Finally, the 2012 nationalization of the Senkaku Islands was a major example of 
effective control. When discussing the background on the islands above, the government 
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of Japan sold the islands to the Koga family. Over time, the Koga family sold the islands 
to the Kurihara family. In 2013, the lease was to expire and the nationalistic Tokyo 
Governor Ishihara Shintaro announced his intention to purchase the islands from the 
Kurihara family. Fearing the actions of a nationalist politician could inflame Sino-
Japanese relations, Prime Minister Noda purchased the islands on behalf of the 
Government of Japan. Although this move was probably the lesser of two evils, the 
purchase upset Sino-Japanese relations and enflamed anti-Japanese nationalism in China. 
In terms of effective control, the nationalization was a clear demonstration of effective 
control.159  
Chinese acquiescence is evident in two examples. First, the 1920 letter of 
appreciation from the Chinese Consul in Nagasaki provided evidence that China 
recognized Japan’s sovereignty over the island. (However, it could be argued, unlike the 
Ihlen Declaration and the Norway v. Denmark case, this Consul was not the Chinese 
foreign minister.) Second, in 1968, the Republic of China did not protest the Japanese 
deportation of Taiwanese workers on the islands. If the Republic of China truly claimed 
the islands they would have vehemently protested Japan’s unjustified immigration 
enforcement. It should be noted ROC acquiescence does not equate to PRC acquiescence. 
It is also suspect that a Chinese protest finally emerged the same year the findings of the 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) were released in 1971.160  
If the case went to an international court, China would probably use a belligerent 
occupation argument to refute all Japanese demonstrations of effective control. However, 
in order for belligerent occupation to apply, China would need to demonstrate it 
maintained effective control before Koga Tatsushiro arrived on the islands in 1885. In 
examining China’s White Paper on the Senkaku Islands, the historic claim does not detail 
any on-island effective control. Chinese sailors may have identified the island and used it 
for navigation, its fishermen may have fished in the waters adjacent to the island, 
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however this does not equate to on-island effective control. Therefore belligerent 
occupation would not apply in this particular case.161  
g. Conclusion 
In conclusion, both Japan and China provided well-balanced arguments to claim 
the Senkaku Islands. However, based on demonstrations of effective control, the  
Japanese claim to the Senkaku Islands is well substantiated. Japan demonstrated effective 
control through the lease and sale of the island, regulated immigration, concluded 
diplomacy over the islands, and operated a lighthouse on the largest island. China also 
acquiesced its claim by failing to pretest the deportation of Taiwanese workers on the 
island and failing to protest continued Japanese administration of the islands immediately 
after World War II.  
C. THE PARACEL ISLANDS AND THE SCARBOROUGH SHOAL 
This section will examine the sovereignty of the Paracel Islands and the 
Scarborough Shoal. It seeks to answer the question which state has a stronger claim. Both 
maritime features are discussed together in this section because of their location within 
China’s Nine Dash Line. Yet one of the most fundamental difference between the two 
disputes is the fact that the Paracel Islands are an archipelago of habitable islets whereas 
the Scarborough Shoal is a low-tide elevation with a rock. This fundamental difference 
affects how states demonstrate effective control on either feature.  
1. Introduction 
The previous section of this chapter built a legal case supporting Japan’s claim to 
the Senkaku Islands. This section will focus on the legal case concerning China’s claim 
to the Paracel Islands and the Scarborough Shoal. The reason why this section combines 
these two cases is because the Paracel Islands and Scarborough Shoal fall within the 
Chinese-claimed “Nine Dash Line.” The legal justifications China uses to build its case 
for both maritime features are virtually identical. Likewise, the legal arguments against 
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China’s Nine Dash Line can be used against both features. In an effort to prevent 
repetition, this section will combine the arguments for and against the Nine Dash Line in 
this section. The chapter will then distill the cases for the Paracel Islands and 
Scarborough Shoal separately from the Nine Dash Line.  
This chapter will show that the Chinese legal justification for the Nine Dash Line 
is flawed. When the claims to the Paracel Islands and the Scarborough Shoal are argued 
separately from the Nine Dash Line, China has a strong case for the Paracel Islands and a 
weak case for the Scarborough Shoal. To reach this conclusion, this section will first 
provide a background on the Paracel Islands and the Scarborough Shoal. Second, it will 
provide a background on the Nine Dash Line. Third, it will assess the validity of the Nine 
Dash Line in international law. Fourth, this section will demonstrate why China presents 
a strong legal case supporting its claim to the Paracel Islands. The fifth and final section 
will show why China’s case for the Scarborough Shoal is flawed.  
2. Background of the Maritime Territories 
This section will briefly discus the background history of both disputed maritime 
claims and the Nine Dash Line. Both the Paracel Islands and the Scarborough Shoal 
reside within the Nine Dash Line (See Figure 3).   
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Figure 3.  The South China Sea/Nine Dash Line  
and disputed maritime territories162 
a. Paracel Islands 
The Paracel Islands are an archipelago of small islets approximately 180 nautical 
miles from both Vietnam and China. The Chinese refer to the islands as the Xisha 
Islands. In Vietnamese, the archipelago is known as the Hoang Sa. Both China and 
Vietnam trace their ownership of the islands back to the 14th century. The islands were a 
navigational point when transiting between the Chinese empire and the Vietnamese 
kingdom. In 1974, the PRC forcefully seized control of the Paracel Islands from South 
Vietnam as the United States was withdrawing from Vietnam and when South Vietnam 
was militarily weak. About a year later, South Vietnam did not exist and the newly 
unified nation of Vietnam was militarily too weak to retake the Paracel islands.163 The 
islands have remained in Chinese de facto control ever since. China constructed an 
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airstrip on Woody Island and based fighters there. The strategic location of the base 
allows China to extend the range of fighter patrols over the South China Sea.164 Since 
1999, China has unilaterally imposed an annual foreign fishing ban in the South China 
Sea from June to July, routinely infuriating Vietnam.165  
b. Scarborough Shoal 
The Scarborough Shoal is located 122 nautical miles west of the main Philippine 
Island of Luzon. The shoal is an enclosed triangle-shaped reef with a narrow channel 
leading to an inner lagoon. Most of the shoal is submerged. The tallest point of the shoal 
is South Rock, which rises 1.8 meters above the water at high tide.166 In Chinese 
Scarborough Shoal is called Huangyan Island. The Philippines refer to the shoal as Bajo 
de Masinloc. As early as 1935, China maintained the reef as part of the Zhongsha Islands 
(Maccesfield Bank). Historic Chinese documents and laws mentioned the island 
formation by name. The shoal lies within the Chinese Nine Dash Line. The Scarborough 
Shoal became a maritime dispute when, in 1997, the Philippine Navy prevented Chinese 
fishing vessels from approaching the shoal.167 In June of 2012, tensions escalated when 
the Philippine naval vessel BRP (Bapor ng Republika ng Pilipinas the prefix for 
Philippine navy ships) Gregorio del Pilar attempted to apprehend Chinese fishermen 
collecting marine life in the shoal. Before the Philippine Navy could arrest the fishermen, 
two Chinese maritime surveillance vessels arrived on scene and prevented the BRP 
Gregorio del Pilar from approaching the fishermen. The Chinese vessels radioed the 
BRP Gregorio del Pilar informing the crew that they had ventured into Chinese 
territorial waters. Since the June 2012 incident, Chinese Coast Guard vessels have 
maintained a continual presence around the shoal. Diplomatically, China and the 
Philippines were unsuccessful in their attempts to resolve the dispute. In January of 2013, 
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the Philippines submitted the case to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. 
About a month later, The PRC replied to the Philippines’s in a note verbale stating it 
would not accept the arbitration. As of December, 2014, the case remains open and 
undecided.168  
c. Background of the Nine Dash Line  
Although scholars and legal experts debate the true meaning of the Nine Dash 
Line (also referred to as the “U-shaped line”), in general it is China’s claim to most of the 
South China Sea. The Nine Dash Line originally appeared as eleven dashed lines in 1935 
as part of a publication from the Republic of China (ROC). The “Map of Chinese Islands 
in the South China Sea” was a Kuomintang representation of the ROC’s claimed insular 
features.169 After 1949, The PRC inherited the ROC’s position on the islands. The PRC 
reiterated its claim with the Declaration on China’s Territorial Sea of September 9, 
1958.170 The controversy surrounding the Nine Dash Line map gained international 
attention when it was, attached to a series of Chinese note verbales responding to 
Malaysia’s and Vietnam’s 2009 submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf. Up to this point, international awareness to the extent of China’s claim 
was not well known. The note verbales contested Malaysia’s and Vietnam’s conflicting 
claims to the South China Sea.171 Many questions arise surrounding the Nine Dash Line 
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map. If the Nine Dash Line map is a visual representation of what China claims, what 
does the dashed line mean? Is the dashed line a boundary? Do the lines represent China’s 
EEZ? What is China’s justification for its claim? The ambiguity of the line has produced 
much debate among scholars and (non-PRC) diplomats.  
The PRC has codified its claim to the Nine Dash Line in its passage of domestic 
laws and reinforced it in international statements. The PRC vaguely reiterated its claim 
with the Declaration on China’s Territorial Sea of September 9, 1958 (henceforth referred 
to as the 1958 Declaration). This document refers to Penghu Islands, the Tungsha Islands 
(or Dongsha Islands aka. Pratas Islands), Hsisha Islands (or Xisha Islands aka. Paracel 
Islands), the Chungsha Islands (Zhongsha Islands aka. Macclesfield Bank), the Nansha 
Islands (Spratly Islands) by name, then states that China owns “all other islands 
belonging to China.”172  
China passed its 1992 Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 
(henceforth referred to as the 1992 Law), reaffirming its claim to the South China Sea 
islands. Interestingly, this document adds a reference to Diaoyu Island (Senkaku Islands) 
but drops mention of the Zhongsha Islands. Just like the 1958 Declaration, the 1992 Law 
left the catch all phrase “all other islands that belong to the People’s Republic of 
China.”173  
When the PRC ratified UNCLOS on 7 June 1996, it added a declaration that 
referenced the 1992 Law as an articulation of China’s maritime territorial claims.174 The 
7 May 2009 note verbale presented the Nine Dash Line map with its ambiguous 
statement: 
China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea 
and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over 
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the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof (see attached 
map). The above position is consistently held by the Chinese Government, 
and is widely known by the international community.175  
The phrase “see attached map” indicated the map equated to China’s claim and somehow 
implied a corresponding justification. “See attached map,” did nothing for China’s case 
except to create doubt and questions. The 14 April 2011 note verbale revealed that the 
Nine Dash Line is based on “abundant historical and legal evidence,” alluding to a 
customary international law argument.176 Yet, scholars, diplomats, and legal experts are 
forced to interpret China’s vague claim to the South China Sea.177  
3. Analyzing the Validity of the Nine Dash Line in International Law 
An overwhelming majority of western scholars and legal experts attack the Nine 
Dash Line based for four reasons. First, the Nine Dash Line claim is ambiguous. Second, 
maps do not significantly contribute to verdicts rendered by the ICJ or PCA. Third, 
China’s claim using customary international law is flawed and based on a Sino-centric 
view of the world. Fourth, effective control during the Imperial Chinese period does not 
meet the legal standard of effective control.  
Western scholars and Chinese scholars draw diametrically opposed conclusions 
on the strength of the Nine Dash Line as a legal argument. Western scholars refute the 
Nine Dash Line is a legal argument. Chinese scholars argue the Nine Dash Line 
represents a historic claim to the South China Sea. This section will analyze the validity 
of the Nine Dash Line as a legal argument.  
a. The Ambiguity of the Nine Dash Line  
Many western legal scholars criticize the Nine Dash Line for its ambiguous 
meaning. No Chinese document provides clarity on what the nine dashes mean. Therefore 
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scholars on both sides of the debate are forced to interpret China’s meaning. Non-Chinese 
scholars have come up with five possible interpretations of what the Nine Dash Line 
means.  
First, the line could be an illustration of China’s continental shelf. The note 
verbale and map was submitted in reaction to Malaysia’s and Vietnam’s claim to their 
continental shelves. Although the map closely follows the 200 meter isobath, the Chinese 
government has failed to define the line.178 The map fails to provide accompanying 
hydrographic evidence to this justification like depth markings or hydrographic contour 
lines.179 Second, it could depict the extent of China’s exclusive economic zone. 
However, many insular features within the Nine Dash Line require interpretation of 
whether they are islands, rocks, or low-tide elevations.180 The map and note verbale do 
nothing to clarify this important legal point.  
Third, it could represent a declaratory line where everything contained inside the 
dashes is Chinese territory. If this is the case, why use dashes? Solid lines are the 
internationally recognized symbol of a territorial claim and China is a member of the 
International Hydrographic Organization. This organization established internationally 
recognized standards for drafting maps and charts. A dotted line is not a standard means 
of identifying a cartographic feature like a boundary or continental shelf. Additionally, if 
this is some sort of boundary, where are the coordinates that mariners and aviators could 
use to stay out of Chinese waters?181  
Fourth, the dashed line is drawn on such a small scale, its detail cannot be 
interpreted.182 Finally, the line could represent nothing more than historic Chinese 
patrols, merchant routes, or fishing grounds. The note verbale implies the map 
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demonstrates some link to history. Yet, viewing maps and reading the note verbale does 
not reveal a clear historic argument. There are no annotations or allusions to historic 
Chinese activity.183  
If western scholars formulated five interpretations of the Nine Dash Line, what do 
Chinese scholars say about the Nine Dash Line? Li Mingjiang condenses the disparate 
scholarly explanations of the Nine Dash Line into four interpretations. First, the Nine 
Dash Line represents the line of Chinese jurisdiction. This commonly accepted Chinese 
interpretation follows the verbiage from the note verbales where all islands are sovereign 
territory of China. (“China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South 
China Sea and the adjacent waters…”184) Therefore all maritime features within the line 
are Chinese. However the extent of the adjacent waters is not clearly defined by the 
dashed line. Second, the line is the limit of China’s historic rights. In this interpretation, 
China maintains sovereignty over the islands, rocks, and low tide elevations, however 
other states enjoy freedom of navigation, and can lay cables and pipelines on the seabed. 
This interpretation claims the islands but also reinterprets UNCLOS EEZs. The third 
interpretation identifies everything within the line as Chinese internal waters. In this strict 
interpretation, the entire line is the outer extent of China’s territorial sea. This means 
ships and aircraft transiting through the Nine Dash Line do not enjoy freedom of 
navigation. It is unclear if China would add an additional 200 nautical mile EEZ on top of 
the claimed territorial waters. The fourth interpretation argues that the Nine Dash Line is 
China’s national territorial boundary. This interpretation sounds similar to the first and 
third interpretation. It is unclear if Li Mingjiang means the line is the extent of China’s 
EEZ. Nevertheless, in weighing all four interpretations, it is evident that even Chinese 
scholars do not understand fully their government’s definition of the Nine Dash Line.185   
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b. Maps and Their Contribution to ICJ and PCA Verdicts  
Legal scholars question the contribution of maps in providing determinative data 
in ICJ and PCA Verdicts. ICJ and PCA court decisions indicate maps are information but 
not deciding factors of a case. This is because maps are cherry-picked evidence, subject 
to interpretation, and are manipulated based on state practice. First, maps from opposite 
claimants contradict each other. In some cases, maps from the same claimant contradict 
other maritime disputes with third-party states. China, in their view, has to explain 
inconsistencies in its Nine Dash Line map. Why did China’s original map of the South 
China Sea have eleven dashes instead of nine? Additionally, China contradicts its own 
map data. The dashes from the 1947 map vary in location (and quantity) from the 2009 
map. For example, the 2009 map appears to hug the Vietnamese and Malaysian coasts 
closer than the 1947 map (See Figure 4). Finally, on 21 October 2010, the Chinese State 
Bureau of Surveying and Mapping placed an electronic map online which added a tenth 
dash to the Nine Dash Line.186  
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Figure 4.  Map showing the disparity between the 1947 10 Dash Line  
and the 2009 Nine Dash Line187  
Second, historic maps were not standardized and have ambiguous cartographic 
symbols, colors, and lines which are subject to interpretation. The Nine Dash Line map 
did not contain a key or legend defining the line.188 Third, case law has historically 
established that map information is not significant. Many ICJ and PCA maritime cases 
included map evidence, yet they were never determinative. In the 1986 Burkina Faso v. 
Republic of Mali Case, the ICJ ruled maps alone do not constitute a claim to title.189 All 
of the claimants in the maritime territorial claims discussed in the last chapter submitted 
map evidence (United States v. Netherlands, Denmark v. Norway, France v. United 
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Kingdom, El Salvador v. Honduras, Eritrea v. Yemen, Qatar v. Bahrain, Indonesia, v. 
Malaysia, Nicaragua v. Colombia, Nicaragua v. Honduras, Malaysia v. Singapore). Yet 
none of these cases were decided based on map evidence alone.190  
Finally, because states hire map makers, the map maker’s neutrality is called into 
question. Maps created by the states involved in a dispute are not objective. Even maps 
created by an objective third party can be questioned if the source documentation of its 
map is derived from one of the original parties. The Nine Dash Line map was created by 
the government of the Republic of China. Therefore, according to critics, the map is 
hardly objective.191  
c. Customary International Law and the Sino-centric View of the World 
The 7 May 2009 note verbale (which accompanied the Nine Dash Line map,) 
made reference to the “widely known” understanding of “sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction over the relevant waters.”192 This reference alludes to the use of customary 
international law to defend China’s claim to the South China Sea. The Sino-centric 
argument asserts during the Imperial Chinese period, China, its vassal kingdoms, and its 
neighbors viewed China as the center of the civilized world (also known as the Middle 
Kingdom). Vassal states paid tribute to China and conformed to its laws and culture. 
Even barbarian cultures recognized Chinese superiority and respected its power.193 
During this time, Chinese sailors frequently traveled, fished, and exerted their dominance 
over the waters surrounding mainland China. In turn, through its unique history and 
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regional dominance China is entitled to the South China Sea as its historic waters.194 (For 
the remainder of this thesis, this argument will be referred to as the Sino-centric historic 
waters argument.)  
This regional view of the world changed during the Qing Dynasty and the ensuing 
period of European and Japanese colonization. Yet, despite a period of western 
colonization, the Sino-centric historic waters view of the world remains the legal 
justification for many of China’s controversial actions in the South China Sea. (These 
controversial actions include fishing bans, maritime patrols, and the construction of 
artificial islands. This will be discussed at length in the next chapter.) China continues to 
use a Sino-centric world view in its maritime claims today and frequently asserts it is 
backed up by customary international law. However, China’s reliance on customary 
international law to support the Sino-centric historic waters legal argument may be 
overstated.195   
To be sure, customary international law is relevant and should not be discounted 
in these disputes. Its relevance is so important that Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice stipulates the court will apply “international custom, as 
evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”196 This means any arguments citing 
customary international law will be weighed when determining legal verdicts. China can 
certainly make a case, the Sino-centric view of the world was and remains the accepted 
norm for the region. However, the concept of effective control is also a long held 
standard developed in customary international law. As the last chapter examined, 
international courts cited the international custom of using effective control to determine 
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sovereignty of disputed territories. The internationally accepted norm of effective control, 
reinforced by customary international law will probably overrule China’s regional world 
view. International case law has also invalidated other state’s historic waters argument. 
The 2006 Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago case clarified:  
Determining an international maritime boundary between two States on 
the basis of traditional fishing on the high seas by nationals of one of those 
States is altogether exceptional. Support for such a principle in customary 
and conventional international law is largely lacking.197   
Therefore, based on legal scholars and legal precedents, China’s Sino-centric historic 
waters argument will probably not stand up in court. Additionally, as a signatory to 
multilateral institutions like UNCLOS and the United Nations, China has adopted the 
Westphalian norm of sovereignty. Although customary international law should be 
looked at as a source of law, it does not apply in this case. Despite the preponderance of 
evidence invalidating the value and strength of a Sino-centric historic-waters legal 
argument supposedly backed by customary international law, China continues to cling to 
this legal argument. China’s sustained use of this weak and unfounded legal argument to 
justify its actions makes the Sino-centric historic waters legal argument a quasi-legal 
argument.  
d. Imperial Chinese Effective Control 
As the last chapter pointed out, demonstrations of effective control are usually 
determinative in settling maritime territorial disputes. Therefore an international court 
would ask what effective control over islands within the Nine Dash Line would look like 
in Imperial China. If China maintains that the Nine Dash Line represents historic or 
“relevant” waters, how did Imperial China exert effective control over its territorial 
claims?198 Under international law countries must demonstrate effective control through 
settlement or local governance. As codified in the landmark Norway v. Denmark case, the 
demonstration of effective control need not be extravagant or extensive. However, even 
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limited settlement or governance of these islands would be unlikely, given Imperial 
China’s lack of the necessary water distillation and food preservation technology to 
sustain a settlement. Therefore, as Masahiro Miyoshi argues, there is little documentation 
of Imperial China exerting effective control to establish a historic claim on islands within 
the Nine Dash Line.199 
e. Conclusion 
In summary, the legal argument to the South China Sea using the Nine Dash Line 
and customary international law is flawed for four reasons. First, the PRC keeps the 
intent of the Nine Dash Line strategically ambiguous. Second, based on legal precedence, 
maps alone are not credible enough to be a legal argument. The weight that China places 
in the Nine Dash Line map to explain its claim contributes to the strategic ambiguity of 
maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Third, the Sino-centric view of the world is not 
supported by customary international law, additionally this world view is no longer 
relevant since China has acceded to Westphalian international norms and institutions. 
Fourth, although the bar for demonstrating effective control is low, there is insufficient 
evidence Imperial China exerted effective control over the islands to warrant an argument 
on the basis of effective control. Therefore, according to critics, the Nine Dash Line map 
is hardly a legal argument or legal justification for Chinese behavior in the South China 
Sea. One of the most important conclusions to draw from the Nine Dash Line is that it 
does not provide an argument supporting effective control over land. As discussed in 
Chapter II, effective control means everything when deciding maritime sovereignty.   
4. Defending the Nine Dash Line  
Scholars defend the Nine Dash Line using five arguments. First, some scholars, 
like Zhiguo Gao, Zhang Haiwen, Hong Nong, and Bing Bing Jia, use a discovery 
occupation argument by citing Chinese seafarers traveled through the islands for 
economic benefit since 475 BC. Records show seafarers visited the islands to collect its 
                                                 
199 Dupuy and Dupuy, “China’s Historic Rights in the SCS,” 137–138; Miyoshi, “China’s U-Shaped 
Line,” 6–8. 
 86
resources (fish, guano, and turtle eggs).200 Zhiguo Gao goes on to cite the travels of the 
“Three-Jewel Eunuch,” Zheng He, who was appointed fleet admiral by the Ming emperor 
to spread imperial power. Zheng He conducted maritime patrols within the Nine Dash 
Line. The South China Sea was also a well-traveled route for merchants making their 
way to the Philippines, South East Asia, India, and the Mediterranean. Gao makes the 
argument that these maritime voyages are examples of early effective control. Gao also 
notes that in the 1940s, markers were placed on numerous islands in the Paracel Islands 
and Spratly Islands.201 Zhang Haiwen adds the act of naming and documenting the 
maritime features on maps provides evidence of ownership.202 Hong Nong provides the 
equation “sovereignty + UNCLOS + historic rights,” which means that China is entitled 
to sovereign jurisdiction to the entirety of area within the Nine Dash Line.203 Nong 
further clarifies the equation by explaining that China enjoys the sovereignty of the 
features within the Nine Dash Line, UNCLOS justifies the EEZ, and historic Chinese 
rights repudiate competing countries’ claims.204   
Second, Gao states that domestic Chinese laws passed in 1958 demonstrate 
China’s claim to the contested islands. The 1958 Declaration, the 1992 Law, China’s 
1996 UNCLOS ratification declaration, and the 1998 Law on the Exclusive Economic 
Zone and Continental Shelf are Chinese laws passed which declare China’s claim.205 
Third, because of the effective control China exerted over the islands, and because other 
claimants failed to lodge a protest, all other countries acquiesced to China’s claim. Since 
the creation of the Nine Dash Line in the late 1940s, states have failed to protest the line. 
Only with the recent reaction to the note verbale in 2009 did Malaysia, Philippines, and 
Vietnam take an interest in the Nine Dash Line.  
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Fourth, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
conflicts with the Sino-centric view or the world. In China’s case, greater weight must 
apply to the PRC’s claim under customary international law.206 China’s claim to the 
South China Sea extends to the third century B.C. and clearly predates UNCLOS. 
Therefore, China expects its claim to the South China Sea to be assessed using customary 
international law.207  
Fifth, based on the Norway v. Denmark case, the ICJ, PCIJ, and PCA do not 
require a major demonstration of effective control for sparsely populated areas like the 
islands within the Nine Dash Line. Carty poses the argument that technology did not exist 
to sustain human habitation or economic gain. This argument was codified in the British 
Foreign Commonwealth Office, Memorandum on claims to Spratly Islands in South 
China of 1974, which argued that China had the best claim to the Paracel and Spratly 
Islands.208  
5. Responding to Defenders of the Nine Dash Line  
Arguments supporting the Nine Dash Line have some flaws. First, arguments 
stating that the Chinese were the only people to sail the South China Sea is narrow-
minded. The voyages of other mariners from ancient Vietnam, Philippines, or Malaysia 
are completely ignored or discounted. The Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
provides examples of Vietnamese voyages during the same time frame of the Chinese 
claim.209  
Second, although China makes a case that unilaterally created domestic 
legislation over the islands are examples of effective control, scholars fail to note that 
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domestic laws must be enforced on the maritime feature in order to demonstrate 
sovereign control. Nevertheless, as the Norway v. Denmark case demonstrated, 
diplomatic agreements mentioning the islands specifically by name do reveal an intent to 
act as a sovereign. However, this is a weak effective control argument without on-island 
enforcement.  
Third, defenders of the Nine Dash Line fail to show how China enforced domestic 
laws within the Nine Dash Line that provide clear evidence of effective control.210 
Demonstration of effective control, the most determinative factor in settling maritime 
disputes, has not been proven by proponents of the Nine Dash Line. The voyages of the 
third century explorers around the islands do not constitute effective control over the 
islands. Unilaterally passing domestic legislation covering the claimed islands does not 
prove effective control over the islands. Sovereignty markers may have been placed on 
some of the islands, but more evidence of this is needed to truly strengthen China’s legal 
title. In summary defendants of the Nine Dash Line do not adequately support it in 
contemporary international law.  
Fourth, the legal arguments from Zhiguo Gao, Zhang Haiwen, and Hong Nong 
are circular and based on gross assumptions of Chinese sovereignty. They assume 
because China has historic rights, China has automatic sovereignty. Their arguments do 
not address competing claims from other states because historic rights (and the Sino-
centric historic waters argument) overrule all other claims. Additionally, none of these 
Chinese scholars address on-island effective control. It appears they believe that, because 
China discovered and named a feature, it has a historic title to the claim. These scholars 
do not complete the second part of the discovery occupation equation and prove China 
has historic rights due to occupation (effective control).  
For western scholars, the Nine Dash Line does nothing to strengthen China’s legal 
claim. The Nine Dash Line does not demonstrate effective control on islands or rocks of 
the South China Sea. Yet for Chinese scholars, the Nine Dash Line represents China’s 
historic claim reinforced by customary international law. The confidence Chinese legal 
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scholars have in the Nine Dash Line is overstated. Unless China develops a historic title 
narrative that incorporates effective control, it will be blindsided by the weakness of its 
Sino-centric historic title legal argument. China’s Nine Dash Line is neither reinforced by 
international law or customary international law. Its overconfidence in the Nine Dash 
Line and the Sino-centric historic waters legal argument is so weak that its repeated use 
forces states to question China’s geopolitical intent. This thesis has already labeled the 
Sino-centric historic waters argument as a quasi-legal argument. Chapter III will discuss 
China’s use of the quasi-legal argument as part of a strategy of legal warfare. The 
continued use of the quasi-legal argument could be used to mask expansionist conduct. 
The next two sections will look past the weak legal argument provided by the Nine Dash 
Line and examine both cases in contemporary international law.  
D. WHY THE PARACEL ISLAND CASE FAVORS CHINA 
Using the Sumner methodology presented in Chapter II, the facts suggest that 
China has a strong legal claim to possession of the Paracel Islands.211 Both China and 
Vietnam have conflicting historic claims that date into their respective imperial periods. 
An international court would find it difficult at best to rule on the historic title and uti 
possidetis alone, owing to the complicated chain of title and the inevitable use of a Sino-
centric perspective of the world. For example, in 1816 the King of Annam (Vietnam) 
annexed the Paracel Islands. At the time, Vietnam was a vassal state of Qing China. 
Therefore the annexation of the Chinese claimed Paracel Islands by a vassal state of 
China would lead to a confusing line of historic title. Can a Chinese vassal state annex 
Chinese islands? Annexation of the Paracel Islands by Vietnam when it was a Chinese 
vassal kingdom constituted annexing a territory from China in the name of China. If a 
vassal state annexes islands, does the title carry over to the ruling kingdom?212  
The more relevant periods of occupation occurred during the twentieth century. 
China physically occupied and provided administration of the islands from 1900 to 
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1932.213 In 1938, France entered the dispute by declaring ownership of the Paracel 
Islands with governance and administration based out of Cochinchina (the former French 
colonial administrative region at the southern tip of modern day Vietnam).214 During 
World War II, Japan occupied the Paracel Islands. In 1955, after recovering the islands 
from the Japanese as a result of the San Francisco Treaty, China reoccupied Woody 
Island and the eastern Paracel Islands.215 Meanwhile, in 1956, French forces turned over 
custody of the western Paracel Islands to South Vietnam.216 In 1956 and 1958, North 
Vietnam recognized China’s Territorial Sea Declaration which stated China’s claim to 
the Paracel and Spratly Islands. This is relevant because it is an example of North 
Vietnamese acquiescence.217 In the 1974 occupation of the Paracel Islands, China 
defeated South Vietnam giving the PRC control over the entire Paracel archipelago. 
China has maintained de facto control of the Paracel Archipelago ever since. After China 
wrested control of the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam, North Vietnam raised no 
objection. Although North Vietnam did not protest the occupation at the time, the current 
Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs contends the South Vietnamese protest in 1974 
constitutes a protest against China’s occupation on behalf of the greater Vietnam. Today, 
Vietnam continues that protest over the Paracel Islands.218  
1. Uti Possidetis  
A legal ruling using uti possidetis would be difficult to trace. France bequeathed 
its portion of the Paracel Islands to its South Vietnamese heir-apparent. Logically, when 
North Vietnam defeated South Vietnam in April 1975, the unification of greater Vietnam 
was complete. Former South Vietnamese territory became Vietnamese territory. 
                                                 
213 Ibid., 97. 
214 Sarah Raine and Christian Le Miere, Regional Disorder: The South China Sea Disputes (New 
York: Routledge, 2013), 37. 
215 Ibid., 39. 
216 Ibid., 39–40. 
217 Carty and Nazir Lone, “New Haven International Law,” 97. 
218 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Vietnam), “The East Sea Issue under the Light of International Law,” 
Vietnam’s Sovereign Boundaries, August 22, 2011, http://123.30.50.199/sites/en/theeastseaissueunderthe-
gid-eng1903a-nd-eng3b1b0.aspx. 
 91
However, China conquered the Paracel Archipelago before Vietnam was unified. 
Vietnam could make a case the islands were legally entitled to them as the heir apparent 
following the fall of South Vietnam. However, China could argue the conquest prevented 
this title from changing hands and North Vietnam was not the intended heir to the Paracel 
Islands. Based on these two competing arguments for title, no clear determination using 
uti possidetis is available. An exception may emerge if the court was asked to determine 
if China’s control over the Paracel Islands is actually belligerent occupation. If the court 
examined a belligerent occupation argument, all Chinese effective control since 1974 
would be invalid and a court could rule in Vietnam’s favor. Looking at how the courts 
viewed the confusing chain of title using uti possidetis in El Salvador v. Honduras, 
Eritrea v. Yemen, Indonesia v. Malaysia, and Nicaragua v. Honduras, the court may have 
to look at effective control as a clear and objective way of settling the dispute.  
2. Effective Control 
Effective control is usually the single most compelling legal argument for settling 
maritime territorial disputes. China’s claim to the Paracel Islands is very strong, with 
multiple examples of effective control. First, the Paracel Islands remain under de facto 
control of the People’s Republic of China. The PRC applies domestic administrative 
control across the Paracel Archipelago. This is shown through the enforcement of laws on 
the islands. The islands are also under the control of Hainan Province.219  
Second, China has conducted multiple public works projects on the island. State 
funded public works projects are clear demonstrations of the intent to act as a sovereign. 
Examples of public works include the construction of an airstrip, port facility, hospital, 
library, and cell phone coverage.220 Naturally, the state-funded services provided by 
these buildings also builds China’s effective control legal case. Third, the People’s 
Liberation Army has conducted deployments on the ground in the Paracel Islands. 
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3. Vietnamese Acquiescence 
In order to support an argument for effective control, a claimant could also argue 
the opposing claimant acquiesced its territory. Effective control arguments are stronger 
when combined with evidence the opposing claimant vacated its entitlement to a 
territory. North Vietnam acquiesced in 1956 and 1958 when it recognized the PRC’s 
Territorial Sea Declaration. This declaration asserted China’s claim to the Paracel and 
Spratly Islands. Following the 1974 Chinese occupation of the entire Paracel 
Archipelago, North Vietnam did not protest the Chinese occupation. A North Vietnamese 
protest would have represented a protest from a united Vietnam. Even though in 1974 
North Vietnam had not unified the entire country, it is indisputable that North Vietnam 
maintained a clear intent to unify the entire country. This is evident in the war of 
independence it fought against France and the United States. Had North Vietnam been 
content with a separated state, it would not have initiated a war against South Vietnam. 
Therefore, after demonstrating its intent to unify the country, North Vietnam spoke for 
the unified Vietnam. This makes all examples of North Vietnamese acquiescence 
compelling.  
After China successfully invaded the Paracel Islands in 1974, North Vietnam did 
not lodge a protest. Instead, South Vietnam lodged the protest as the claimant that had 
just lost its islands to China. Eventually, the newly unified Vietnam assumed South 
Vietnam’s stance and protested Chinese occupation of the Paracel Islands (amid 
deteriorating relations with China).221 The North Vietnamese failure to lodge a protest 
immediately after the invasion suggests acquiescence. North Vietnam had three reasons 
not to protest. First, North Vietnam pragmatically recognized it could not alienate its 
powerful communist ally to the north. Second, in 1974, North Vietnam did not have a 
navy to re-take the islands. Third, North Vietnam was preoccupied with winning its war 
against the United States. Nevertheless, North Vietnam in 1974 acquiesced its claim to 
China.  
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4. Defending Vietnam’s Claim 
To protest the PRC’s claim, Vietnam’s argument would likely reason that France 
intended for South Vietnam to control the Paracel Islands based on uti possidetis. After 
the unification of Vietnam, South Vietnamese territory became greater Vietnamese 
territory. China illegally conquered the islands by force contrary to the UN Charter, 
therefore a state of belligerent occupation has existed since 1974. In this view, while 
China maintains de facto control over the islands to this day, its sovereignty should not be 
recognized in a court of law, nor should any demonstrations of Chinese effective control 
since 1974. This would be Vietnam’s only legal defense as it has not exercised effective 
control over the islands since 1974. Although this is a strong argument, it is nullified by 
the acquiescence argument. If North Vietnam represented the greater Vietnamese 
government then it should have protested China’s invasion of the Paracel Islands 
immediately after its invasion.  
5. Summary of the Paracel Islands 
In conclusion, based on evidence of Chinese effective control and acquiescence 
from North Vietnam, the Paracel Islands legally belong to China. Analysis of history 
revealed tracing a chain of title from dynastic rule to the French colonial period was 
convoluted and inconclusive. Some of the Chinese claims used customary international 
law based on the Sino-centric view of world. Uti possidetis would not reveal a clear and 
decisive verdict due to the intervening Chinese occupation of the islands before South 
Vietnam was unified. Effective control would clearly determine Chinese ownership 
because of its de facto control over the islands. Additionally North Vietnam acquiesced to 
the PRC’s claim in 1956, 1958, and 1974. Vietnam’s only legal defense of the islands 
would use a belligerent occupation argument. However China’s effective control and 
corresponding North Vietnamese acquiescence arguments remains very strong.  
E. THE SCARBOROUGH SHOAL CASE 
The Scarborough Shoal is a recently disputed claim between China and the 
Philippines. Similar to Vietnam’s claim to the Paracel Islands, China claims the 
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Scarborough Shoal based on Imperial-era trade and the Sino-centric view of the world.222 
China’s historic claim to the Scarborough Shoal is based on its arguable ownership of the 
Zhongsha Island (more commonly known as Maccesfield Bank). China contends the 
Zhongsha Islands are a large archipelago that incorporates the Scarborough Shoal. (It 
should be noted Maccesfield Bank, a low-tide elevation, is approximately 170 nautical 
miles west of the Scarborough Shoal. As a low tide elevation outside of territorial waters, 
Maccesfield Bank would not earn any sovereignty and would not produce a territorial 
sea, let alone a 200 nautical mile EEZ.)223 As already described, Scarborough Shoal is a 
submerged feature with a rock. The fact that the only feature states can exert effective 
control over is a tiny rock, significantly influences how states can provide effective 
control and concurrently affects the strength or weakness of that effective control.   
The dispute initially came to light in 1997 when a Philippine naval vessel 
prevented Chinese vessels from approaching the Shoal. The crew of the Philippine naval 
vessel apparently raised a Philippine flag on one of the Scarborough rocks.224 2012 was 
an eventful year in the waters surrounding the Shoal. As described above, the BRP 
Gregorio del Pilar attempted to arrest Chinese fishermen who were extracting marine life 
from the shoal. PRC maritime security vessels quickly responded initiating a standoff. 
Since 2012, China has maintained a continual presence at Scarborough Shoal.225 In 2012, 
China placed the islands of the South China Sea under administrative control of Hainan 
Province.226 That same year, China instituted an annual fishing ban in the vicinity of 
Scarborough Shoal.227 In January of 2013, the Philippines submitted the dispute over the 
Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands to the International Tribunal for the Law of 
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the Sea (ITLOS).228 About a month later, the PRC submitted a diplomatic note stating it 
rejected the Philippines’s request for arbitration. To date, no verdict has been provided by 
the tribunal.  
1. Applying International Law to the Scarborough Shoal 
Before analyzing the case using Sumner’s methodology it is important to review 
relevant legal precedents. The legal dispositions of low-tide elevations were first 
discussed in Qatar v. Bahrain. The case stated sovereignty over a low-tide elevation can 
be determined if it falls within a territorial sea.229 The Scarborough Shoal is outside of 
the territorial sea of the Philippines and any Chinese claim (that is unless China claims 
everything within the Nine Dash Line as its own territorial sea). To clarify, the two 
nearest Chinese claims are the Spratly Islands and Maccesfield Bank. If the Chinese 
claim to the Spratly Islands or Maccesfield Bank were valid, Scarborough Shoal would 
still remain well outside of the 12 nautical mile territorial seas to justify a claim.  
The legal disposition of rocks has rested on two separate legal arguments. The 
first argument, which is similar to low-tide elevations, is the territorial sea argument. As 
observed in Eritrea v. Yemen, the PCA granted sovereignty of the Mohobbakahs islets to 
Eritrea based on its location within the Eritrean territorial sea.230 The second argument is 
effective control. In Qatar v. Bahrain, the ICJ granted sovereignty of Qit’at Jaradah (a 
rock by definition) to Bahrain based on the construction of a navigation marker 
constructed by the government of Bahrain. Therefore rocks are subject to demonstrations 
of effective control just like islands.  
In contrast to the Senkaku Islands and the Paracel Islands, the Scarborough Shoal 
case is dramatically different as it is a low-tide elevation and a rock. This definitional 
difference will make Sumner’s methodology in determining sovereignty (using treaty 
law, uti possidetis, and effective control) difficult to apply in this case.231 First, no 
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bilateral treaty discusses the ownership of the Scarborough Shoal. China’s declaration in 
UNCLOS claims the Zhongsha Islands via its domestic 1992 Law. However, the 
Philippines are not bound to recognize China’s declaration simply because it is a state 
party to UNCLOS.232  
Second, during Spanish and American colonization, no title to the shoal was 
bequeathed to the Philippine state, which makes analysis using uti possidetis nonviable. 
Concurrently, during European colonization of China, no colonial power bequeathed 
Scarborough Shoal to China. Although treaties between Spain and the United States 
established the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines in 1898 and 1901, Scarborough 
Shoal remains 13.5 nautical miles outside of this baseline and therefore outside of the 
Philippine territorial sea.233  
Third, effective control is difficult to demonstrate in this case. Rocks by definition 
are incapable of sustaining human life or economic viability.234 Therefore the ability of a 
claimant state to generate examples of effective control on the rock is limited. A human 
can barely stand on South Rock, the largest rock of the Scarborough Shoal, therefore 
demonstrations of effective control would be limited to the placement of markers or flags 
on the rocks as opposed to the administration of a population. Therefore the small and 
barren nature of South Rock prohibits states from demonstrating strong examples of 
effective control.   
As discussed in the analysis of the Norway v. Denmark, the legal bar for 
demonstrating effective control over remote islands (or rocks) is low. Both the 
Philippines and China would argue their naval or law enforcement patrols within the 12 
nautical miles of the Shoal constitute effective control. However, as demonstrated in 
Malaysia v. Indonesia and Nicaragua v. Honduras, the ICJ concludes effective control 
must take place on land and not in the surrounding waters.  
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China may contend that it demonstrates effective control over the rock from its 
administrative headquarters in Hainan Province.235 However, as seen in Nicaragua v. 
Honduras, passing laws that vaguely reference maritime features without enforcement of 
those laws on the actual territory is not a demonstration of effective control.  
According to a statement by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, the 
Philippines conducted three demonstration of on-rock effective control. First (and 
second), the Philippine flag was raised on the rock in 1965 and later in 1997. Third, the 
Philippines states it built and operated a lighthouse in 1965. The lighthouse was 
registered with the International Maritime Organization for eventual publication in its 
“List of Lights” (a comprehensive list of worldwide navigational aids). However this 
lighthouse is no longer in operation, nor is there physical evidence at the shoal such a 
lighthouse existed.236  
Hoisting the flag of the Dutch monarchy was one of many demonstrations of 
effective control used in the United States v. Netherlands case. As Chapter II showed, 
lighthouse construction and operation is a common means to demonstrate effective 
control in multiple ICJ and PCA cases. Even the intent to operate a lighthouse was 
evidence of effective control in the case of Eritrea v. Yemen. However, the question 
remains: were these examples the best and only demonstrations of on-rock effective 
control? The flag raising might be enough to sway a court in favor of the Philippines, but 
the question remains as to whether it would be enough. Are there more historic 
demonstrations of on-rock effective control that have been made by either side? Are there 
examples of effective control that are not known because China refuses to participate in 
the South China Sea arbitration? In the end, the 1965, and 1997 flag raising is the best 
example of effective control. The existence of the lighthouse could lend even more 
credibility to the Philippines claim if it can be proven. Therefore the Philippines claim to 
Scarborough Shoal is weak but better substantiated.  
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On 22 January 2013, the Philippines submitted the dispute over the validity of the 
Chinese Nine Dash Line and the Scarborough Shoal to the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea. To date, China has refused to participate in this arbitration. At first 
glance, the South China Sea arbitration could settle this dispute and resolve conflict over 
the Nine Dash Line. The Philippine claim seeks to have ITLOS invalidate the Nine Dash 
Line, rule on the status of rocks versus islands in the South China Sea, and prevent future 
Chinese encroachment in the Philippine EEZ. However, the underlying legal question of 
this case is the sovereignty of the Chinese and Philippine claims in the South China Sea. 
The jurisdiction of the ITLOS is limited to resolving conflicts within UNCLOS and this 
court does not resolve disputes over sovereignty. Only the PCA and ICJ can settle 
sovereignty disputes. Therefore, there is a good chance the Philippine case will be thrown 
out because it is outside of the jurisdiction of ITLOS.237  
2. Conclusion 
In summary, the Scarborough Shoal remains a controversial legal claim because 
its disposition as a low-tide elevation with a rock. Analyzing treaty law and uti possidetis 
did not reveal a clear claim to the Shoal. Planting the Philippine flag in 1965 and 1997 is 
the only unambiguous on-rock demonstration of effective control. Based on the low bar 
of proof established by the Norway v. Denmark case, this might be enough for a court to 
rule in the Philippines’ favor. However, until more historic examples of effective control 
can be provided, or more tangible and permanent forms of effective control are 
demonstrated on the Scarborough Rocks, no state can claim the shoal. Although the case 
was submitted to ITLOS, it will be likely thrown out because ITLOS lacks the 
jurisdiction to rule on the sovereignty of the islands in the South China Sea.  
China’s refusal to participate in arbitration provides strong evidence its behavior 
is not limited by institutions. China’s acceptance of arbitration would have provided 
strong evidence China is willing to conform to international institutions in order to 
peacefully resolve disputes through the rule of law. Instead, Chinese behavior appears to 
be motivated by self-help factors like power. Although the liberal institutionalist 
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framework does not account for China’s rejection of arbitration, the English School of 
Realism explains that states reserve the right to reject international norms for self-
interest. In this case, China prefers to use bilateral negotiation rather than arbitration so it 
can use its advantages in power. Additionally, realism rejects any constraints by 
international law therefore this episode provides evidence China’s behavior is also realist.  
F. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this chapter discussed the legal claims for the Senkaku Islands, the 
Paracel Islands and the Scarborough Shoal. It also assessed the legality of China’s Nine 
Dash Line. The chapter used the methodology presented in the previous chapter to review 
the sovereignty claims in three cases based on treaty law, uti possidetis, and effective 
control. Paralleling the findings from last chapter, in all three cases, treaty law and uti 
possidetis would likely be inconclusive and the cases force the examination of effective 
control. The Senkaku Island case suggests that Japanese effective control and a brief 
period of Chinese acquiescence lend strong support to Japan’s claim to the islands. The 
analysis of the Paracel Islands case indicates that China’s effective control since 1974 
and North Vietnamese acquiescence give China the strongest legal case. The 
Scarborough Shoal case is complicated because, as the maritime feature is a low-tide 
elevation and rock, any demonstration of effective control is very difficult. In the end, the 
planting of the Philippine flag in 1965 and 1997 makes a weak but minimal case for 
effective control in support of the Philippine claim. The justification for China’s Nine 
Dash Line is based on quasi-legal arguments and is unlikely to stand up in court.  
In the context of this thesis, to strengthen its legal claim, China would need to 
augment demonstrations of effective control to bolster a weak legal case (in the Senkaku 
Islands and Scarborough Shoal) or to maintain an already strong legal case (in the Paracel 
Islands). As will be discussed in the next chapter, China has developed the strategy of the 
Three Warfares where legal warfare is identified as an approach in achieving China’s 
strategic objectives. The legal warfare strategy uses international law to justify 
demonstrations of effective control to fortify China’s maritime claims.  
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IV. CHINESE LEGAL WARFARE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will discuss China’s use of “Legal Warfare” and seek to answer the 
research question: do international legal principles govern China’s past and present 
behavior in these disputes? Despite the strengths and weaknesses of its claims, China 
uses a strategy called “Legal Warfare” to fortify its legal position around the disputed 
maritime territories. In order to examine this argument, the chapter will cover seven 
topics. First, the chapter will define legal warfare. Legal warfare uses laws to justify a 
state’s actions, invalidate an adversary’s actions, and provide a legal justification why a 
state acts outside of the law. Second, this chapter will discuss the origins of Chinese legal 
warfare. Third, the chapter will discuss the overall strategy of legal warfare and how it 
affects national goals. Legal warfare strategy strengthens the legitimacy of China’s 
actions and attempts to delegitimize an adversary using a combination of laws and public 
opinion. Fourth, this chapter will discuss how China uses legal warfare tactics. Some of 
these tactics include the implementation of an air defense identification zone or the use of 
maritime patrols around disputed maritime territories. Fifth, the chapter will provide 
examples of legal warfare in the three maritime dispute case studies. China uses legal 
warfare in the Senkaku Islands, Paracel Islands, and the Scarborough Shoal. Sixth, it will 
discuss legal warfare outside of the three case studies. Finally, the chapter will describe 
how China is not the only state using legal warfare in its maritime disputes. This chapter 
will briefly discuss the use of legal warfare by Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines.  
The use of legal warfare provides evidence that China’s behavior is governed by 
international legal principles or at least legal principles (like customary international law) 
that justifies its actions. To be sure, some of China’s actions could be viewed as 
irredentist non-lethal behavior that uses legal arguments to disguise its true intent. This is 
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certainly the opinion of some non-Chinese scholars who explain China’s behavior using 
offensive realism.238 This question will be analyzed in the next chapter.  
The use of legal warfare suggests that Chinese behavior related to its maritime 
disputes is best explained by the English School of realism. The English School of 
Realism explains that states will conform to rules and norms in order to participate within 
a society of states. However, in a self-help international system, states also reserve the 
right to change or ignore rules and norms as it sees fit. Some of China’s behavior 
conforms to international law and norms like the respect for mutual co-existence. 
However, China’s use of a Sino-centric historic waters legal argument provides evidence 
it is trying to redefine how sovereignty is determined in its maritime disputes.  
As argued in Chapter II, international courts tend to settle maritime territorial 
disputes using treaty law, uti possidetis, and effective control. Of the three categories of 
legal arguments, demonstrations of effective control are overwhelmingly the most 
determinative. The last chapter discussed the strengths and weaknesses of China’s legal 
claim to three maritime disputes. Japan’s claim to the Senkaku Islands is very strong 
because of repeated demonstrations of effective control on the island since 1895. China’s 
claim to the Paracel Islands is solid due to demonstrations of effective control across the 
islands since 1974. Finally, the Philippines’ claim to Scarborough Shoal is valid but weak 
because of a two demonstrations of effective control on a rock. China’s use of legal 
warfare can strengthen a weak legal position (like in the Senkaku Islands or Scarborough 
Shoal) or it can revalidate an already strong legal position (like in the Paracel Islands).  
B. DEFINING LEGAL WARFARE? 
In short, legal warfare uses law as an important political tool. One scholar who 
wrote extensively on legal warfare is retired Major General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. He 
defined legal warfare as “a method of warfare where law is used as a means of realizing a 
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military objective.”239 In a subjective sense, law is interpreted differently by different 
sides of a conflict, so Dunlap also adds that legal warfare is “the strategy of using--or 
misusing--law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational 
objective.”240  
There are four problems with Dunlap’s definition of legal warfare in the context 
of China and its maritime disputes. First, Dunlap correlates legal warfare as a means to 
reach a military objective as opposed to a political objective. As Carl Von Clausewitz 
famously stated, "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means."241 In the 
maritime disputes, obtaining or maintaining sovereignty of disputed islands is done for 
political reasons not military reasons. Second, although Dunlap makes a case that legal 
warfare works at the operational level, it is relevant at the strategic level as well. Again, 
the sovereignty disputes in the East and South China Seas are strategic, not operational, 
concerns. Third, using and misusing law goes both ways. Although major powers like 
China can use law to support its cause, other state or non-state actors can use law against 
China. Fourth, although it is called legal warfare, a state of war does not need to exist as a 
precondition for its use. China is conducting legal warfare against Japan, Vietnam, and 
the Philippines; likewise, these countries are conducting legal warfare against China and 
in some cases against each other. However, none of these three countries are in an official 
state of war with each other.  
As Dunlap’s definition of legal warfare is vague and problematic, legal warfare 
can be reinterpreted as pursuing three primary objectives. First, legal warfare argues 
one’s “own side is obeying the law.” Second, it condemns the opponent for “violating the 
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law.” Finally, legal warfare “makes arguments for one’s own side in cases where there 
are also violations of the law.”242  
One historic and controversial argument where the three primary objectives of 
legal warfare were applied was the treatment of detainees from the war in Afghanistan. In 
2002, the Bush Administration contended the United States military obeyed the 1949 
Geneva Convention as a military engaged in combat. United States service members 
were lawful combatants that wore uniforms and operated in clearly marked military 
vehicles while focusing their aggression against an enemy. Conversely, the Bush 
Administration classified Taliban and Al Qaida fighters as “unlawful combatants” 
because they were civilians committing belligerent acts. Based on this definition, Taliban 
and Al Qaida fighters did not earn protection under the Geneva Convention. By 
classifying enemies as “unlawful combatants,” the Bush Administration claimed that 
Taliban and Al Qaida personnel could be held indefinitely in the military prison at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and could be subject to controversial interrogation techniques, 
which some critics argue was torture. In this specific case, the Bush Administration 
justified its behavior outside of the Geneva Conventions.243  
1. The Origins of Chinese Legal Warfare 
Legal Warfare was first mentioned by a Chinese publication in the 2003 Chinese 
People’s Liberation Army Political Work Regulations. This document stated legal 
warfare was part of the larger “Three Warfares” strategy. The “Three Warfares” included 
media warfare (also referred to as public opinion warfare), psychological warfare, in 
addition to legal warfare. Media Warfare is designed to manipulate both domestic and 
international opinion to build support for Chinese actions. Psychological Warfare 
attempts to demoralize the enemy and targets the enemy’s willingness to wage war. The 
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U.S. Department of Defense defined legal warfare as using, “international and domestic 
laws to gain international support and manage possible political repercussions of China’s 
military actions.”244 The “Three Warfares” are a form of information warfare and 
intended to give China an advantageous strategic position in both peace and wartime. The 
“Three Warfares” would be used before, during, and after war to shape domestic, enemy, 
and international opinion to favor China.245  
By combining media warfare and psychological warfare with legal warfare, China 
intends to “control the enemy through the law, or by using the law to constrain the 
enemy.”246 In a hypothetical scenario, legal warfare uses law to legitimize Chinese 
actions and to delegitimize or vilify an opponent. Media and psychological warfare 
publicizes the legitimate actions of China and the illegitimate actions of the opponent. 
Legal warfare can work alone or in conjunction with the other two warfares. For 
example, an unpublicized encounter between the Coast Guard vessels of China and 
Vietnam could be an example of legal warfare operating alone. However, if that 
encounter between claimants is widely publicized and justifies China’s actions and 
vilifies the other claimant, then the encounter is using the other two warfares.  
The use of legal warfare perfectly complements China’s Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence. Dunlap also contends, “Many uses of legal ‘weapons’ and 
methodologies avoid the need to resort to physical violence and other more deadly 
means.”247 The use of international legal principles promotes respect for China’s 
sovereignty, promotes non-aggression, non-interference, and inevitable peaceful co-
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existence.248 Avoiding conflict harkens back to a strategy of Sun Tzu who wrote, “for to 
win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the 
enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” 249 Although the “Three Warfares” 
appeared in 2003, it is a 21st century adaptation of Chinese military theory dating back to 
Sun Tzu.  
2. The Strategy of Legal Warfare 
Dean Cheng, a conservative western scholar who wrote about Chinese legal 
warfare, observed that the strategy of legal warfare entails its use, “as an offensive 
weapon capable of hamstringing opponents and seizing the political initiative.”250 Using 
laws and public opinion is a very effective strategy in the 21st century. Democracies are 
particularly susceptible to legal warfare. Well publicized events captured on video have 
the ability to turn public opinion very quickly. Free press and globalized mass 
communication can spread news quickly. The effect of public opinion inherently affects 
the electorate, which in turn affects the government. If the electorate of a democratic state 
feel China’s actions are legitimate it would likely be very difficult for that state to go to 
war against China.251  
3. The Tactics of Legal Warfare 
The last section discussed the strategic goals of legal warfare attempt to stifle and 
delegitimize an opponent. Additionally, appropriate use of legal warfare can prevent 
conflict. This section will broadly discuss China’s legal warfare tactics. They include the 
use of the military, law enforcement, and legal experts.  
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In discussing how legal warfare is used by China, Dean Cheng stated that, “legal warfare, 
therefore, is not decisive on its own – it must be backed by military capability”252 Legal 
warfare cannot simply rely on the existence of laws to deter actors; there must be local 
actors to enforce laws or collect evidence. According to Cheng, that local actor can be a 
soldier on the ground or a naval vessel at sea. However, China does not always need to 
use the PLA to conduct legal warfare, instead it can use non-military power as well. For 
example, China uses maritime law enforcement vessels to exert control around disputed 
maritime claims and throughout the claimed Nine Dash Line. The use of both the military 
and maritime law enforcement will be discussed in more detail below in the specific case 
studies.  
In addition to law enforcement, non-military aspects of legal warfare will use, 
“domestic legislation, international legislation, judicial law, legal pronouncement.”253 
Domestic legislation has included China’s 1992 Law on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone. This domestic law asserts China’s claim to Taiwan, the Senkaku 
Islands, Penghu Islands, Maccesfield Bank, the Paracel Islands, and the Spratly 
Islands.254 The law provides China’s military and law enforcement with a legal 
justification to defend its maritime claims. Passing domestic laws that specifically 
mention the disputed maritime territories by name is a form of exerting effective control 
over a maritime territory. It also helps that the 1992 Law specifically mentions the 
Senkaku Islands by name. As observed in the Nicaragua v. Honduras case, treaties and 
laws must specifically reference maritime territories by name or location. In the 
Nicaragua v. Honduras Case, the passage of three Honduran constitutions vaguely 
referencing the disputed islands was not enough to convince the court that Honduras had 
jurisdiction over its disputed islands.255  
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China’s controversial interpretation of UNCLOS and its staunch defense of that 
interpretation (through the use of the Nine Dash Line) may best represent China’s use of 
legal warfare in an international agreement. China has exploited ambiguities in 
UNCLOS, such as the definition between an island and a rock, to name one very 
important example. As discussed in Chapter II, an island is “a naturally formed area of 
land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.”256 Islands are entitled a 12 
nautical mile territorial sea and a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone. On the 
other hand, a rock is defined as a geographic feature that rises above the water at high-
tide. Rocks are unable to “sustain human habitation or economic life of their own.”257 A 
rock is only entitled a 12 nautical mile territorial sea. UNCLOS does not clearly define 
what constitutes “human habitation” or “economic life,” and these vague terms are 
subject to interpretation and debate. Does the term “human habitation” mean humans can 
live on an insular feature for one day or 365 days? Does “human habitation” include the 
artificial expansion (or reclamation) of rocks to support long term habitation? Does 
“human habitation” on rocks allow inhabitants to use advances in technology such as 
solar energy and desalination plants for long term settlement? Does “economic life” mean 
the insular feature can generate one dollar or one billion dollars in revenue? Does it mean 
it must generate money for one day or 365 days? Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky put it best by 
saying, “international regimes have ‘vested otherwise worthless islands with immense 
economic value.”258 Interpreting a rock as an island can entitle a coastal state to an 
additional 125,000 square nautical miles of exclusive economic zone. Therefore states 
have an incentive to interpret rocks as islands. This liberal interpretation of rocks versus 
islands in UNCLOS is another rationale and interpretation of China’s Nine Dash Line. 
China takes a stance that many of its claimed maritime features within the Nine Dash 
Line are islands and not rocks. Therefore, because of China’s liberal UNCLOS 
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interpretation the line could represent the 200 nautical mile EEZ from all of China’s 
claimed islands.259   
Chinese legal warfare could potentially use judicial law to justify its actions. As 
discussed in Chapter II, trends in the ICJ and PCA emphasizing the use of effective 
control to decide cases creates the unintended consequence of promoting the continued 
demonstration of effective control. The pursuit of effective control can lead to potential 
conflict among states competing to demonstrate effective control over the same maritime 
claim.260  
Legal warfare is not limited to domestic laws, international laws, and law 
enforcement, Dean Cheng adds legal warfare can include the use of, “legal experts – both 
military lawyers and a cadre of internationally recognized legal scholars – whose 
opinions will carry influence abroad as well as at home.”261 The use of scholars was also 
echoed by Sangkuk Lee when he observed Chinese foreign propaganda, “conduct[s] 
public diplomacy [through] exchanges and contacts with local think-tanks, commercial 
circles, [and] academia…”262 The use of legal experts merge legal warfare with media 
and propaganda warfare. Legal experts provide credible legal justifications to the media 
to legitimize Chinese actions. Chinese propaganda proliferates the expert opinions to 
provide legitimacy to the world. As in the case with the Nine Dash Line, sometimes the 
legal experts will use quasi-legal arguments to justify China’s claim to its maritime 
disputes. One example of a quasi-legal arguments is that the Nine Dash Line and the 
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Sino-centric view of the world are well founded in customary international law.263 As 
discussed in the last chapter, the legal basis for the Nine Dash Line is filled with holes.264  
The overwhelming majority of legal scholars who justify China’s claim to the 
Nine Dash Line using the Sino-centric historic waters argument are Chinese.265 Some of 
these scholars are affiliated with western universities. Others are associated with Chinese 
academic institutions. The Chinese authors rely on their professional credibility and the 
credibility of the scholarly journals in which they write in order to forward a quasi-legal 
argument.  
Legal Warfare and International Relations 
With an initial understanding of legal warfare it is relevant to identify which IR 
frameworks account best for legal warfare. Legal warfare uses international laws, so 
superficially it might appear it fits into a liberal institutionalist framework. However, 
legal warfare can be used to justify actions outside of international law. The “unlawful 
combatant” example above is one instance where international laws and norms did not 
constrain U.S. behavior. Offensive and defensive realism pay little attention to the value 
of international law unless it can favor the state. Legal warfare is definitely a tool that 
uses law to favor a state. In offensive realism, legal warfare can disguise or justify a 
state’s power seeking behavior. Legal warfare can justify defensive realist behavior as 
long as it does not create balancing or security dilemmas. The English School of realism 
describes how states adhere to international law and stray from international law when 
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they attempt to revise rules to suit them. Legal warfare is best explained by the English 
School. The final chapter will further examine how China’s use of legal warfare 
conforms to the English School of Realism.  
It can be argued that from an IR perspective legal warfare reduces the potential 
for lethal militarized conflict. Legal warfare uses law as an important tool to prevent 
military force or to use law enforcement in lieu of military force. It averts military force 
unless it is absolutely necessary and justified by international law. When war is 
necessary, it is done for legal reasons. However, if legal warfare is used nefariously, it 
can justify and disguise unlawful behavior that can be destabilizing. For example in 
Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, Russia justified its invasion of Crimea on the basis 
of international law. Russia argued that it was defending its ethnic Russian citizens, was 
invited by Ukrainian president Victor Yanukovych, and that its invasion was a response 
to a Crimean democratic referendum.266  
C. CHINESE DEMONSTRATIONS OF LEGAL WARFARE IN THE 
SENKAKU ISLANDS, PARACEL ISLANDS, AND SCARBOROUGH 
SHOAL  
Now that the definition and background of legal warfare has been established, this 
section will demonstrate China’s use of legal warfare in the three case studies of the 
Senkaku Islands, Paracel Islands, and Scarborough Shoal. Typical Chinese 
demonstrations of legal warfare pertain in its efforts to demonstrate effective control. 
These efforts can be broken into three categories. First, when applicable, China will use 
forms of effective control that have traditionally been accepted by international tribunals. 
This includes the construction of public works. Second, China will use innovative forms 
of effective control that have a strong basis in legal decisions. For example, China uses 
an Air Defense Identification Zone to control airspace over the Senkaku Islands. Finally, 
China will use forms of effective control that international courts have historically seen 
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as inadequate. This third category of arguments do not follow international law or historic 
court precedence but they are nevertheless justified by using legal arguments. Examples 
are the use of maritime patrols around disputed territory, despite numerous judicial 
conclusions that naval patrols are not forms of effective control. Actions in this third 
category are interpreted by other nations as expansionist or escalatory despite being 
justified by a legal argument. Furthermore, these examples show how China attempts to 
revise the rules of how sovereignty is determined which supports an English School 
argument. Or, these examples could be non-lethal power seeking behavior conducted 
under the guise of international law.  
1. Senkaku Islands 
As argued in Chapter III, Japan’s sustained demonstration of effective control 
constitutes a strong case in favor of Japanese ownership of the Senkaku Islands. Without 
de facto control of the Senkaku Islands, China is in a disadvantaged situation to exert 
effective control over the island. In fact Japan does not even acknowledge the existence 
of a dispute over the Senkaku Islands. In light of its legal disadvantage, China aims to 
exert effective control around the Senkaku Islands by using Coast Guard patrols and 
establishing an Air Defense Identification Zone. The probable intent of China’s behavior 
could be to force Japan to acknowledge the existence of a dispute for potential diplomatic 
resolution. The possible legal warfare objective is to conduct actions that resemble the 
acts of a state demonstrating effective control over its own island.  
a. Maritime Patrols 
China conducts maritime patrols around the Senkaku Islands in its attempt to 
demonstrate effective control over the islands. The maritime patrols take place inside and 
outside the 12 nautical mile territorial sea surrounding the Senkaku Islands. According to 
the Chinese State Oceanic Administration, Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels routinely 
patrol the Senkaku Islands, while Chinese media, report that the CCG patrol the Senkaku 
Islands approximately two to four times a month, with a total of 85 cruises around the 
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islands since Japan nationalized the Senkaku Islands in 2012.267 Decisions in 
international law have maintained naval or maritime patrols do not constitute valid 
examples of effective control. In Indonesia v. Malaysia and Nicaragua v. Honduras, the 
courts found naval patrols in the surrounding waters did not constitute effective control. 
Only in Nicaragua v. Colombia was a naval patrol deemed to exert effective control. In 
this particular case, the patrol went ashore after conducting a port call on the island itself. 
In that case, the court found the patrol exerted effective control over land.268  
b. The East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone 
In November 2013, China announced the creation of an East China Sea Air 
Defense Identification Zone (See Figure 5).269 An ADIZ is an area of airspace, 
established by coastal states, outside of its territorial airspace (usually over water) that 
allows a state’s air defense to identify potentially hostile aircraft prior to entry into 
sovereign airspace. ADIZs are unilaterally declared and not specifically covered by any 
international agreement or treaty.270  
Yang Yujin, spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of National Defense clarified 
the official Chinese intent of the ADIZ in stating that, “the establishment of the East 
China Sea ADIZ is indisputable. It aims to safeguard the country’s national sovereignty 
as well as territorial airspace safety, ensuring orderly flights.”271 Therefore the stated 
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Chinese intent of the ADIZ is to protect sovereignty and maintain aviation safety. 
However, a lot more can be interpreted from the ADIZ declaration.  
The Chinese ADIZ encompasses the East China Sea and incorporates the Senkaku 
Islands (See Figure 5). The East China Sea ADIZ incited protest from Japan, South 
Korea, and the United States. The Japanese Foreign Ministry protested the Chinese ADIZ 
because it encompassed the Senkaku Islands.272 South Korea also protested the ADIZ 
and reacted by enlarging its own ADIZ to incorporate Ieo Island, which it contests with 
China.273 The United States protested the creation of China’s ADIZ stating that it is an 
“attempt to change the status quo in the East China Sea.”274 Arguably the greatest 
concern to the security situation in East Asia is the fact that the Chinese ADIZ overlaps 
the Japanese and South Korean ADIZs. Overlapping ADIZs increase the opportunity for 
fighter aircraft from South Korea and China or Japan and China to interact and react to 
each other (see Figure 6). This interaction increases the chance for misinterpretation and 
unintended escalation between states. It should be noted both Japan and South Korea 
primarily protested the inclusion of contested islands as opposed to the overlap of the 
ADIZs themselves. Failure of Japan and South Korea to protest the inclusion could be 
perceived as acquiescence to China’s claim in an international court of law.275  
Some scholars (both western and Chinese) argue the East China Sea ADIZ is a 
reaction to the changing security situation in the East China Sea for three reasons. First, 
scholars argue it is necessary to protect the aerial sovereignty of China. Arguably the 
ADIZ is a mature reaction to regular U.S. reconnaissance flights off the coast of China. 
With a modernized air force, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force now has aircraft 
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(like the new Su-27, J-10, and J-11) that are capable of enforcing the ADIZ far from the 
Chinese mainland.276  
Second, this was China’s first ADIZ despite its being surrounded by countries, 
like Japan and South Korea, which have existing ADIZs. Japan’s ADIZ was established 
in 1969 and covered the Senkaku Islands. South Korea’s ADIZ was established in 1951, 
during the Korean War, and incorporates the southern portion of North Korea. China 
interprets the row caused by announcing its new ADIZ as a double standard where the 
United States and its treaty partners can have an ADIZ but China cannot.277  
Third, although China insists the ADIZ is not directed against a particular 
country, the reality is its ADIZ abuts the ADIZs of two countries with security alliances 
with the United States. The ADIZ also touches Taiwan’s ADIZ, a non-recognized state 
with an ambiguous security agreement with the United States (the Taiwan Relations Act). 
Therefore, in a security environment surrounded by U.S. allies, it is logical for China to 
take defensive steps to secure itself. China is within its right under international law to 
unilaterally declare an ADIZ.278  
Despite the geopolitical and security justifications, legal scholars argue the 
Chinese ADIZ and its location, encompassing the Senkaku Islands, is a statement of 
sovereignty. Yang Yujin’s statement from the Chinese Ministry of National Defense 
clarified the intent of the ADIZ was to defend sovereignty. Superficially the statement 
would imply the sovereignty of mainland China. However it might also mean Chinese 
sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands.279  
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As a demonstration of effective control, managing the air space above a disputed 
maritime claim is a demonstration to act as a sovereign. In the 1993 ICJ verdict 
Nicaragua v. Honduras, the court found the Honduran regulation of the airspace above 
disputed islands was a compelling demonstration of effective control. In 1993, the U.S. 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) requested Honduran government permission to 
overfly four disputed islets to collect intelligence on drug traffickers. The court found 
Honduras’ authorization for the DEA overflights constituted an act by a sovereign state to 
regulate the “national air space.” Consequently the ICJ decided the effort to regulate air 
space was a relevant demonstration of effective control.280  
By encompassing the ADIZ above the Senkaku Islands, China additionally 
demonstrates its intent to defend the Senkaku Islands. The intent to defend the islands is a 
demonstration of China’s intent to govern the islands. Although this legal argument has 
not been used in an international court for a maritime claim, it is a potentially compelling 
legal justification. Therefore, the institution of an ADIZ over the Senkaku Islands, to both 
regulate national air space and to defend disputed Chinese territory may be a 
demonstration of effective control.281 However, if China uses these legal arguments, 
Japan would rebut that it has maintained its ADIZ since 1969.  
China has reinforced its ADIZ through action. Since China established its ADIZ, 
Japan has intercepted numerous Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) 
aircraft in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands.282 The Chinese National Defense Ministry 
confirmed this by stating, “China has the capability to conduct effective control over 
relevant airspace.”283 The phrase choice, “effective control over relevant airspace” 
includes three potentially significant concepts.284 It combines elements of international 
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law (“effective control”) with the existing Nine Dash Line justification and airspace. The 
2009 note verbale justifying the Nine Dash Line stated the following:  
China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea 
and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over 
the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof. 285  
Weaving its way through the official Chinese statements for the Nine Dash Line is the 
similar argument justifying the ADIZ. Remembering Yang Yujin’s Ministry of Defense 
statement, and Yun Lintao’s statement, the reappearance of words like “relevant” and 
“indisputable” begs the question of whether China will claim an ADIZ encompassing the 
entire Nine Dash Line. This will be discussed more below.  
 
Figure 5.  China’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)286   
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Figure 6.  China’s ADIZ overlapping with Japan’s ADIZ287  
c. The Overall Legal Warfare Strategy in the Senkakus 
China is in a difficult position to demonstrate effective control on an island it does 
not maintain de facto control over. So why does China pursue maritime patrols and an 
ADIZ? The preponderance of legal precedence proves naval patrols do not generate 
effective control. Yet China still conducts maritime patrols. Additionally, China 
established an ADIZ knowing it would spark regional criticism. Therefore, it would seem 
the negative regional perception would outweigh the benefits of engaging in this 
controversial behavior.  
The answer lies in the intricacies of the Senkaku dispute. To date, Japan refuses to 
acknowledge a dispute exists. Since Japan maintains de facto control over the Senkaku 
Islands, the Japanese Foreign Ministry is at liberty to make statements such as the 
following:  
There is no doubt that the Senkaku Islands are clearly an inherent part of 
the territory of Japan, in light of historical facts and based upon 
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international law. Indeed, the Senkaku Islands are under the valid control 
of Japan. There exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved 
concerning the Senkaku Islands.288  
Japan’s claim sounds similar to China’s claim to “indisputable sovereignty” in the South 
China Sea. China’s use of maritime patrol vessels to penetrate the territorial seas around 
the Senkaku Islands as well as its declaration and enforcement of the ADIZ is a way for 
China to force Japan to admit a dispute exists over the islands.289 As one Chinese legal 
scholar put it:  
China’s public service ships and aircraft have implemented normalized 
patrol of the waters and airspace around the Diaoyu [Senkaku] Islands, 
undermining Japan’s claim of exclusivity and thereby causing a complete 
turnaround in the situation of the Diaoyu Islands.290 
Using legal warfare and forcing Japan to admit a dispute exists can be the first step in 
diplomacy (or legal proceedings if China would ever agree to them.) By engaging in 
behavior that resembles the actions of a sovereign, China could raise doubts in the 
international community that Japan owns the island. Or, China could raise tensions to the 
point that the options are either war or diplomacy because the escalated status quo is not 
sustainable. In either case, China casts doubts on Japan’s “indisputable” claim to the 
islands.  
On 7 November 2014, after a high level cabinet meeting between Japan and the 
PRC, a four point joint statement was released affirming continued bilateral relations 
between both countries. In addressing growing tensions over the Senkaku Islands, the 
carefully worded statement said the following: 
Both sides recognized that they had different views as to the emergence of 
tense situations in recent years in the waters of the East China Sea, 
including those around the Senkaku Islands, and shared the view that, 
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through dialogue and consultation, they would prevent the deterioration of 
the situation, establish a crisis management mechanism and avert the rise 
of unforeseen circumstances.291 
This statement was hardly a breakthrough in Sino-Japanese relations. Both countries 
acknowledge there are “different views,” however this does not mean Japan recognizes a 
dispute over the Senkaku Islands exists. It was telling that the Japanese version of the 
statement only used the Japanese name of the islands (Senkaku) and the Chinese version 
published in Xinhua only used the Chinese name of the islands (Diaoyu). In this case, the 
divisions in the translations still acknowledged the existence of a dispute. In the end, both 
states were willing to acknowledge ways to de-escalate tensions around the Senkaku 
Islands.292  
2. Paracel Islands 
The last section discussed China’s use of legal warfare in Japan. This section will 
examine China’s use of effective control and legal warfare in and around the Paracel 
Islands.   
a. Demonstration of Effective Control on the Island 
Demonstrations of effective control on the Paracel Islands are much easier for 
China in contrast to the Senkaku Islands. The last chapter discussed China has maintained 
de facto control over the islands ever since it occupied the Paracel Islands in 1974. China 
demonstrates effective control through public works which include the construction of an 
airstrip, port facility, hospital, library, and cell phone towers. As demonstrated repeatedly 
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in the ICJ and PCA, state funded public works construction are examples of effective 
control.293  
b. Demonstrations around the Island  
Having established in the last chapter that China has provided ample evidence of 
on-island effective control, it is relevant to discuss off-island demonstrations of effective 
control. As discussed above, off-island effective control is generally considered irrelevant 
by the courts. Naval patrols, that do not touch land, have no bearing on supporting an 
effective control legal claim. Concurrently, law enforcement surrounding the islands, to 
include restricting fishing, does not support an effective control legal claim. However, 
this has not stopped China from restricting fishing and using maritime law enforcement. 
Since 1999, China has instituted a fishing ban throughout the claimed Nine Dash Line. 
This ban affects both Vietnamese and Philippine fishing within the South China Sea.294 
In 2012, China arrested 21 Vietnamese fishermen near the Paracel Islands. The fishermen 
were accused of violating the Chinese fishing ban and exploiting resources within the 
Chinese EEZ.295 As recently as June and July of 2014, Chinese Coast Guard intercepted 
and deported Vietnamese fishermen sailing in Chinese-claimed waters.296  
Oil exploration in the waters surrounding a disputed maritime claim can be 
perceived as escalatory. To be sure, it is the only way to verify and estimate the size of 
hydrocarbon resources beneath the seabed. However, in international courts, oil 
exploration is not legally a basis for demonstrating effective control on land. (For 
example, Eritrea v. Yemen and Nicaragua v. Honduras concluded government 
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sanctioning of offshore oil exploration alone was not a demonstration of on-island 
effective control.) However, China has repeatedly cited international law as a reason to 
conduct oil exploration or to deny another claimant’s oil exploration.  
Some of the most frequent examples of oil exploration occurred in the disputed 
waters between Vietnam and China. In Gulf of Tonkin and the waters south of China’s 
Hainan Island, the EEZ of both China and Vietnam overlap. In 1997, Chinese mobile oil 
platform Kantan-3 conducted exploratory drilling in the Gulf of Tonkin based on China’s 
EEZ south of Hainan Island. Vietnam vehemently protested the drilling.297 Years later in 
2011 and 2012, Chinese patrol boats and fishing vessels harassed the Vietnamese oil and 
gas survey vessel Binh Minh 2 because the vessel was conducting economic activities 
within China’s perceived EEZ. The incidents devolved into Chinese vessels cutting the 
Binh Minh 2’s survey equipment cables.298 In 2014, Chinese state owned mobile oil 
platform HD-981 conducted exploratory drilling in the Gulf of Tonkin. Unlike the 
Kantan-3 incident, the Vietnamese reaction here was more virulent. The Chinese Coast 
Guard attempted to defend HD-981 using water cannons. According to Chinese press, a 
Vietnamese Coast Guard ship collided with Chinese Coast Guard vessel 46015. The 
incident eventually climaxed with riots against Chinese businesses in Vietnam. Yet these 
incidents are much ado about nothing. Instead of providing more legal support for the 
Paracel Islands (or even the Spratly Islands), China’s state backed oil exploration and law 
enforcement actions do not provide any on-island demonstrations of effective control. 
The behavior can be explained as power seeking and expansionist by engaging in 
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escalatory behavior in Vietnam’s EEZ. Or, China’s behavior is once again attempting to 
redefine how sovereignty is determined in the South China Sea.299  
3. Scarborough Shoal 
As discussed in the last chapter, the Philippines’s legal claim to Scarborough 
Shoal is slightly stronger than China’s claim because the Philippine Navy planted a flag 
on the largest rock in the shoal in 1997. Just as China conducts legal warfare by 
conducting a maritime patrol in the vicinity of the Paracel Islands, the Philippines are do 
the same in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal. The Chinese maritime patrol prevents the 
Philippine vessels from conducting resource exploitation around the shoal. The Chinese 
patrols also prevent further demonstrations of effective control on the surfaced rocks. The 
recent flare-up started in 2012 when the Philippine warship BRP Gregorio del Pilar 
boarded Chinese fishing vessels inside the lagoon at the center of Scarborough Shoal. 
The Philippine Navy found captured marine life onboard the Chinese fishing vessels, 
which violated the Philippine EEZ. Two Chinese maritime law enforcement vessels 
arrived at the shoal and prevented the BRP Gregorio del Pilar from arresting the Chinese 
fishermen.300 In a legal warfare move attempting to demonstrate that the Philippines was 
in violation of international law, Li Jie, a Chinese scholar from the Chinese Naval 
Research Institute, argued the Philippines escalated the situation by sending a warship to 
handle a fishery dispute. He stated the response “is not in line with international laws and 
the UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea.”301 Later in 2012, China constructed 
concrete barriers connected with heavy ropes blocking the lagoon entrance from shallow 
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draft vessels.302 As mentioned in the Parcel Islands section above, these demonstrations 
of off-rock effective control do nothing to support China’s legal case. Although China 
could argue these demonstrations of maritime effective control support a Sino-centric 
historic waters argument, this will likely prove to be inconsequential in an international 
court of justice.  
According to one Chinese scholar, however, the Scarborough Shoal incident was 
a watershed moment of maritime legal warfare:  
China has vigorously protected sovereignty and rights of the sea and has 
introduced the new mode of maritime rights protection. For example, in 
terms of the Huangyan Island [Scarborough Reef] issue, China has 
adopted non-military means to practically protect China’s rights of the sea, 
fighting back against the brazenness of the Philippines and forming the 
“Huangyan Island Model.”303  
To augment its available forces to conduct legal warfare using the “Huangyan Island 
Model,” the Chinese Coast Guard received ten brand new 1000-ton Coast Guard Vessels 
in 2014. According to the website of the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, the 
company will deliver increasingly larger and longer-deployable Coast Guard vessels. The 
website shows it will deliver a 4000-ton class and a 10,000-ton class vessel to the 
Chinese Coast Guard.304  
 Two western scholars have an alternative offensive realist based opinion of the 
“Scarborough Model.” In their view, the Scarborough Model utilized power and 
intimidation against the weaker Philippines. In his article, “A Plan to Counter Chinese 
Aggression,” Ely Ratner argues the Scarborough Model was an “extraordinary act of 
coercion.”305 Patrick Cronin described the Philippines’ dilemma, where it could “escalate 
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and risk a violent run-in with the Chinese Navy, or stand down and negotiate with Beijing 
from a position of weakness.”306 The Scarborough Model tests the limits of what China 
can get away with by using low intensity conflict justified in international law. In this 
case, offensive realism was used and China’s intentions were justified using legal 
warfare. 
D. OTHER DEMONSTRATIONS OF LEGAL WARFARE – CHINESE 
ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS 
As shown in the last section, China uses legal warfare in the Senkaku Islands, 
Paracel Islands, and Scarborough Shoal. China also uses legal warfare in other capacities 
related to its maritime disputes. This section will focus on examples of Chinese legal 
warfare outside of the three case studies. China conducts legal warfare in the South China 
Sea by applying an effective control argument to the waters and airspace contained 
within the Nine Dash Line. This section will discuss how China supports its maritime 
claim through the reclamation of shoals to create islands. 
China goes to great length to consolidate its legal claim to the South China Sea. 
Within the Nine Dash Line China has also begun major maritime reclamation projects. 
These massive reclamation projects convert low-tide elevations or submerged features 
(like reefs and shoals) into habitable island installations to bolster China’s claim to the 
South China Sea.  
As observed in a recent BBC article, China has created five new “islands.”307 
China has transported earth-moving equipment onto Johnson South Reef (site of the 1988 
Chinese skirmish over Vietnam) to convert the reef into an outpost. A Philippine press 
outlet reports that the China State Shipbuilding Corporation has posted plans to convert 
the reef into a major military outpost that includes a port facility and a runway to support 
aircraft. According to the article, 30 to 74 hectares of the reef are to be reclaimed to 
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create an artificial island.308 Imagery analysis shows construction on Gaven Reefs, 
Johnson South Reef, Cuateron Reef, Kennan Island, and Burgos islands.309 The 
construction is conducted by a Chinese ship named the Tian Jing Hao. This vessel is a 
6,000-ton dredger and is believed to be the largest ship of its type in East Asia; it has the 
ability to suction sand and sediment to create islands similar to the man-made islands 
created in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.310  
The spokeswoman for China’s Foreign Ministry, Hua Chunying, stated the 
construction is in accordance with China’s position that it maintains “indisputable 
sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and the adjacent waters, and China’s activities on 
relevant islands and reefs of the Nansha Islands fall entirely within China’s sovereignty 
and are totally justifiable.”311 When asked if the construction was for military or civilian 
use the foreign minister replied the construction is to “improve[e] the working and living 
conditions of people stationed on these islands.”312 This was a peculiar statement since 
prior to the construction, no island existed nor was human habitation possible. 
Furthermore, it is not clear whether people were voluntarily living on the island or 
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“stationed” on the island. When pressed for clarification Hua Chunying replied, “I have 
already answered your question.”313  
Based on what Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying did state, China 
intends to adhere to its Sino-centric historic waters argument evident in its Nine Dash 
Line to justify its island reclamation. As discussed at length in the last chapter, this Nine 
Dash Line argument using customary international law is flawed. Nevertheless, the 
construction of islands is a relevant subject to examine in international law. Can China 
construct islands to generate a territorial sea, an exclusive economic zone, and 
demonstrate effective control? 
UNCLOS does state that the coastal state is within its right to construct artificial 
islands within its EEZ. UNCLOS Article 56 and 60 declare the coastal state can construct 
artificial islands for the purposes of exploiting resources in the EEZ.314 One key 
assumption China makes by investing and constructing these artificial islands is that the 
construction takes place within its EEZ. Until external intervention or an international 
court says otherwise, China can continue to make this assumption and continue 
construction.  
However, do artificial islands entitle China to a territorial sea and exclusive 
economic zone? In examining UNCLOS it is clear that artificially constructed islands on 
former low-tide elevations or submerged features cannot be considered islands.315 
UNCLOS clearly states:  
Artificial islands, installations and structures do not possess the status of 
islands. They have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence does 
not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic 
zone or the continental shelf.316 
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Therefore if UNCLOS stipulates artificial islands do not generate a territorial sea and 
EEZ, why does China persist with building the islands? The answer is parallel to China’s 
justification in using maritime patrols to produce effective control. It is an effort to 
bolster the Chinese claim to the area within the Nine Dash Line based on a Sino-centric 
historic waters legal argument. China’s use of a quasi-legal argument provides evidence 
it is trying to redefine how sovereignty is determined. Additionally, a controversial and 
self-serving interpretation of UNCLOS shows China is also redefining how the treaty 
applies to them. Therefore, based on the attempt to revise legal norms, the English School 
of Realism is a framework that potentially explains China’s behavior.  
Aside from international law, a problem China faces with its island reclamation 
program is that it arguably violates China’s-ASEAN’s 2002 Declaration on the Conduct 
of Parties in the South China Sea. In China’s-ASEAN’s declaration, Article V clearly 
states:  
The Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities 
that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability 
including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the 
presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to 
handle their differences in a constructive manner.317  
It is difficult for China to argue submerged maritime features were already populated. 
Therefore the conversion of submerged features to habitable islands makes China’s 
behavior a possible violation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the 
South China Sea. This behavior certainly works against China’s behavior fitting into a 
liberal instituionalist framework. 
 The artificial island creation could also be explained by an offensive realist 
explanation. Similar to the realist interpretation of the Scarborough Model, the island 
construction could be low intensity power-seeking behavior disguised by international 
law. This framework certainly explains why China was dismissive of China’s-ASEAN’s 
Declaration.  
                                                 




E. WHAT CHINA CAN DO TO STRENGTHEN ITS LEGAL CLAIM 
The above examples demonstrate two Chinese views of international law. One 
view is that China has an, albeit flawed, understanding of international law and how to 
strengthen its legal claims. An alternative view is China is power-seeking and irredentist 
but uses international law to disguise its behavior. It appears that Chinese decision 
makers understand the relevance of effective control. In their 2014 “Position Paper of the 
Government of the People's Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South 
China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines,” paragraph 11 of 
section two goes into detail about the relevance of effective control. The paragraph even 
cites some of the court decisions mentioned in Chapter II. However the Chinese argument 
in the position paper focuses more on why the arbitration has no legal authority to render 
a verdict. Additionally the position paper fails to address how China ever exerted 
effective control over its claims in the South China Sea.318  
What can China do to strengthen its legal claims based on successful 
demonstrations of effective control in international courts? China could initiate a 
campaign to strengthen its legal claims on every maritime feature throughout the South 
China Sea by using effective control.  
1. Markers and Flags 
As the Island of Palmas case concluded, flags and markers are legally recognized 
demonstrations of effective control. China can plant flags and hardened markers 
throughout the South China Sea. Although inexpensive, the longevity and visibility of 
hardened stone markers could be indefinite. In at least one case, China left a marker. At 
James Shoal, a low tide elevation disputed between China and Malaysia on the southern 
tip of the Nine Dash Line, a Chinese Marine Surveillance Vessel approached the 
submerged feature and, “several officers of the ship threw a sovereignty stele into the 
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water.”319 China could hypothetically go to every island, rock, and low tide elevation and 
drop heavy marble steles.  
2. Lighthouses 
As observed in Eritrea v. Yemen, Indonesia v. Malaysia, Nicaragua v. Colombia, 
and Malaysia v. Singapore, the construction and maintenance of lighthouses are a legally 
recognized demonstration of effective control. Aside from planting flags and creating 
markers, the construction and maintenance of lighthouses can be an even more relevant 
form of effective control. Under the auspices of maritime safety, China could construct 
lighthouses on islands and rocks throughout the Nine Dash Line claim.  
3. An ADIZ over the Nine Dash Line 
Similar to the ADIZ over the Senkaku Islands, China could establish an ADIZ 
over its claimed islands in the South China Sea. As argued earlier, in Nicaragua v. 
Honduras, regulating the overflight of aircraft demonstrates the intent to act as a 
sovereign.  
4. What Prevents China From Doing This? 
China could plant flags, construct markers, build lighthouses, and enforce and 
ADIZ over the South China Sea, but why does it refrain? One answer is that it costs a lot 
of money. The cost to deploy construction teams and accompanying security to the 
numerous Chinese South China Sea islands would be expensive. It would be free to 
declare an ADIZ but costly to enforce it. The cost in military aviation flight hours used to 
enforce an ADIZ far from mainland China would take its toll on the People’s Liberation 
Army Air Force (PLAAF) and People’s Liberation Army Navy Air Force (PLANAF). 
However, the long-term economic benefit of establishing a marker or building a 
lighthouse may outweigh the short-term initial expense of building a maker.  
Second, China may not have logistics to construct and maintain lighthouses 
throughout the South China Sea. Yet, as demonstrated with the massive reclamation 
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project mentioned above, as well as the numerous Coast Guard Vessels China uses to 
enforce its maritime claims, China could construct markers and lighthouses if it wanted 
to. On the other hand, the PLAAF may not have the operational capability to sustain 
extended detachments on far-flung air strips in the South China Sea. The most developed 
air base is on Woody Island of the Paracel Chain. Woody Island is far from the 
southeastern tip of the Nine Dash Line. However, as one author argues, the Woody Island 
air strip is the first step in establishing an ADIZ in the South China Sea. The Chinese 
aircraft carrier program is not currently in a position to defend Chinese airspace.320 Third, 
coupled with the regional outcry and violations of China’s-ASEAN’s Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, China may fear the potential escalation to 
armed conflict due to misinterpretation and miscalculation.  
Third, the damage to Chinese regional relations would be extensive. Although its 
actions could be supported by the quasi-legal Nine Dash Line argument, tensions with 
claimant nations would be high. ASEAN’s Declaration of Conduct would be in tatters. 
More importantly, this behavior could taint China as an expansionist revisionist power. 
The consequence could lead China’s neighbors into security dilemmas and 
bandwagoning with the United States, which would inherently reduce China’s security. 
F. HOW CHINA’S COMPETITORS CONDUCT LEGAL WARFARE 
Up to this point, this chapter has shown China goes to great lengths to 
demonstrate its effective control over its maritime claims through the use of legal 
warfare. However, this is only one side of the story. In many ways, China is reacting to 
an environment where other countries have already demonstrated effective control 
through public works construction on claimed maritime territories.  
1. Japan 
As described in the last chapter, Japan has assumed the control over a lighthouse 
built on Senkaku Island built by a Japanese nationalist group.321 Prior to the construction 
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of the lighthouse, the prefectural government of Okinawa constructed markers in 1895 
and 1969.322 In 2012 Japan nationalized the island by purchasing them back from the 
Kurihara family. As noted in Chapter II, Japan initially leased then sold some of the 
Senkaku Islands to the Koga family. The Koga family later sold the islands to the 
Kurihara family.323 In order to prevent the islands from being sold to the nationalistic and 
antagonistic Tokyo governor, Shintaro Ishihara, Japan purchased the islands. By 
purchasing the islands, Japan assumed the lesser of two evils. However, the move to 
nationalize the islands infuriated China. China responded by dispatching maritime and air 
patrols in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands. Concurrently Japan maintains a Coast 
Guard presence and scrambles the Air Self Defense Force in reaction to Chinese 
interactions.324 Every time a Chinese state vessel intrudes into the 12 nautical mile 
periphery of the Senkaku Islands, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodges a 
protest with the Chinese Ambassador to Japan. This protest is required to demonstrate 
Japan has not acquiesced its claim. Since 2012, these protests have become routine.325  
Recognizing Japanese aims are parallel with Philippine aims, on 31 May 2014, 
Shinzo Abe promised to provide ten patrol vessels to the beleaguered Philippine Coast 
Guard. In the same statement, Abe alluded to a similar delivery of Coast Guard vessels to 
Vietnam. Japan’s delivery of Coast Guard vessels attempts to level the legal warfare 
playing field in the South China Sea. Both the Philippines and Vietnam have a weak navy 
and coast guard compared to China.326  
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a. Acknowledgement of a Dispute 
If Japan maintains de facto control of a maritime claim, then Japan will not 
acknowledge a territorial dispute exists. However, if Japan does not maintain de facto 
control, then Japan acknowledges that a territorial dispute exists. For example, Japan 
refuses to acknowledge the existence of a territorial dispute in the Senkaku Islands. The 
Japanese Foreign Ministry calls the Senkaku Islands an “inherent part of the territory of 
Japan.”327 Unlike the Senkaku dispute, Japan acknowledges two territorial disputes. The 
first dispute is with South Korea over the Takeshima Islands (also known as Dokdo 
Island or Liancourt Rocks). The second dispute concerns the Northern Territories with 
Russia. These four islands lie northeast of the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido. In 
both cases, Japan does not maintain any de facto control over the disputed territories. 
Therefore it seems logical to conclude when Japan possesses de facto control of disputed 
maritime territory, then Japan declares there is no dispute. However, when Japan does not 
maintain de facto control, then Japan claims there is a maritime dispute.328  
2. Vietnam 
Vietnam occupies 27 islets in the South China Sea. As a reaction to the 1974 
Battle of the Paracel Islands, Vietnam constructed outposts on the islands in order to 
defend its territory as well as strengthen its legal claim through effective control. Vietnam 
has surpassed all other Spratly Island claimants in the quantity of its occupied South 
China Sea islands. Although China’s reclamation activities in the South China Sea looks 
escalatory, Vietnam was one of the first countries to fortify its islands. 329  
In order to protest China’s fishing bans and oil exploration, Vietnam utilized its 
maritime law enforcement to counter Chinese maritime law enforcement. As described 
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above, in 2014 Vietnamese Coast Guard vessels confronted Chinese law enforcement in 
the HD-981 standoff. Nevertheless, Vietnam uses maritime law enforcement to enforce 
its maritime claims.  
3. Philippines 
Similar to Vietnam, the Philippines have occupied nine islets in the Spratly 
Archipelago. One of the occupied claims is a rusted-out tank-landing ship (BRF Sierra 
Madre) run aground on Second Thomas Shoal.330 Second Thomas Shoal is a low tide 
elevation, however the presence of the BRF Sierra Madre arguably makes it an artificial 
island. The Philippines maintains a continual detachment of Marines on the BRF Sierra 
Madre in an attempt to defend the shoal. UNCLOS stipulates the coastal state is free to 
construct artificial islands within its 200 nautical mile EEZ. Second Thomas Shoal lies 
within the Philippine EEZ extending from Palawan Island. However the Philippine-
claimed EEZ assumes there are no competing claims to the EEZ.331  
Other instances of Philippine legal warfare include the use of international treaty 
law to forward its territorial claims. When ratifying UNCLOS in 1984, the Philippines 
reasserted its claim to the Spratly Islands. However, the Philippines did not specifically 
mention the Scarborough Shoal by name.332  
The Philippines have used laws to enforce its claim to the Scarborough Shoal. As 
discussed above, in 2012 the Philippine warship BRP Gregorio del Pilar boarded 
Chinese fishing vessels to enforce the Philippine EEZ and prevented Chinese fishermen 
from exploiting the marine resources of the Scarborough Shoal.333  
G. CONCLUSION 
In summary, this chapter attempted to show China’s use of legal warfare in its 
maritime disputes. Legal warfare uses laws to achieve a military or national objective. 
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Legal warfare has three objectives. First, it shows how one’s side obeys the law. Second, 
it shows how an adversary violates the law. Finally it justifies actions when one’s side 
violates the law.334 Chinese legal warfare is part of the “Three Warfares” strategy and is 
complemented by Media Warfare and Propaganda Warfare. When combined with the 
“Three Warfares,” China seeks to legitimizes its actions and de-legitimize the actions of 
its adversaries. Chinese legal warfare includes the use of domestic and international law 
to justify its actions. It utilizes law enforcement to implement law. Legal warfare also 
utilizes quasi-legal arguments to justify its actions. Finally, legal warfare uses academic 
and legal experts to lend credibility to Chinese actions and its quasi-legal arguments.  
In the context of the three case studies in the Senkaku Islands, Paracel Islands, 
and Scarborough Shoal, Chinese legal warfare is used in an attempt to generate effective 
control over its claims. In the Senkaku Islands, China’s implementation of an Air 
Defense Identification Zone is a way to prove it maintains effective control over the 
island, even though it does not have de facto control on the island. Based on the 
Nicaragua v. Honduras Case, controlling the airspace above an island is a way to 
demonstrate effective control.  
In the Senkaku Islands, Paracel Islands, and Scarborough Shoal, China uses 
maritime law enforcement vessels to demonstrate effective control in the territorial seas 
around the disputed maritime claims. However, as demonstrated in many ICJ and PCA 
court cases like Eritrea v. Yemen, Indonesia v. Malaysia, and Nicaragua v. Honduras, 
effective control must be demonstrated on land. Maritime patrols on the water do not 
provide effective control on land.  
In the Paracel Islands, China’s use of offshore oil exploration is another attempt to 
demonstrate effective control. However, as demonstrated in Eritrea v. Yemen and 
Nicaragua v. Honduras, oil exploration on the water do not demonstrate effective control 
over land. The use of maritime patrols and offshore oil exploration do not provide 
examples of effective control recognizable to an international court. Instead, China uses 
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these maritime demonstrations of effective control to strengthen its quasi-legal argument 
supporting its historic waters claim to the Nine Dash Line and the greater South China 
Sea.  
Outside of the three cases studies, China also attempts to use legal warfare in the 
Spratly Islands dispute. China’s island-reclamation program in the South China Sea turns 
low-tide and submerged features into artificial islands. However, within UNCLOS, 
artificial islands do not generate a territorial sea or exclusive economic zone. Instead, the 
construction of the artificial islands are used to strengthen the quasi-legal argument based 
on historic waters claim to the Nine Dash Line.  
China’s use of legal warfare does provide some evidence it is constrained by 
international law and governs its behavior. Although controversial, China cites 
international law in its actions on or around its disputed maritime claims. On the Paracel 
Islands, China provides clear and unambiguous examples of effective around the islands 
through the construction of public works and peaceful administration of the population. 
China also uses maritime law enforcement to administer its domestic laws in the seas 
around its maritime claims in lieu of naval force.  
Legal warfare also utilizes quasi-legal arguments. China uses many quasi-legal 
arguments in its maritime disputes. The most prominent quasi-legal argument is the legal 
justification for the Nine Dash Line. The Chinese justification to the Nine Dash Line is 
based on a Sino-centric historic waters argument rooted in customary international law. 
However, sovereignty over land using effective control is a stronger legal precedence 
backed up by years of customary international law. China’s repeated use of the flimsy 
Sino-centric historic waters argument makes it a quasi-legal argument. This quasi-legal 
argument justifies its fishing ban throughout the Nine Dash Line and the conversion of 
low-tide elevations or submerged features into artificial islands.  
Throughout this chapter various uses of Chinese legal warfare could be explained 
by both offensive realism and the English School of Realism. ADIZ implementation, the 
occupation of the Scarborough Shoal, or artificial island construction could be explained 
by power seeking offensive realist behavior. However, the 2014 law enforcement clashes 
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over maritime disputes provide examples of some constraint within international law and 
question the applicability of offensive realism. Why are non-lethal tactics used? Why are 
coast guard vessels clashing and not naval combatants? What prevents China from 
retaking claimed islands within the Nine Dash Line? On the surface these questions raise 
doubts offensive realism is the best IR frameworks to explain China’s behavior in its 
maritime disputes. However, these answers could be explained by the use of legal 
warfare disguise irredentist Chinese behavior as law abiding. Perhaps China engages in 
low-intensity, take what it can get, offensive realism that uses legal warfare to disguise its 
expansionist intent. 
Alternatively, the English School of Realism is an IR framework that can explain 
Chinese legal warfare. It is apparent that China respects rules of coexistence in its 
maritime disputes. The Senkaku Islands and many islands throughout the Spratly Islands 
are occupied by other claimants. China does not invade these islands even though it 
perceives it owns these islands. However, China seeks to revise international law and 
norms. For example, the continued use of the Sino-centric historic waters argument and 
legal warfare attempt to redefine how sovereignty is determined in China’s maritime 
disputes. The final chapter will examine the four IR frameworks (offensive realism, 
defensive realism, the English School of Realism, and liberal institutionalism) and apply 
them to China’s behavior in its maritime disputes. As the final chapter will show, China’s 
use of legal warfare provides evidence that China’s behavior in its dealings with maritime 
disputes is best explained by the English School of realism.  
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The beginning of this thesis asked whether China behaves within the confines of 
international law and which theory of international relations best explains China’s 
behavior in its maritime disputes. Is China’s behavior within the norms established in 
international law? To answer the first question, of whether China’s behavior is within 
norms established in international law, this thesis investigated the norms associated with 
maritime disputes to determine if China behaved in accordance with those norms. To this 
end, the thesis investigated maritime dispute settlement in international law, China’s 
maritime disputes, and its actions related to international law. The research concluded 
that China acts both within the law and outside of the law. For the most part, Chinese 
actions related to maritime disputes conform to international norms. However in other 
cases, which will be described in more detail below, China either redefines some norms 
or uses international norms and laws as a façade for self-interested behavior. After 
examining four IR theories (defensive realism, offensive realism, the English School of 
Realism, and liberal institutionalism) the thesis found China’s use legal warfare provided 
evidence that offensive realism and the English School of Realism are two IR 
frameworks that explain China’s behavior related to its maritime disputes. China’s 
behavior is reflective of offensive realism because it acts in an irredentist manner while 
using legal warfare to disguise its true expansionist intent. The English School of Realism 
is another IR framework that describes Chinese behavior because China conforms to 
some international norms and laws while attempting to revise the internationally accepted 
way sovereignty is determined.  
Chapter II examined the decisive factors that international courts used to decide 
maritime disputes, and concluded that effective control is the most important factor in 
determining disputed maritime sovereignty. The chapter analyzed all international court 
cases that decided sovereignty over an island or rock. An overwhelming majority of cases 
(nine out of ten) were decided by a demonstration of a state’s effective control over the 
island or rock. Effective control is defined as the unambiguous exertion of state power in 
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a territory or population. In his 1928 decision over the Island of Palmas, Max Huber 
further clarified effective control as the “continuous and peaceful display of State 
authority during a long period of time.”335 Effective control can be demonstrated by 
providing examples of governance on a territory. The landmark 1933 case over the Legal 
Status of Eastern Greenland, established a very low bar for a state to demonstrate 
effective control due to the remote and uninhabited nature of disputed islands. Among the 
ten decisions analyzed, clear demonstrations of effective control included the 
construction of public works on the island, state sponsored health care for the population, 
law enforcement, and criminal prosecution. Weaker, yet valid, examples of effective 
control included the regulation of air space over an island, the regulation of turtle egg 
collection, and the promise of placing a lighthouse on a maritime feature. As Brian 
Taylor Sumner observes, the low bar for demonstrating effective control combined with 
the requirement to demonstrate effective control provide perverse incentives for states to 
engage in expansionist and imperialistic behavior.336  
With an understanding that effective control was the primary means for 
establishing sovereignty over islands, Chapter III turned to examining three of China’s 
maritime disputes. This chapter’s case studies examined the dispute between China and 
Japan in the Senkaku Islands, the dispute between China and Vietnam in the Paracel 
islands, and the dispute between China and the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal. 
Each case study attempted to examine both sides’ sovereignty claim based on the 
demonstration of effective control. In the Senkaku Islands, Japan maintains de facto 
control over the islands. Some examples of Japanese effective control are the transfer and 
sale of one island in the chain from the Japanese government to a private citizen, the 
placement of sovereignty markers, the nationalization of the lighthouse on Senkaku 
Island, and repurchase of Senkaku Island from a private citizen back to the government 
of Japan. The Paracel Islands case is similar to the Senkaku Islands, however in this 
situation China has maintained de facto control over the islands since 1974. Examples of 
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Chinese on-island effective control are the construction public works, public health care, 
and stationing PLA forces on the islands. In the Scarborough Shoal, the Philippines 
demonstrated effective control in 1965 and 1997 by raising its flag on South Rock. Being 
that this maritime feature is mostly submerged it is difficult to exert effective control over 
the Scarborough Shoal. This physical limitation will prevent states from demonstrating 
strong forms of effective control on the rock.  
Chapter IV argues that Chinese legal warfare is a way for China to attempt to 
demonstrate effective control in its maritime disputes as well as show it is a status quo 
power. Chinese legal warfare rests on three arguments. First, it shows how China obeys 
the law. Second, it shows how an adversary violates the law. Finally it justifies actions 
when China violates the law.337 Much of Chinese legal warfare involves the attempt to 
demonstrate effective control. One attempt at demonstrating effective control is the 
creation of an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). In this case, 
China’s assertion of management of the air space over the Senkaku Islands is supported 
by a precedent seen in the Nicaragua v. Honduras case. In that case, the court ruled that 
Honduras’s control over national air space was a demonstration of effective control.338 
More importantly, the ADIZ prevents Japan from claiming it maintains undisputed 
sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. Here, legal warfare attempts to force Japan to 
acknowledge a dispute exists. Some of China’s use of legal warfare is, in contrast, backed 
up by the Sino-centric historic waters legal argument. For example, China maintains that 
maritime patrols off the coast of disputed islands are legitimate demonstrations of 
Chinese sovereignty over its “historic waters.” However, as case law repeatedly shows, 
maritime patrols do nothing to demonstrate effective control of territory. Therefore, 
China’s use of legal warfare to demonstrate effective control attempts to defend or 
enhance its claim to sovereignty regardless if its actions will be interpreted as such in an 
international court. Instead, the state must demonstrate effective control on land. This 
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important legal element was particularly important in the case study analysis of the 
Senkaku Islands and Scarborough Shoal (as mentioned above).  
Another example of legal warfare is China’s marine reclamation. China is 
constructing artificial islands out of submerged reefs. Five low tide elevations in the 
Spratly Islands (Gaven Reef, Johnson South Reef, Cuateron Reef, Kennan Island, and 
Burgos Islands) are being converted into artificial islands.339 Although reclamation of 
this nature is authorized within UNCLOS, UNCLOS only permits the construction of 
artificial islands within a state’s 200 nautical mile EEZ. Therefore, China constructs these 
artificial islands on the disputed assumption that the Spratly Islands reside within China’s 
EEZ.340  
B. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FRAMEWORKS 
To answer the second question, of which IR theory best explains China’s behavior 
in its maritime disputes, this thesis needed to identify the relationship between IR theories 
and international law. Chapter I discussed this relationship by comparing offensive 
realism, defensive realism, the English School of Realism, and liberal institutionalism. 
Both offensive realism and defensive realism argue that power, not international law, is 
the most influential factor in international relations. The English School of Realism 
additionally identifies basic rules and norms, like international law, as creating a society 
of states. Liberal institutionalism concludes that institutions, like international law or 
UNCLOS, provide benefits for members and raise the costs of acting against 
international norms. Therefore, in the latter two views, states constrain their behavior in 
order to maintain their membership within the society of states (in the case of the English 
School) or these institutions (in the case of liberal institutionalism). By establishing these 
four IR frameworks and their relationship to international law, this thesis examined 
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China’s actions in its maritime disputes in order to identify an IR framework that most 
likely describes China’s behavior.  
In the three maritime disputes analyzed here, China exerts or attempts to exert 
effective control. Effective control is attempted either through de facto control over the 
island or through the use of legal warfare. By using effective control, China demonstrates 
a level of adherence to international laws. In some cases, by using legal warfare and a 
quasi-legal argument, China attempts to justify its actions under the guise of international 
law. This section will examine the IR frameworks of liberal institutionalism, offensive 
realism, defensive realism, and the English School of realism to categorize China’s use of 
international law and legal warfare in its maritime disputes. The section will show 
offensive realism and the English School of Realism are two of the strongest IR 
frameworks that explain Chinese behavior related to its maritime disputes. In contrast, 
liberal institutionalism and defensive realism are two of the weakest IR frameworks to 
explain China’s behavior.  
1. Liberal Institutionalism 
Of all four IR frameworks, liberal institutionalism is probably the weakest 
explanation of Chinese behavior related to its maritime disputes. Liberal institutionalism 
expects that prospective benefits deriving from institutionalized cooperation among states 
should lead China to constrain its behavior so it can continue to participate and profit 
from these organizations.341 Some of China’s behavior conforms to this expectation. For 
example, China ratified UNCLOS and constructs its arguments within the rubric of 
international law. China uses international legal norms to defend its maritime claims. For 
example, China uses a customary international law argument to defend its Nine Dash 
Line. Customary international law is an internationally recognized approach to settling 
legal disputes. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice stipulates that 
the court will apply “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
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law.”342 However, many western legal scholars agree, that China’s use of a Sino-centric 
“historic waters” argument will probably not stand up in an international court of law. 
This is because, aside from the Paracel Islands, China failed to build a case that it 
historically exerted effective control over the claimed islands and rocks within the Nine 
Dash Line.343 Furthermore, as the 2006 Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago case clarified:  
Determining an international maritime boundary between two States on 
the basis of traditional fishing on the high seas by nationals of one of those 
States is altogether exceptional. Support for such a principle in customary 
and conventional international law is largely lacking.344  
Therefore, based on legal scholars and legal precedents, China’s Sino-centric historic 
waters argument, which rests on maritime activity, but not territorial control, will not 
likely stand up in court.  
In January 2013, the Philippines submitted the dispute over the Scarborough 
Shoal and Spratly Islands to ITLOS. In its Notification and Statement of Claim, the 
Philippines’s sought arbitration on China’s claims in the South China Sea, including a 
ruling on the validity of the Nine Dash Line, construction of artificial islands within the 
Spratly Island archipelago, infringement of the Philippine’s EEZ, and the denial of 
Philippine freedom of navigation within its EEZ. On 19 February 2013, China submitted 
a response to the Philippines’s Notification and Statement of Claim stating China 
opposed the arbitration and declined to participate in its proceedings. China could 
justifiably argue the case exceeds the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea (ITLOS) since the court must rule on the sovereignty of various maritime 
features in the South China Sea in order to render its verdict. Sovereignty determinations 
are outside the jurisdiction of ITLOS. Instead, the ICJ or PCA should hear the case to rule 
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on sovereignty. With that said, in accordance with Article 298 of UNCLOS, states are not 
required to consent to compulsory jurisdiction for dispute settlement related to 
determining sovereignty over certain insular maritime features. China’s position is that 
since the South China Sea case must rule on the sovereignty of maritime features, Article 
298 is active and China does not have to participate. In lieu of compulsory jurisdiction 
Article 298 requires states to use diplomacy to settle the dispute. However from the 
Philippines’s point of view, diplomacy has been exhausted and it has no other recourse 
except conflict or arbitration.345 
China has more to gain and little to lose by opting out of the arbitration. If China 
participated in the South China Sea arbitration, it would set a precedent whereby legal 
action and not bilateral negotiation could become the standard for resolving sovereignty 
disputes with the PRC. China is a party to many sovereignty disputes (both land and 
maritime), so China has a lot to lose by participating in arbitration when many other 
states could prefer arbitration than confronting Chinese power in bilateral negotation. 
Additionally, China has little to gain from participating in the arbitration. In accordance 
with Annex VII, Article 9 of UNCLOS, a party’s absence will not grant an automatic win 
to the disputing party. Article 9 stipulates the arbitrators will do their utmost to uphold a 
verdict based on fact and law. “Before making its award, the arbitral tribunal must satisfy 
itself not only that it has jurisdiction over the dispute but also that the claim is well 
founded in fact and law.”346 Therefore, China is counting on ITLOS to rule that the case 
is outside of its jurisdiction.347 If China was willing to settle its maritime disputes in a 
court, then it could be argued liberal institutionalism provided the best explanation of 
China’s behavior. China would accept the liberal institutions to maintain peace and 
stability within the international system. However, this is not the case. Although China 
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willingly participates in arbitration in the World Trade Organization, it is unwilling to do 
the same in issues related to sovereignty.348  
Another example of China operating outside the confines of liberal institutions is 
its violation of China’s-ASEAN’s 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the 
South China Sea. As discussed in Chapter IV, the signatories of the Declaration on 
Conduct (which China signed in 2002) agreed not to “complicate or escalate” the 
disputes by inhabiting previously uninhabited maritime features.349 Arguably, China’s 
reclamation and conversion of submerged features into habitable artificial islands on 
Gaven Reef, Johnson South Reef, Cuateron Reef, Kennan Island, and Burgos Islands are 
evidence that China is not conforming to the China’s-ASEAN’s 2002 Declaration.350 As 
a consensus based organization ASEAN did not place any punitive language or sanctions 
in its Declaration on the Conduct. However, the intent of the Declaration on the Conduct 
was to maintain a status quo and dissuade any escalation. China’s recent construction 
efforts arguably upset the 2002 status quo.  
Using observed Chinese behavior as evidence, China does not fully conform to 
liberal institutionalism in its maritime disputes. China is willing to operate outside some 
norms and institutions despite the incentives afforded by cooperation within international 
or multilateral institutions. Although China pays some heed to international law, it opts 
out of UNCLOS arbitral dispute settlement with the Philippines and dismisses provisions 
established in China’s-ASEAN’s 2002 Declaration.  
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2. Offensive Realism 
Offensive realism provides the second strongest IR framework to explain China’s 
behavior related to its maritime disputes. John Mearshimer proposes an offensive realist 
explanation of China’s behavior in his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. 
Mearsheimer states that China’s strategic calculus may not currently favor an exercise of 
power. China may desire to be a regional hegemon capable of instituting an East Asian 
version of the Monroe Doctrine. However, the timing and a corresponding reduction in 
U.S. power has not occurred to allow China to rise. Instead, China is building strength, 
waiting for the opportune time to exert its power. Due to the presence and strength of the 
United States, China does not maintain a clear power advantage to act as it wills within 
the region. Therefore, China’s behavior may be explained by offensive realism, however 
the timing to exert that power has not come up.351  
With respect to China’s use of legal warfare, offensive realism does not entirely 
dismiss international law when it favors the state. If a state’s actions are supported by a 
legal justification, the state will not disregard justifying its actions under law when it can 
deliver an advantage. Therefore, China’s use of legal warfare, particularly the use of non-
lethal force backed up by quasi-legal arguments, could be interpreted as incremental, 
small-scale, offensive realism. The use of maritime patrols and island reclamation are 
examples that suggest China uses a low level of hard power, backed up under the 
auspices of international law. In other words, China’s quasi-legal arguments provide a 
legal pretense for China to act aggressively and cite international law while doing so. 
Additionally, as Brian Taylor Sumner raised, legal precedents in international courts 
emphasize the demonstration of effective control can lead to perverse incentives for states 
to conduct imperialistic land grabs.352 It can be argued China’s conversion of low tide 
elevations into man-made islands are imperialistic land grabs under the guise of 
international law. Therefore, this particular nuanced explanation using offensive realism 
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is one of the stronger IR explanations of China’s behavior related to its maritime 
disputes.  
 Offensive realism, however does not explain fully China’s behavior in its 
maritime disputes. Two pieces of evidence in particular fail to support offensive realist 
expectations. The first piece of evidence that China’s behavior is contrary to offensive 
realism relates to its dispute with Vietnam. China maintains a clear power advantage over 
Vietnam, yet does not take advantage of it. The second situation that offensive realism 
cannot explain is the conversion of submerged features into artificial islands, or what is 
known as the “Island Factory”. Why would a state expend resources in order to bolster a 
legal argument when power, not international law, is the preeminent force in geopolitics? 
Conversely, the evidence that China’s behavior supports offensive realism is that China’s 
strategic calculus does not endorse action because of the presence of the United States in 
the region. Similarly, China’s use of legal warfare, if seen as a small scale land grab 
merely justified under the auspices of international law, would support offensive realism.  
If China’s behavior in its maritime disputes were based on an offensive realist 
calculus, China would use power in situations where it held a clear advantage. Currently, 
China has a power advantage over Vietnam. Vietnam possesses a weak military in 
contrast to China’s military. In 2012 China expended between 1.99% and 4% of its GDP 
on defense. This equates to between $221 billion to $247 billion spent on the Chinese 
military.353 In contrast, in 2012, Vietnam spent between 2.37% and 2.39% of its much 
smaller GDP on defense for a total between $3.3 billion and $8.08 billion on its own 
military. This means Vietnam spends between 1.3% and 3.7% of what China spends on 
its military.354 Therefore, based on military spending alone, Vietnam’s military is 
comparatively weak relative to China’s military. Another area where China is more 
powerful than Vietnam is in economy. Vietnam is economically dependent on China 
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because of its trade deficit. In 2013, Vietnam’s trade deficit with China was between 
$17.4 billion and $23.4 billion. This means China should dictate terms to a vulnerable 
Vietnam.355  
In the relationship between Vietnam and China, China holds a clear power 
advantage. Therefore, in accordance with offensive realism, China’s expected behavior 
related to its maritime disputes with Vietnam should resemble the 1974 Paracel Islands 
invasion. In that year, China successfully occupied the Paracel Islands. However, China 
does not behave that way toward Vietnam. Instead, China’s behavior is rooted in low 
intensity conflict and legal warfare. When the Chinese oil exploration rig HD-981 
showed up in the waters off of Vietnam’s coast, the oil rig was not escorted by a flotilla 
of naval combatants ready to sink approaching Vietnamese vessels. Instead, Chinese 
Coast Guard Vessels escorted the oil rig. Instead of using lethal force to confront 
Vietnamese Coast Guard Vessels, the Chinese Coast Guard used non-lethal force. With a 
40 year history of conflict and war between both nations, intentional collisions at sea are 
preferable to the use of lethal force. With the power disparity between Vietnam and 
China, combined with the lack of a security agreement with the United States, offensive 
realists would expect to see more coercive behavior against Vietnam despite international 
condemnation. Yet this behavior is not observed.  
The second example of China’s behavior in its maritime disputes that offensive 
realism does not explain satisfactorily is the case of the Chinese “Island Factory.”356 
Offensive realism pays little heed to the effects of international law on the international 
system. Powerful states do what they will regardless of international law. Yet, by creating 
man-made islands in the Spratly Chain, China attempts to solidify its legal claim to 
various submerged features by exerting effective control over the artificial island. China 
attempts to demonstrate effective control over submerged features by converting former 
shoals and reefs into man-made islands. An offensive realist would not expect such a 
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regionally militarily powerful state to go through this much trouble to bolster a legal 
claim.  
In conclusion, the IR framework of offensive realism partially explains China’s 
behavior in its maritime disputes. It can be argued China’s behavior does not fall into 
offensive realism because it does not use power in the case against Vietnam, where it 
maintains a clear power advantage. China’s construction of artificial islands to bolster a 
legal claim does not support offensive realism since realism identifies power and not 
international law as the primary factor influencing states. As a result, offensive realism is 
not an ideal framework to explain China’s behavior in its maritime disputes. However, 
the nuanced argument that Chinese expansionist and power-maximizing behavior is 
disguised by legal warfare is a subtle but compelling argument that supports offensive 
realism.   
3. Defensive Realism 
Defensive realism is a weak and non-compelling IR framework to explain 
Chinese behavior related to its maritime disputes. In defensive realism, states pursue 
security, rather than power, in an anarchic world. To ensure security, states should act in 
moderation to prevent instigating security dilemmas and to prevent opponents from 
balancing against itself. Therefore the question must be asked, does China’s behavior in 
its maritime disputes ensure security or jeopardize it? By examining the reactions of 
opposing claimants in the three maritime disputes, it is evident Chinese behavior creates 
distrust leading to security dilemmas and counterbalancing. Therefore, defensive realism 
does not fully explain Chinese behavior related to its maritime disputes. Although non-
lethal, China’s behavior over its maritime disputes pushes states to balance against it and 
inadvertently causes regional security dilemmas. This is evident in ASEAN’s behavior, 
regional bandwagoning with the United States, and regional maritime security 
modernization.  
a. ASEAN 
In reaction to Chinese violations of China’s-ASEAN’s “Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” and escalating tensions between China and 
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Vietnam, during the 2014 ASEAN meeting member states released a watered down joint 
statement to calm tensions in the South China Sea. Although the language of the joint 
statement was insipid, South East Asian scholar Carl Thayer noted that the unusual act of 
releasing a statement separate from the summary proceedings indicated unity among non-
Chinese member states against Chinese escalatory behavior. “It highlights ASEAN unity 
on the fact that ongoing developments in the South China Sea are a source of serious 
concern because they have raised tensions.”357 The fact that member states made a 
separately released comment specifically addressing escalating tensions against one of its 
members is a subtle indicator of anti-China balancing in a consensus based organization 
like ASEAN. This is particularly relevant since two member nations specifically 
Cambodia and Myanmar are Chinese allies. 358  
b. Philippines 
As China maintains its presence in the Scarborough Shoal, the Philippines drew 
closer to its ally, with the United States. During his visit to the Philippines in December 
2013, Secretary of State John Kerry promised $40 million in maritime security 
assistance.359 Later, in April of 2014, the Philippines and the United States agreed to the 
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. The agreement continued the existing 
military-to-military cooperation and training related to counterterrorism operations. More 
importantly, in reaction to escalating tensions in the South China Sea, the agreement 
promised to “assist the Philippine Coast Guard in assuming increased responsibility for 
enhancing information sharing and interagency coordination in maritime security 
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operations.”360 Although the United States and the Philippines already maintain a security 
alliance, addressing deficiencies in the Philippine Coast Guard appears to be a direct 
reaction to Chinese Coast Guard operations in the Scarborough Shoal.  
c. Vietnam 
Vietnam looked past history and ideology and warmed to the United States as a 
way to balance against China. Bilateral relations have healed since initial rapprochement 
in 1995. By 2011, both states were comfortable enough to sign a Memorandum of 
Understanding for defense cooperation. The Memorandum promised high-ranking 
dialogue and cooperation in military operations, such as search-and-rescue and 
peacekeeping. As a way to counter the Chinese Coast Guard, in December 2013, 
Secretary of State John Kerry committed to bilateral assistance to augment the 
Vietnamese Coast Guard with five patrol boats and an additional $18 million in 
assistance. Additionally, Vietnamese Defense Minister Gen. Phùng Quang Thanh 
extended an open invitation for U.S. ships, including military vessels, to utilize Cam 
Ranh Bay for repairs. The United States has also offered the Trans-Pacific Partnership to 
Vietnam as a way to counterbalance the trade deficit Vietnam runs with China.361  
Although Vietnam is far from achieving military parity with China, it has begun 
to modernize its navy around lethal anti-ship cruise missile vessels. In 2014 Vietnam 
received the first of six Kilo Class submarines from Russia. This variant of Kilo class 
submarine is capable of firing the SS-N-27 Sizzler anti-ship cruise missile. Along with 
the submarines, Vietnam has also purchased state of the art Gepard class frigates from 
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Russia and Sigma class corvettes from the Netherlands. The Gepard class frigate is 
capable of carrying the long range SS-N-25 Switchblade anti-ship cruise missile while the 
Sigma class corvette can fire the Exocet anti-ship cruise missile. Vietnam is also looking 
at upgrading its fleet of guided missile patrol boats with some of the most advanced 
Russian anti-ship cruise missiles, including the supersonic SS-N-22 Sunburn anti-ship 
cruise missile. A navy built around state-of-the-art, long-range, anti-ship cruise missiles 
ensures Vietnam is capable of waging a survivable guerre de course against Chinese 
shipping transiting through the South China Sea.362 Vietnam’s recently timed military 
modernization and bandwagoning with the United States is most likely a reaction to 
increasing insecurity pressures from China. If true, Chinese behavior in the South China 
Sea is specifically driving Vietnam’s naval purchases and U.S. maritime security 
cooperation.  
d. Japan 
In the case of Japan, China’s behavior using maritime patrols has created informal 
Japanese alliances with the Philippines and Vietnam. As discussed in Chapter IV, Japan 
is selling Vietnam and the Philippines coast guard vessels to aid in countering China’s 
Coast Guard. Therefore, China’s use of maritime law enforcement has caused a Coast 
Guard version of security competition. The informal alliance between Japan, Vietnam, 
and the Philippines provides evidence that territorial claimants are banding together to 
balance against China.363  
One question that needs to be asked is why China’s neighbors interpret Chinese 
behavior as expansionist. The answer can be found in international law. Recalling the 
precedent established in the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, the bar for establishing 
effective control on remote islands is very low. PCA, PCIJ, and ICJ decisions reinforce 
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this standard. The geopolitical consequence of this legal standard leads states down a path 
toward miscalculating neighboring states’ intensions. A single unprotested maritime 
patrol or an ADIZ is interpreted as a major threat to sovereignty leading to security 
dilemmas and balancing. For a defensive realist, maritime disputes are a nightmarish 
environment for misinterpretation and unintended escalation.  
In reaction to perceived aggressive behavior, many of its neighbors are balancing 
against China by strengthening ties with the United States or with other maritime 
claimants. In the case of Vietnam and the Philippines, both countries leveraged the 
United States to aid in balancing against China. Additionally, both states are willing 
recipients of maritime security assistance receiving $18 million and $40 million 
respectively. This aid funds maritime security modernization programs in both countries. 
Additionally, regional security ties with Japan have grown in order to balance against 
China. Vietnam’s military modernization also appears to be a reaction to perceived 
Chinese aggression in the South China Sea.  
Defensive realism does not adequately describe China’s behavior related to its 
maritime disputes, though it does explain the reactions of Vietnam, the Philippines and 
Japan. In the defensive realist framework, China should avoid actions to drive states to 
balance against itself. Additionally, it should steer clear of behavior to create security 
dilemmas. China’s maritime neighbors clearly are attempting to balance against China. 
Chinese behavior is causing distrust. Although China can make a case that its behavior is 
a response to Japanese and Philippine maritime patrols, or Vietnamese outpost 
construction throughout the Spratly Islands, a perception gap clouds cognitive 
interpretations of which state initiates aggression and which state maintains the status 
quo.  
This perception gap drives tensions related to the maritime disputes. Japan, 
Vietnam, and the Philippines perceive that China is the destabilizing expansionist force in 
East Asia. After all, China is a growing authoritarian power that has undergone an 
aggressive military modernization. It recently declared and enforced an ADIZ over the 
East China Sea. It frequently conducts maritime patrols and prevents Vietnamese and 
Philippine citizens from fishing or sailing in their own EEZ. China also constructs 
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artificial islands in the Spratly Archipelago. However, China argues all of its actions are a 
reaction to the destabilizing security environment surrounding itself. An ADIZ is a 
reaction to defend itself when it is surrounded by two American allies with well-
established ADIZs. The maritime patrols are a defensive reaction to Vietnamese and 
Philippine maritime patrols that have arrested or endangered Chinese fishermen sailing in 
historic Chinese waters. China’s construction of artificial islands is a reaction to 
Vietnamese and Philippine construction on islands in the Spratly Archipelago. From a 
Chinese perspective it is merely reacting to belligerent neighbors. In many cases, China 
was not the first to initiate the perceived conflict.364  
4. English School of Realism 
The English School of Realism is the strongest IR framework to explain China’s 
behavior related to its maritime disputes while incorporating its use of legal warfare. 
English School scholar Hedley Bull argues that states observe three sets of rules that 
uphold the international order. The first set is the maintenance of a society of states, and 
establishes territorial sovereignty as the central principle for maintaining international 
order.365 The second set establishes the rules of coexistence. This rule both restricts and 
legitimizes the use of violence between states, it establishes international law and 
diplomacy as means of settling disputes, and it limits the scope and aims of armed 
conflict.366 In the context of its maritime disputes, China adheres to the rules of co-
existence, as a state party to UNCLOS. China is a signatory to UNCLOS and adheres to 
most of its rules. For the most part, China does not violate the territorial waters of the 
Japanese home islands, the Koreas, or even Taiwan. China also respects the sovereignty 
of other claimants. For example, China has not acted to remove states from territory it 
claims. Although it claims the entirety of the territory within the Nine Dash Line, China 
has not violently removed states from islands within the Nine Dash Line since 1974. 
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China also restrains its military behavior, despite being a regional military power. The 
third English School set of rules, cooperation rules, regulate the agreements and 
cooperation between states beyond mere coexistence, such as trade relations, 
environmental cooperation and human rights. For example, China is a member of the 
World Trade Organization. It enjoys the benefits of membership, and even participates in 
arbitration.  
Among the coexistence rules within the English School of Realism, however, 
China appears to be attempting to reinterpret or revise the determination of sovereignty 
over maritime claims. Such reinterpretation of rules and norms is also explained by Bull. 
In an anarchical system, states are left to interpret the rules on their own. Bull argues 
states can take advantage of rules in a self-help system:  
States undertake the task of legitimizing the rules, in the sense of 
promoting the acceptance of them as valuable in their own right, by 
employing their powers of persuasion and propaganda to mobilize support 
for them in world politics as a whole.367  
In many ways, legal warfare seems to parallel this English School idea. The English 
School explains states adjust and redefine the rules to their advantage by stating that, 
“states change the old rules by violating or ignoring them systematically enough to 
demonstrate that they have withdrawn their consent to them.”368 China argues that the 
Sino-centric historic waters argument is a valid argument based in customary 
international law. By repeatedly using this argument, China seeks to change the relevance 
of effective control over land as the determinative factor on how sovereignty is resolved. 
In lieu of effective control over land, China seeks to replace this norm with the principle 
that China was (and is) the pre-eminent power of East Asia and historic demonstrations 
of effective control over the water is sufficient validation of China’s claim to the islands 
and waters of East Asia. Legal warfare is also one of the “three warfares,” along with 
media warfare and psychological warfare. Therefore the application of the “three 
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warfares” seems to parallel Bull’s idea of “employing their powers of persuasion and 
propaganda to mobilize support for them in world politics as a whole.”369 
Of all the IR frameworks, the English School of Realism appears to best explain 
China’s behavior related to its maritime disputes. The English School accounts for 
China’s behavior in accordance with international law and respect for sovereignty. It also 
explains China’s variation from the norms established in UNCLOS and use of legal 
warfare as a way to change the manner in which sovereignty is determined.  
C. CONCLUSION 
The English School of Realism provides the most comprehensive explanation of 
China’s behavior related to its maritime disputes. This IR theory addresses China’s 
adherence to some international norms and laws, while it attempts to redefine other 
international norms, particularly with respect to determining sovereignty. China does not 
adhere to liberal institutionalism because it does not participate in international court 
resolution or arbitration and maintains a self-serving contradictory interpretation of 
UNCLOS. Offensive realism, as discussed above, is not the strongest framework for 
explaining Chinese behavior in its maritime disputes. First, although China maintains a 
clear power advantage over Vietnam, offensive realism suggests it should take advantage 
of Vietnamese weakness by taking Vietnamese-held islands throughout the South China 
Sea. However China has not done so, and shows no indication of doing so in the 
immediate future. Second, offensive realists believe power and not international law is 
the most influential factor in geopolitics. Yet, China expends a significant amount of 
resources to bolster a legal claim by constructing artificial islands in the South China Sea. 
However, a nuanced offensive realist explanation shows China’s expansionist and power-
seeking behavior can be disguised as status quo behavior that is justified under the 
auspices of international law through the use of legal warfare. Therefore, offensive 
realism does provide one possible explanation for Chinese behavior. Defensive realism is 
also not an adequate explanation of China’s behavior in its maritime disputes. Instead of 
increasing its security, China’s behavior triggers security dilemmas and counterbalancing 
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throughout the region. Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines use the United States to 
balance against China. Vietnam most likely initiated a naval modernization as a response 
to China’s overwhelming naval strength.  
This thesis suggests two additional areas for further research. First, with respect to 
realist theories of international relations, more can be done to incorporate domestic 
factors and external perceptions into explaining China’s behavior. Second, in order to 
evaluate the claims by those, such as Dean Cheng and Sangkuk Lee, who argue that 
Chinese scholars are active participants in legal warfare and media warfare, more 
research is needed. Research should investigate the disparity between scholarly articles 
written by Chinese scholars and western scholars.370 Are Chinese scholars active 
participants in the “Three Warfares”? Anecdotally, when researching this thesis, it was 
apparent Chinese legal scholars overwhelmingly write to justify the legal case supporting 
the Nine Dash Line. Some of these articles are written on flimsy evidence and 
assumptions. The majority of western scholars, on the other hand, write in opposition to 
the Nine Dash Line. The answer would shed light on whether Chinese scholars are 
victims of groupthink that ultimately influences Chinese foreign policy, and what might 
be done to break down cognitive barriers to each side’s arguments. In the end, more 
research can be done to prove or disprove this idea.  
 
 
                                                 
370 Cheng, “Winning without Fighting,” 6; Lee, “China’s ‘Three Warfares’: Origins, Applications, and 
Organizations,” 214. 
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